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ABSTRACT
DANGEROUS KNOWLEDGE? MORALITY AND
MORAL PROGRESS AFTER NATURALISM

Daniel Diederich Farmer, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2014

From the perspective of at least some of our valuing practices, the advance of the
sciences can seem to constitute a threat. The question I take up in this dissertation is
whether or not naturalism—understood as the picture of the world and of ourselves
bequeathed to us by the sciences—should be understood as a threat to our moral
practices, to moral living. On the account I defend, the knowledge we gain from
empirical inquiry need not undermine moral living in toto, although a naturalistic mindset
does raise some possibly dangerous questions for particular inherited moral norms and
ideals.
In defense of my claim that the examined life need not destroy the moral life, I
develop a social view of morality. On this view, both moral authority and moral
justification are viewed as fundamentally social phenomena, and morality itself as a tool
for social living. With a case study on the development of the ethics of care, I illustrate
ways in which a concern for empirically truthful representations of humanity can also
dovetail with liberatory political concerns. That is, I defend not only the claim that moral
living can survive critical scrutiny, but also the claim that it can be enriched by this
scrutiny—that the truth can be transformative.
Expansive moral ideals, such as those humanist views that see progress in the
expansion of our moral vocabularies and institutions, are compatible with a naturalistic
outlook, I argue. However, a strong defense of humanist views, according to which such
ideals flow unproblematically from the nature of reason or from the history of ethical
practice, does not seem possible. A weak defense of humanism, which connects the ideals
of humanists to more widely held values, seems more promising. In working socially and
politically for their cause, I contend that humanists in some sense have the truth on their
side: sexist, racist, classist, or otherwise inegalitarian views regularly trade in falsehoods
and obfuscation. Empirically truthful accounts of particular inherited norms and ideals
thus continue to be dangerous, at least for those invested in the continued existence of the
corresponding institutions.

i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Daniel Diederich Farmer, B.A., M.A.

I am very grateful to my committee for inspiring me and for supporting my work
on this project: to Margaret Walker, for patiently steering me in fruitful directions; to
Nancy Snow, for consistently direct and consistently helpful comments; to Theresa
Tobin, for introducing me to feminism and feminist ethics; and to Kevin Gibson, for the
big picture. For their camaraderie, their thoughtfulness, and our many thought-provoking
conversations, I thank my fellow Marquette philosophy graduate students, and Celeste
Harvey Gustafson, Trevor Smith, and Chad Kleist in particular. I also want to thank the
Philosophy Department for nominating me for the Schmitt fellowship, which I received
in the 2011-2012 school year. I am grateful to the friends and family members who cared
for my children while I worked on the dissertation: Rebecca Keiser, Rachel Stolpe, and
Lisa Diederich especially. Finally and most importantly, I am infinitely grateful to my
wife and partner Nicole Elisabeth Farmer, whose support every step of the way has meant
the world to me.

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER
I. NATURALISM AND SKEPTICISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
What We Know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
How the World Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
What Must Disappear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Morality after Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Optimistic View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Preemptive Adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Skeptical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Mortality and Moral Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Evolutionary Skepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Fictionalism and Abolitionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
II. PICTURING MORALITY AFTER DARWIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2. Joyce’s Master Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Practical Clout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
The Evolution of Conscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

iii
Usefulness and Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Non-Cognitivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
The Failure of Moral Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Joyce’s Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3. Revisiting Moral Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Two Sources of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Convention and Convention-Transcendence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
The Moral-Conventional Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4. Transparency and Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Pictures of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Opacity and Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Moral Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
III. MORAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE ETHICS OF CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2. The Ethics of Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A Different Voice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Feminine Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Maternal Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Intersectionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Meeting Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3. An Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Feminist Skepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

iv
Moral Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
IV. THE ROLE OF REASON IN MORAL PROGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2. Singer on Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Sociobiology and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Choosing Rationally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Expanding Sympathies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Singer’s Five Theses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3. The Rational Altruism Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Beyond Biology? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Indirect Reciprocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Reason as a Psychological Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
The Social Activation of Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4. The Rational Foundation Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Why Reason? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
The Default Utilitarianism Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
The Normative Truth Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Reasons for Whom? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
V. THE CASE FOR UTOPIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

v
2. Pragmatic Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
The Ethical Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Functions, Ethics, and Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Utopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3. Against Functionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
The Original Function of Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Functions, Problems, and Personal Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
4. Defending Utopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Dealing with Skeptics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Justifying Utopia to Whom? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Power, Politics, and Bullying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5. Moral Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Axes of Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Progress and Human Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Truthfulness and Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

1
INTRODUCTION

Is it possible both to live clear-sightedly, that is, to fully grasp, embrace, and
internalize a scientific and especially evolutionary understanding of our world and of
ourselves while simultaneously taking morality seriously? That is the question I wrestle
with in this dissertation. The answer that I defend is: yes, it is possible.
In chapter one, I outline my understanding of science as an empirical project, and
of naturalism as a scientific worldview. I suggest that naturalism is a challenge to our
valuing practices. While some moral philosophers appear optimistic and unperturbed, I
argue that more pessimistic views deserve a hearing. I caution against a whole-hearted
embrace of moral skepticism, however, because of its probable pernicious social and
political effects. This is not intended as a philosophical criticism, for moral skepticism
could be socially pernicious and yet still be true, in some sense. Rather, it motivates my
search for a naturalistically respectable understanding of morality that can directly face
the strongest scientifically inspired skeptical arguments.
Specifically, my goal is to articulate a picture of morality that meets three broad
conditions. It must (1) fit well with what we’ve learned about human beings from the
sciences, and especially evolutionary biology and psychology, (2) provide grounds for
resistance to skepticism, and (3) adequately capture the possibility of progressive change.
Thus, with the exception of chapter three, the chapters that follow engage with
philosophers whose work explicitly aims to fulfill condition (1). In so doing, however,
they fall afoul—intentionally or unintentionally—of either condition (2) or condition (3).
Accordingly, my own account aims first to identify their mistakes and then to rectify
them. (The relevance of the ethics of care to this project lies in its illustration of the
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critical, transformative, and progressive potential of empirically informed inquiry for
inherited moral norms and ideals.)
In chapter two, I tackle head on what I take to be the strongest formulation of
evolutionary moral skepticism: Richard Joyce’s argument in The Evolution of Morality.1
On Joyce’s account, we take moral norms seriously because of natural selection for the
tendency to view biologically important social norms as having convention-transcendent
importance, authority, or “clout.” Appreciating this fact about the evolutionary genealogy
of morals, Joyce argues, means seeing our moral beliefs as evolutionarily useful
falsehoods. I argue that Joyce misses the possibility of seeing moral authority as a social
phenomenon, and morality itself in a social light. I develop what I call a social view of
morality according to which moral life can be lived transparently. That account turns
back Joyce’s concerns about the epistemic justification of our moral beliefs with a social
account of moral justification.
In chapter three, I present a case study on moral justification through a brief
history of the emergence and development of the ethics of care. By tracing the evolution
of philosophical and feminist thought on care, I show how a moral and political concern
for self-determination and self-representation (in particular, the self-determination and
self-representation of women) can dovetail with an empirical concern for truthfulness in
our theories. The evolution of the ethics of care, I suggest, can be read as driven by a
concern for the empirical adequacy of representations of women, each new correction to
our conception of care driven by the desire to rectify politically harmful empirical
oversights in preceding conceptions. This case study illustrates how the process of

1

Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006).
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justifying ourselves to each other in shared terms—the process and practice of moral
justification—can be driven by the same kinds of concerns that lead Joyce to worry about
the epistemic justification of our moral beliefs. It illustrates how our moral beliefs can be
justified against the background of increasingly detailed or accurate (truthful) pictures of
humanity.
In chapter four, I provide an in-depth critique of Peter Singer’s recently
refurbished account of progress in The Expanding Circle.2 Moral progress occurs,
according to Singer, when our moral categories and institutions expand—when those who
had been previously excluded come to be included in our moral horizons. I take it for
granted that the examples Singer has in mind count as progress. That is not the target of
my critique. The target of my critique is Singer’s claim that reason plays (and has played)
a unique role in driving moral progress. Although Singer is to be praised for his early
engagement with evolutionary biology and psychology, his ethical arguments are
problematic. In addition to missing important developments in the study of the evolution
of altruism, Singer at several points underemphasizes the relevance of social, political,
economic, and ecological factors in the expansion of our moral horizons. The result is not
that reason is shown to be irrelevant to moral progress; rather, it is just that reason alone
can hardly be said to lead the charge. I emphasize in particular the role of social exchange
and social pressure in the transformation of sociomoral norms.
In chapter five, I take up Philip Kitcher’s recent account of moral progress in The
Ethical Project.3 Kitcher’s account is more subtle than Singer’s, and my critique is

2

Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress, second edition (Princeton
University Press, 2011). The first edition was published in 1981.
3
Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project (Harvard University Press, 2011).
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accordingly more modest in scope. Like Singer, Kitcher attempts in his own way to plot
moral progress on a single axis. Reason is not leading us up to an ever more impartial
point of view; rather, moral practice inherits the ethical functions unwittingly designed by
our ancestors. Ethics is thus a kind of social technology, and progress consists in the
more successful discharging of its functions (a social achievement). In spite of its appeal
and sophistication, I argue that ethical functionalism cannot do for Kitcher what he
hopes. In particular, it cannot provide any objectivity for a secular, humanist picture of
progress. But this does not mean that expansive moral ideals cannot be made
naturalistically respectable, so to speak. The humanist naturalist can offer what I call a
weak defense of humanist commitments, the details of which I explore briefly at the close
of the chapter. Further, Kitcher’s vision of Utopia can remain a goal for humanists, I
contend. But the method by which Kitcher hopes to justify Utopia—an imagined global
conversation under ideal epistemic and affective conditions—must be translated, as much
as is possible, into concrete social and political action. This can lead to sociomoral
change that counts as progress (progress in our moralities) in a variety of ways.
The social view of morality I articulate and my defense of the meaningfulness of
talk of progress in our moralities provide the heart of a critical compatibilist account of
the relationship between moral living and naturalism. My account is compatibilist
because it allows for the reconciliation of the examined life with the moral life. My
account is critical because not all moral norms and ideals can be justified once the reality
of their social production has been made apparent.
It is possible, I argue in this dissertation, to reconcile naturalism and moral living.
Thus the knowledge provided to us by the sciences need not be morally dangerous.

5
Throughout the dissertation, however, I hint at a more constructive danger posed by
certain forms of knowledge: the danger for those who hold oppressive moral structures in
place posed by the understanding that those moral structures are held in place by mere
human beings. If, as I believe, our moralities are social constructs, designed knowingly or
unknowingly by human beings, then they can be deconstructed and reconstructed by
other human beings. For those of us whose basic needs and desires are left unmet under
the current moral regime, the danger posed by this understanding is very welcome news.
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CHAPTER ONE

NATURALISM AND SKEPTICISM

1. Introduction

The past few centuries have been marked by a tremendous growth in human
knowledge. The shared pool of knowledge is growing, and access to that pool is growing
as well. Speaking very generally, we can say that sustained empirical inquiry, organized
in discrete projects of various sorts, has produced increasingly accurate, increasingly
truthful, maps of the world. Science can thus be thought of as an empirical project,
encompassing all those individual projects that aim to produce truthful maps of some
subset of the world.
Though its refinement is ongoing, what has clearly emerged as a result of our
empirical engagement with the world is a coherent picture of nature, and of humanity
itself as a part of nature. From a philosophical perspective, what is noteworthy about our
best scientific engagements with the world is that they seem to be mapping one world.
Our maps may be as a diverse as our forms of interaction with the world, but the world
itself does not call for two kinds of maps: some for a natural realm, and others for a
super-natural realm. We may say then, that our emerging picture or map of reality is
naturalistic. As clarity has been gained on a variety of phenomena, from the formation of
the planets to the water cycle, from the biological mechanisms of reproduction to the
outlines of the human psychological profile, various spirits and life-forces have
effectively been exorcized from our maps of reality. Our explorations of nature have
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made a notion of the super-natural unnecessary. I shall call this picture of reality
naturalism.4
Naturalism, understood in this way, is simultaneously promising and challenging.
It offers the promise of improved understanding, of satisfaction for our fundamental
desire to know and to understand. But by improving upon and thereby discrediting older
maps of nature and of humanity, it also challenges deeply held convictions about what
matters and who we are. Many naturalists, for example, take traditional religion to be in
some sense outdated, embodying prescientific assumptions and forms of thought.
(Religious believers, as a result, have not been eager to embrace naturalism.) The
question that occupies us in this and subsequent chapters is whether morality can survive
the metaphorical onslaught, or whether, like the mythological dragons on the edge of an
incomplete map, it must eventually be banished from a complete understanding of the
world.
Moral philosophers are divided on this question. Some argue the natural and
social sciences will enrich moral belief and practice, while others argue the sciences
largely problematize moral belief and practice. There is something to be said for each
perspective. In what follows I give a hearing to both sides. An initial concession must be
made, I claim, to the skeptical or pessimistic side. That concession follows from the
functional godlessness of naturalism: whatever authority morality might have, it cannot

4

Non-naturalists might reject this “two-world” picture of their view, I suppose. But if they view the work
of gods, spirits, or other occult forces as immanent in nature, their hypotheses must be amenable to
empirical inquiry, and to falsification. Naturalism, taken as the view that (as far as we can tell) there exists
only the one world investigated by science, rules out elaborate hypotheses about what allegedly
“transcends” nature on epistemological grounds (for how can we know about what is beyond nature?), and
it rules out elaborate hypotheses about forces immanent in nature on evidential grounds (there is no
evidence for karma, for demons, for abduction-prone extra-terrestrial visitors, etc.). As good empiricists
however, naturalists can and should remain open to new evidence, should it become available.
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be the divine authority commonly ascribed to it. Having conceded this point, I hope to
show that we still have reason to salvage some conception of moral authority. The point
is a negative one: that adopting a full-blown moral skepticism entails a socially noxious
detachment from moral life. Of course, the possible consequences of adopting a view
have no bearing on whether or not the view is true. But by showing that we have reason
not to want global skepticism to be true, I hope to motivate, if only indirectly, the positive
work that follows.
2. Naturalism
What We Know5

The known universe is roughly fifteen billion years old. It is expanding at a
measurable rate and seems to have had its beginning in the sudden and rapid expansion of
a dense and inconceivably hot singularity. The energy from this primordial “explosion,”
in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, has ever since become
increasingly disorganized on the whole. Various clumps and pockets of matter throughout
the universe however, have reached relatively impressive levels of organization, forming

5

I help myself in what follows to the (always provisional) conclusions of various contemporary scientists,
science writers, and philosophers. For cosmology and physics, Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos:
Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality (Vintage, 2005), esp. part III. For evolutionary biology and
psychology, Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder
(Houghton Mifflin, 1998); Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of
Life (Touchstone, 1996); Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language (Harvard
University Press, 1998); Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology
(Pantheon, 1994); Carl Zimmer, Evolution: The Triumph of an Idea (Harper, 2002); for geography and
ecology, Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (W. W. Norton, 1997);
Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (Pantheon, 2000). The language I use for talking
about science is inspired in part by Philip Kitcher, Science in a Democratic Society (Prometheus, 2011),
Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge University Press,
1999), and Miriam Solomon, Social Empiricism (MIT Press, 2001). I am grateful to Theresa Tobin for
pointing me to Solomon’s work.
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innumerable supernovae, galaxies, stars, and planets—including our own. This sets the
stage, under certain conditions, for the emergence of life.
In biological systems on Earth, genetic mutation, though random, occurs at a
somewhat steady rate. When these mutations generate well-adapted phenotypes, life
proliferates. Under various conditions, but also and especially when an ecological niche
reaches its limits, a kind of natural selection occurs, such that genes coding for adaptive
traits—and with them, their biological “hosts”—do better than genes coding for less
adaptive traits. All the evidence indicates that selective pressures operating on natural
occurring diversity explain both the structure of biological organisms on Earth and their
distribution across the globe. This evolutionary framework helps explain the presence of
our species on this planet, as well as our various physical and mental traits. Our genes tell
the story of our continuity with nature.
We parted ways with our closest evolutionary cousins, the chimpanzee and the
bonobo, some seven million years ago. Having branched away from the other Great
Apes, our ancestors were most likely hunters and gatherers for the longer part of the
evolution of our species. They spread out across the globe and, some twelve to thirteen
thousand years ago, started the transition to more settled forms of life. With the dawn of
agriculture, our ancestors formed various cities, states, and even empires. Higher
population densities, the effect of more efficient food production methods, have given
rise to various forms of social specialization, and to more targeted and intensive
collaborative projects. Without wanting to minimize the violence and conflict that has
occurred both within and between our civilizations, it’s also true that trade, travel, and
communications technology have brought at least some of us together. While some
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economists have made much of the “invisible hand” of the market, Robert Wright thus
emphasizes the invisible brain, as it were, that is the product of collective human
ingenuity in an age of global communication.6 We are animals for whom culture has
become an important force, and our ideas about the world, along with our techniques for
engaging with and manipulating it, have evolved in conversation with the world and with
each other. Thus the fabric of human knowledge has been woven ever more densely and
richly, and the “we” who know these things has also grown ever more expansive.
Thomas Kuhn famously suggests that science progresses not in a slow accretion
of knowledge, but by the “revolutionary” overthrow of outdated paradigms.7 How well
Kuhn’s model in its details applies to particular cases in the history of science is best left
to historians of science. But even on Kuhn’s model, science progresses. The view that I
will take for granted in this dissertation then, is that we are justified in seeing the history
of science as, in broad outline at least, progressive. Whether slowly and surely, or
through occasional lurches in understanding, our pictures of the natural world have
become increasingly truthful. That progress shows no signs of abating.
How the World Works

It is said that when Socrates was young, he was briefly enamored with the
philosophy of Anaxagoras, which promised to show him how Mind had arranged the
universe. He was eager, we might say, to find purpose and design in the universe—to see
conformity to a pre-existing plan in the natural world. As the story has it, he was
ultimately disappointed when Anaxagoras was able to identify only the mechanical
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causes of things.8 Plato would remedy the situation by articulating a powerful picture of
the world in which immaterial and timeless exemplars took ontological priority over the
mundane multiplicities of an ever-changing physical world.9
Daniel Dennett suggests that the Platonic model is a kind of cosmic pyramid, in
which God ontologically precedes Mind, which precedes Design, and Order more
broadly, with Chaos and Nothingness at the furthest metaphysical remove from the top.10
Of course, God as such doesn’t figure in Plato’s philosophy. He is slotted in, with relative
ease, by subsequent religious thinkers. The Platonic model, under some form or other,
has dominated Western thought until quite recently. According to this model, the
explanation of a natural phenomenon is complete when it has been traced back to a mind,
or better, a Mind. Largely due to the influence of Christianity, the immaterial Architect of
nature is typically thought to be God.
As late as 1802, when William Paley publishes his Natural Theology, apparent
design in nature is seen as evidence for the pre-existence of a greater mind—one capable
of designing the various fine-tuned organisms that populate the planet.11 From the
obvious structure in a pocket watch, for example, one is amply justified, accordingly to
Paley, in inferring the existence of a watchmaker. So too from the allegedly obvious
design of biological organisms, one should infer the existence of a designer.
As it turns out however, the watchmaker is blind.12 The processes by which
biological organisms, human or otherwise, come to be “designed” for survival in their
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environments are not prescient and they do not make plans. That is, the posit of a
superintending teleological force in explaining the trajectories of biological evolution is
unnecessary, given a suitable understanding of the relevant selective forces. The
incredible empirical success of the evolutionary framework suggests that, in contrast to
the Platonic model, mind is not a “first cause” of human or any other animal existence.
Mind is rather an effect of mindless causes that have, unthinkingly, produced thinking
primates. From an evolutionary standpoint, we can explain the temptation to see purpose
in nature as a kind of “hypertrophy of social cognition”—as a misleading overextension
of our otherwise useful interpersonal “mind-reading” abilities.13 To put the conclusion
schematically, on a naturalist and evolutionary view, the cosmic pyramid is inverted.14
Matter (whatever it is15) comes first, and then, much later and only under certain very
specific conditions, organisms evolve, some of which have those impressive social and
cognitive abilities we christen with the label “mind.”
As I suggested earlier, we can call this picture of the world naturalism.
Naturalism is helpfully opposed to supernaturalism, which attempts to explain various
phenomena—whether important events, natural disasters, or even the existence of the
universe—by appealing to immaterial minds, usually the mind or “will” of God. From a
naturalistic perspective, such an explanation is not an explanation at all, but rather a kind
of mystification, a “here be dragons” on the map of human experience. We have no
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evidence for the existence of immaterial agents, and all the evidence suggests that human
beings themselves are fully material beings.16 Once we have accounted for an
individual’s cells, organs, various biological systems (digestive, reproductive, nervous
etc.), there is nothing left to say about what makes up that person. There is more to each
one of us, in some sense, than our biological make-up. But our personalities (to pick one
name for that something more) are best understood as ways in which the biological
beings we are interact with our various natural and social environments. Or, if the focus
is on our minds, we should follow cognitive scientists and say, “the mind is what the
brain does.”17 Naturalism denies that the human person is made up of more than just a
material body, where that something more, soul or mind, is supposed to be a thing.18 This
straightforwardly entails mortalism—the view that death is the extinction of the
personality, and that expectations of an afterlife are ill founded.
In brief, naturalism is a matter-first view of cosmic history, of nature, and of
human beings. It provides no home in its conception of the world to occult personal or
purposeful forces that might superintend over human affairs. It is a perspective poetically
summarized by Bertrand Russell as follows.
That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were
achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs
are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism,
no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the
grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the
noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death
of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must
16
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inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if
not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which
rejects them can hope to stand.19
This naturalistic perspective is the one that I assume in all that follows.
What Must Disappear

For a wide range of natural phenomena, it is possible both to understand and to
appreciate the phenomenon in question. Early researchers in optics may have been
accused of “unweaving the rainbow,” but a poetic appreciation for the “mystery” of
rainbows is no real reason to resist scientific understanding. We can “unweave” the
rainbow—by articulating an explanation of why human beings see rainbows—without
undercutting the beauty or poetic evocativeness of our ordinary experiences of
rainbows.20
The work of scientists also sheds a great deal of light on otherwise puzzling
phenomena. We now have powerful ways of understanding the occurrence of volcanic
eruptions, earthquakes, lightning and thunder, and much more. Demystifying these
phenomena isn’t so much “disenchanting” the world, as some have suggested, as it is
making it intelligible—and not nearly as terrifying, I would add.21 So understanding often
leaves the world untouched. But there is a real sense in which understanding can also be
destructive. Traditional religion, in particular, seems especially under threat.
Religious thinkers and practitioners have adopted a variety of stances toward
science, some conciliatory, and others less so. The evidence that I’m familiar with
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suggests that many of the practices and beliefs that characterize traditional religion have
their roots in psychological capacities easily explained in evolutionary terms.22 The
trouble is that this same evidence suggests that traditional religious beliefs (about the
existence and importance of ancestors, spirits, and souls, say) come to “stick” in human
social life regardless of their epistemic merits. Certain ideas may be especially attractive
or “contagious,” as it were, regardless of whether they are true or false. So the risk here is
that religion will be explained away; that truthful genealogies of religious beliefs will
undermine those beliefs rather than provide justification for them.
The Mennonite theologian Gordon Kaufman, in an effort to reconcile Christian
faith with the deliverances of science, has argued that personal metaphors for God are no
longer tenable, and that the Christian God should rather be thought of as an impersonal
creative force, which can be harnessed, for good or for ill, in human affairs. Jesus of
Nazareth, on his analysis, is an unusually creative and thus inspirational human being
some people will choose to emulate.23 Perhaps Kaufman’s system works as a kind of
naturalistic religion. But its distance from traditional Christian orthodoxy might be
judged problematic for many Christians. If religious belief must reinvent itself so
drastically to accommodate our best understandings of the world, it may be simpler just
to say that naturalism and traditional religion are incompatible. I do not think it is
inappropriately bold to suggest, borrowing here an idea from Bernard Williams, that on a
naturalist view, religion “must come to understand itself as a human construction; if it
does, it must in the end collapse.”24
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In these ways, naturalism is both promising and challenging. It promises to enrich
our experience and understanding of the natural world and of ourselves. But it also
challenges, and even threatens, deeply held hopes and values. An example of this threat is
the possibility that a thoroughgoing naturalism might be incompatible with traditional
religion as we know it. The question now raised is whether other important values might
likewise be endangered by the naturalistic onslaught. More specifically, we can ask what
place, if any, morality has in an empirically respectable worldview. Will morality
naturalized go the way of the rainbow or of the angels?
3. Morality after Naturalism

The Optimistic View

Philosophers have taken up the question with gusto. They fall into two broad
camps. Philosophers in the first camp are optimistic about naturalism’s impact on moral
belief and practice. Morality, on their view, will go the way of the rainbow. It will be
better understood, but its fundamental power will remain untouched. Philosophers in the
second camp are less optimistic, and may, for all intents and purposes, be called
pessimists. On their view, morality will go the way of the angels. Their claim is that
coming to know the natural origins of morality will undermine our ability to take it
seriously. Morality, on this view, cannot escape the progress of science unscathed. I’ll
have more to say about the pessimistic view in what follows, but I begin with the
optimistic view.
There are many forms the optimistic view might take. In a sense then, there may
be several optimistic views. Yet they all share the same conviction that however much
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tinkering is needed here and there to tighten things up, morality can and should continue
to be an important force in the lives of even the most empirically minded.
On what we might call a scientific utilitarian view, for example, right and wrong
are correlated with pleasure and pain. We are all capable of making judgments about
what is pleasant and what hurts, but scientific inquiry nevertheless enriches our
understandings of pleasure and pain, and provides quantitative measures by which to
judge courses of action, whether characterizing individual choices or political programs.
Just as “scientific terms refer to real features of the world, and the sciences provide us
with successively more and more accurate knowledge of the world,” so also “our moral
claims not only purport to but often do state facts and refer to real properties, and [...] we
can and do have at least some true moral beliefs and moral knowledge.”25 Those moral
properties, such as an act’s being cruel or a practice’s being unjust, supervene
nonmysteriously on everyday nonmoral properties. Moral knowledge can thus be gained
and moral progress made in much the same way as scientific knowledge is gained and
progress made.26 David Brink and others have made this argument in philosophy, and
Sam Harris has recently offered a popularized version of the view.27
On a broadly Aristotelian view, the starting point isn’t pleasure and pain but
rather the notion of a good, full, and flourishing life. What is characteristic of such a view
is the insistence that morality is a natural extension of biological existence, rather than,
say, an autonomous realm with its own unique words and rules. As Philippa Foot puts it,
“evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure with evaluations of
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characteristics and operations of other living things.”28 Thus moral goodness is not a
distinct and unique kind of goodness, but rather just the goodness of a human being qua
human being. Foot says, “there are objective evaluations of such things as human sight,
hearing, memory, and concentration, based on the life form of our species. Why, then,
does it seem so monstrous a suggestion that the evaluation of the human will should be
determined by facts about the nature of human beings and the life of our own species?”29
Once we understand how the notion of goodness is employed for natural things in
general—oak trees, squirrels, or a digestive system, for example—there is no further
puzzle about goodness and badness in human beings. Full knowledge of the natural world
is no impediment to moral judgment. To the contrary, it enriches moral judgment.
Finally, there is what we might call an ecological view. On the ecological view,
particular moral practices, customs and vocabularies are adaptations to a local natural and
social environment. The view is straightforwardly relativistic. Moral knowledge is not a
single unified body but rather, as Owen Flanagan puts it, “Moral knowledge is the result
of complex socialization processes”30 aimed at regulating a local form of life (and thus it
varies from ecological niche to ecological niche). Moral socialization, Flanagan is careful
to note, is not mere socialization because it incorporates to varying degrees the languages
and practices of critical self-reflection. Moral goodness on the ecological view is thus a
kind of social adeptness, akin, perhaps, to wit or tact, though broader in scope. In brief
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ethics is “concerned with saying what contributes to the well-being of humans, human
groups, and human individuals in particular natural and social environments.”31
The scientific utilitarian, Aristotelian, and ecological views just mentioned
certainly do not exhaust the possibilities for an optimistic view on morality’s naturalistic
prospects. They do nicely illustrate the unity of the perspective however. There is little
trepidation in their pronouncements, and no fear that the natural sciences might
undermine moral belief or practice. Morality comes out on the side of science rather than
superstition, and science in turn enriches moral practice—a fortunate outcome.
Preemptive Adjustments

Have the optimists underestimated the threat posed by naturalism? One way of
answering the question involves noting the distance between these philosophically
elaborate accounts and more common conceptions of morality.
First of all, not everyone agrees that harmfulness and wrongness are coextensive.
Brink insists on a nonreductive account of morality and moral language, and so he’s well
aware of this fact. But the revisionism implicit in his theory needs to be drawn out. The
psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues that everyday moral judgment in most people is
emotionally driven. One piece of evidence he provides involves people’s reaction to a
vignette depicting one-time, consensual, non-procreative incest between opposite-sex
siblings. The hypothetical scenario makes it clear that no harm is done either directly in
the encounter, or indirectly as a result of the encounter. Nevertheless, Haidt reports that
most people insist the siblings have done something morally wrong. That is, they insist
that the imagined deed is wrong in spite of its not being harmful. This provides evidence,
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Haidt argues, that moral judgments are usually formed intuitively, and that moral
reasoning, when present, is usually a post hoc construction developed to support an
already formed emotional judgment.32 For our purposes, the point is this: that it is not
obvious to many people that what is wrong is that which is harmful (Brink’s view). That
conclusion is rather a refinement, an interpretation, to which Brink and other utilitarians
are attempting to convert us, as it were. Thus morality survives “naturalization” on the
scientific utilitarian view only because it has already been stripped down ahead of time,
in ways that manifestly conflict with common moral judgments.
The Aristotelian proposal is problematic in a different way. As I understand it, the
strategy of neo-Aristotelians such as Foot involves putting human moral goodness on the
same evaluative spectrum as the biological “goodness” of specimens of other species. I
suspect there is a bad (pre-Darwinian) understanding of biology at work here. Biological
evolution “aims” to produce not flourishing beings (in the sense that they are strong and
happy, say), but rather reproducing beings.33 From a strictly biological perspective, it is
unclear what the judgment that a particular specimen is good might mean, if not that its
constitution is such that it will likely lead to reproductive success in a given ecological
niche. But the strategies that lead to reproduction are more varied than just those that
human beings might judge to involve a good life. A good peacock is one with a beautiful
tail, not because human beings happen to find its tail beautiful, but because peahens do.
And a biologically “good” parasitic wasp may have great reproductive success, but any
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analogy with moral goodness seems stretched.34 Linda Mealy has argued that sociopathy,
a condition in human beings that involves a complete lack of empathy, is an evolutionary
stable strategy.35 That is, that sociopaths, from an evolutionary perspective, have adopted
a good strategy for reproduction. Whether or not she is right, this is a possibility in
keeping with our best understanding of evolutionary biology and psychology. But even if
being Ted Bundy is “good” from an evolutionary standpoint, that is clearly insufficient
for being morally good.36 My point is that there may be a considerable distance between
modern, Darwinian biology and the morally rich Aristotelian biology of Foot and other
neo-Aristotelians and virtue ethicists. Foot is not proposing an analysis of morality from
within a naturalistic framework, in my sense of “naturalistic.” Rather, her view owes
more to Aristotle than to Darwin. For this reason, I am hesitant to view it as truly
naturalistic.37
Finally, it may be the case that moral customs vary the world over, as Flanagan
and others are happy to note. But many perceive the fact of moral variance as a problem.
As John Mackie suggests, it may be the case that ordinary moral discourse
characteristically involves a claim to objectivity. The idea is just: if something is morally
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wrong, it is wrong for everyone, everywhere. Thus the fact that moral vocabularies vary
in lockstep with forms of life problematizes the implicit claim to objectivity of ordinary
moral language. For Mackie then, the cultural relativity of morality is a building block in
the case for moral skepticism.38 I am not arguing that we need to follow Mackie down the
path of error theory. My point is that a real grasp of the variability of moral norms across
cultures is transformative. So the picture we get from Flanagan and other relativists of
morality as an ecological adaptation is already in some sense an adjustment to the lessons
of empirical science.
The morality that survives naturalization on the optimist view is thus a modified,
pared down, or otherwise interpreted morality. Something survives the transition to
naturalism, and optimists call it morality or moral goodness. In the case of Foot’s view,
the alleged normative force of biological considerations may be at odds with an
evolutionary picture of our species. So there the transition to naturalism (as I understand
it) is quite possibly only apparent. I offer this overview of optimistic views simply to
point to the range of possibilities. Transplanting our moral beliefs and practices to a truly
naturalistic framework is work. The possibility to be explored presently is that the
transition might involve leaving some things behind.
4. Skeptical Considerations

Mortality and Moral Authority

What is characteristic of modern moral philosophy, according to Elizabeth
Anscombe, is its retention of law-related moral metaphors in the absence of a
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commitment to a law conception of ethics. “[B]etween Aristotle and us came
Christianity,” she says. “In consequence of the dominance of Christianity for many
centuries, the concepts of being bound, permitted, or excused became deeply embedded
in our language and thought.”39 Thus modern moral philosophy is in the awkward
position of deploying and attempting to demonstrate the intelligibility of a language
displaced from its original home. The notions of moral law or obligation, the notions of
right and wrong, Anscombe insists, require a lawgiver. That is just how the concepts
work. A course of action cannot be “forbidden” unless someone in a position of authority
is doing the forbidding. Something may be called morally wrong, but in the absence of a
lawgiver—traditionally, God—“all the atmosphere of the term is retained while its
substance is guaranteed quite null.”40
Against the backdrop of Anscombe’s historical scheme, in which Greek moral
philosophy is succeeded by Christian moral philosophy and then by modern moral
philosophy, Immanuel Kant can be read as a transitional figure—the first modern moral
philosopher. The command of morality, on Kant’s view, comes not from any source
outside ourselves, but rather from our rationality itself. Morality is in that sense selflegislated. It is authoritative and inescapable for each one of us.41 From the perspective of
Anscombe’s historical scheme however, this notion of a categorical imperative, of a
command that applies to us as rational beings regardless of our personal ends, appears as
a kind of last-ditch effort to save the idea of the moral law from the obsolescence of God.
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The point becomes clear if we consider, not Kant’s arguments, but alternative, religious
foundations for the authority of morality.
In a religious worldview that promises post-mortem judgment, the inescapability
of morality, from which its practical authority follows, is simply the result of that
judgment’s inevitability. “It is appointed for men to die once, and after this comes
judgment.”42 If God’s post-mortem judgment is inescapable, then that is all that’s needed
to make the authority of his commands inescapable, and hence morality “authoritative” in
the relevant way. The biblical authors themselves can be seen to connect the anticipation
of post-mortem judgment with the practical force of moral injunctions: “If the dead are
not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.”43 If, however, we bracket the
existence of God and the possibility of an afterlife, as Kant attempts to do, whatever
“authority” or “inescapability” morality is supposed to have will seem quite weak, in
light of the Christian alternative. That, I take it, is Anscombe’s point. The Kantian
scheme that is supposed to save moral authority for a post-religious society seems
contrived when set in a broader historical context. No doubt this is why Philippa Foot
says that to insist on inescapability is to rely “on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral
‘ought’ a magic force.”44 If God is dead, as the slogan has it, then the categorical
imperative must die with him.
Making the transition to naturalism involves leaving some ideas behind. I am
suggesting that both the more obviously religious conception of morality’s authority and
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the allegedly secular alternative for it that we find in Kantian ethics are problematic. In a
traditional Christian picture of moral life, the authority of God’s commands is backed up
by a final, post-mortem judgment. If death is just death however, and there is no final
judgment of this sort to be expected, then there is no final enforcement of the rules. As
Anscombe argues, this guts divine law based moral metaphors of their original
significance. They can have no real force. (I take no stance here on the viability of neoKantian accounts of moral authority.) Thus we must do without conceptions of authority
that trade on the clout of a divine sovereign’s commands. Morality naturalized must
abandon pretensions of divine authority, under whatever name.
Evolutionary Skepticism

Making the transition to a naturalistic framework is work. In contrast to theistic
moral philosophies, in which the conviction is that “reality itself is committed to morality
in some deep way,”45 a naturalist moral philosophy must find its anchors in the
contingencies of human nature. Morality may have evolutionary antecedents in our
region of the tree of life, but naturalists don’t generally look for morality in “reality
itself.”
Inferences about our history can be made on the basis of observation of our
closest evolutionary relatives (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans). The
primatologist Frans de Waal has documented the extent to which our evolutionary
relatives share important psychological and social similarities with human beings.
Emotional contagion, empathy, consolation behavior, gratitude, kindness, a sense of
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fairness—all of these characterize at least some of our relatives.46 Some have accused de
Waal of anthropomorphism. Appealing to evolutionary parsimony, de Waal has
responded by arguing that fear of misplaced anthropomorphism needs to be balanced
against the risk of falling into “anthropodenial”—the denial that we are in fact evolved
animals and therefore share much in common, especially in terms of cognitive
architecture, with at least some other mammals.47 It would be very surprising after all, if
Homo sapiens exhibited some capacity (for morality, say) that was an absolute
evolutionary novelty.
De Waal’s point is that, whatever comes together to constitute that phenomenon
we call human morality, the hypothesis that it must have evolutionary antecedents is well
borne out by observation of our closest relatives. If morality in any way involves these
important psychological capacities, then we can see the capacities and behaviors of other
apes (and thus also plausibly the ancestors we share with them) as in some sense protomoral.
Having conceded the untenability of an excessively strong understanding of moral
authority, de Waal’s remarks on the evolution of morality might be taken to lay the
groundwork for an optimistic take on morality’s “naturalization” prospects. But the
evolutionary approach might just as easily generate an argument for moral skepticism. I
want to briefly outline that skeptical argument here, before revisiting it in detail in the
next chapter. I do think a somewhat optimistic conclusion is in the offing—morality need
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not go the way of the angels. But I want to provide in what follows some consideration of
why we might not want to concede too much to the skeptic.
From an evolutionary perspective, the reason an organism has any particular trait
is that that trait contributed to its ancestors’ actual reproductive success, or that it is a side
effect of such a trait. That means morality has emerged only because of its relation to this
procreative imperative. To put the thought a bit more precisely, we might say that the
psychic structures that generate our feelings of love, justice, and guilt (etc.) were likely
“chosen” by natural selection because they were useful for increasing the evolutionary
fitness of our ancestors. Recall Haidt’s incest vignette. Even when it is made clear that no
one is harmed, either physically or emotionally, most people judge sibling-sibling incest
to be wrong. They find it disgusting. From an evolutionary perspective these responses
make perfect sense. The offspring of incestuous unions are often at a significant genetic
disadvantage, and so natural selection should favor the evolution of mechanisms that
channel sexual interest away from immediate kin.48
This observation can be used to fuel a skeptical argument. If we find incest
disgusting, we are not content to call it biologically disadvantageous. We call it twisted,
sinful, wrong, or whatever. That is, we describe it under suitably heavy terms of
condemnation. While the evolutionary perspective makes sense of why we heap moral
scorn on incest, it thereby problematizes the conviction that, in addition and not reducible
to its genetic riskiness, such behavior is objectively wrong. The reasons we give to justify
our moral judgments in such cases don’t seem to be explanations of those judgments, but
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rather post hoc rationalizations of them. That, at least, is Haidt’s conclusion. “The
reasoning process in moral judgment may be capable of working objectively under very
limited circumstances” but usually, “moral reasoning is […] likely to be hired out like a
lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of preordained
conclusions.”49 Those preordained conclusions on his view are driven in part by strong
moral feelings bequeathed to us by our evolutionary history. Though moral judgments
purport to be about the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, then, the driving force
behind them is the evolutionary usefulness of the intuitions they express.
This is troubling. As Richard Joyce puts it, “the faithful representation of reality is
of only contingent instrumental value when reproductive success is the touchstone,
forcing us to acknowledge that if in certain domains false beliefs will bring more
offspring then that is the route natural selection will take every time. Moral thinking
could very well be such a domain.”50 Joyce’s argument will receive close attention in the
next chapter. For now, we can jump to his conclusion: that the evolutionary genealogy of
our capacity for moral judgment undermines whole-hearted participation in moral
discourse. Our moral judgments, on this skeptical view, don’t refer to anything real in the
world. They merely codify evolutionarily useful prejudices. If this is correct, then what
Williams says in the religious case applies here too: in a naturalistic worldview, morality
must come to understand itself as a system of post hoc rationalizations of evolutionarily
useful feelings. If it does, it must in the end collapse. Before we accept this conclusion,
it’s worth asking what reasons we might have to resist it.
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Fictionalism and Abolitionism

John Mackie’s argument against the objectivity of moral value occupies less than
half of his Ethics. The rest of the book is devoted to positive normative ethical theory.
This may seem surprising in light of his moral skepticism, but Mackie is convinced that
human belief in morality has a beneficial impact on the species.51 “The function of
morality,” Mackie suggests, “is primarily to counteract [the] limitation of [our]
sympathies.”52 If I believe it is wrong to break a promise, for example, rather than merely
unwise, I am more likely to keep my promises and to feel bad when I break them. The net
effect of this type of belief is to reinforce social bonds and encourage altruistic behavior,
which, in the long run, benefits humanity as a whole. Rather than jettison moral talk
entirely then, Mackie suggests that it be maintained—and transformed where needed—to
serve as a useful fiction. It isn’t actually wrong to lie, cheat, and steal, on this view, but
it’s better for us to act and talk as if it were.
This moral fictionalism, which both Mackie and Joyce defend, is on my view
problematic. Where moral obligation and personal desire are in harmony, moral
obligation is superfluous. Presumably then, the social benefit of morality accrues where
moral obligation and personal desire conflict. But if morality is known to be a fiction,
individuals have no reason to allow their personal desires to be thwarted by “moral
obligation” (since there is no such thing). Perhaps they have a desire to live in a healthy
society, and they view acting on so-called “moral obligations” as the only means to fulfill
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this desire. But then moral obligation “itself” is causally epiphenomenal. Individuals can
be seen as acting on personal desire—in this case, the desire to live in a particular kind of
society. There is no fiction here.
The only sense I can make of this talk of moral fiction is if moral fictionalists
exempt themselves from the system altogether. They know morality isn’t real, but they
keep that information a secret. Morality has become superfluous for them, but by
maintaining the fiction in public, the rest of society continues to benefit from its social
effects. In public, that is, fictionalists must “pass” as moral realists. If their views are
espoused only outside the centers of power, fictionalists remain impotent amoralists
(willfully so). But vested with political authority, fictionalists become an amoral elite that
moralizes for the greater good. I take it many today would view this possibility as
socially noxious and politically dangerous.
As an alternative to moral fictionalism, skeptics have entertained the possibility of
moral abolitionism or eliminativism. The idea here is to get rid of morality altogether.
Richard Garner suggests that “morality inflames disputes and makes compromise
difficult, it preserves unfair arrangements and facilitates the misuse of power, and it
makes global war possible.”53 Thus we should purge our vocabulary of moral notions
altogether. Garner specifically mentions moral rights, moral personhood, and moral
desert. In lieu of standard moral terminology, we may speak of interests, desires, and
emotions, but no more. “What good is morality,” Garner asks, “if it can so readily be
marshaled to defend the sanctions of a tyrant?”54
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What are we to make of this proposal? While Garner is certainly right that moral
talk can inflame disputes, and that it can even be used to start wars, it’s not obvious that
this is enough to indict all such talk. One obvious response would be that this constitutes
a misuse of moral language. For example, talk of justice and freedom may be misused, or
it may be used as window dressing for what is in fact self-interest. But it is unclear why
such abuses should move us to abandon justice and freedom as rich moral ideals.
Identifying and correcting misuses seems like the simpler and politically more promising
alternative. It’s also interesting to note that Garner has trouble stripping all moral
resonance from his prose. Arguably, a “tyrant” is just a powerful figure whose actions
violate some moral standard.
The case of the tyrant is instructive. Presumably, Garner would have tyrantfighting revolutionaries speak not in terms of “justice” or their “moral rights,” but rather
in terms of their interests, emotions, and desires. Without wanting to venture too deeply
into questions of moral semantics, I think it’s important to note that, on some views at
least, talk of “justice” and “rights” is not fundamentally different from talk of human
interests and desires. That is, the language of justice might be used to express opposition
to an otherwise unjustified thwarting of basic human desires or needs. Maybe “your
policies are unjust” or “we want justice!” is just emotionally effective shorthand for
“you’ve provided us with no justification for policies that serve your interests but not
ours.” If a defense of moral language along these lines works, Garner’s abolitionist
prescription can be reinterpreted. Rather than prohibiting moral language as such, he
could be read as insisting that moral vocabularies intersect meaningfully with central
human desires, emotions, and interests. The problem with moral language that does not
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meet this criterion would then be not so much a failure to refer to anything real, but rather
uselessness. On the other hand, if the abolitionist really does want to get rid of all talk of
justice, rights, and so forth, it hard to see how the result wouldn’t be politically
disempowering.
What I’m arguing, in brief, is that we have prima facie reason to resist moral
skepticism. Expressed either as fictionalism or as abolitionism, the political result is
unattractive—to those of us who find Enlightenment ideals of self-determination and
freedom from oppression attractive, at least. Fictionalists play the moral game in public,
but don’t really believe in the rules. Abolitionists refuse to hear talk of justice, rights, or
personhood. There are ways to render such commitments more palatable: for example, if
the fictionalist’s personal desires line up perfectly with what the “fiction” of moral
obligation is supposed to get us, or if the abolitionist is only concerned with those parts of
moral talk that don’t connect with vital human interests. But on a strong interpretation of
each view, the result is social disengagement. The fictionalist lives with ironic
detachment from all moral discourse; the abolitionist doesn’t respond to talk of justice. If
this is where naturalism leaves us, then some kinds of knowledge really are dangerous.
5. Conclusion

Science is an empirical project. It encompasses a wide variety of engagements
with nature. And it pays off. We’ve learned a lot about the world and about ourselves.
We know the basic workings of matter. We know how life evolves, how various
lifeforms adapt to changing environments. We know human beings are continuous with
nature, and that human society, though complex, can in principle be studied with some of
the same tools as other animal societies. All of this is incredibly exciting, and promising,
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from the standpoint of our fundamental desire to know, from the standpoint of curiosity
and a hunger for truth.
It is also daunting, frustrating, and threatening, from the standpoint of traditional
value systems. Some of the metaphysical anchors for our various social systems have
come loose, and comparable tethers in the newly understood natural world are not always
available. The aim of this chapter has been to provide a bird’s eye view of this tension for
morality—as understood, at least, by philosophers. I have drawn attention to optimistic
points of view—the scientific utilitarian, Aristotelian, and ecological views—that have
high hopes for moral talk after the advent of naturalism. I have argued that, whatever
merits these views have, and whatever challenges they face, they do not simply codify
prevailing moral thought. Rather they articulate sophisticated and reformative theories of
morality that aim to be immune from the sharpest edges of naturalist criticism.
What then is this potential naturalist criticism? Well, at first pass, there is the
simple fact that religious moral systems can prop up morality with hopes about or threats
from the afterlife. If all of us stand to face judgment post mortem, after all, then the
commands of a divine legislator may deserve our attention for that simple reason. The
authority claimed for morality in such a scheme is just the authority of God himself. But
if there is no room for God, as traditionally conceived, in our new maps of reality, then
this approach to moral authority is fruitless. Morality’s “inescapability” can no longer be
thought of in such drastic terms, for death is actually death: the extinction of the
personality. Morality appears to be a human system, and it appears to be, at least in this
sense, “escapable.”
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There is an even stronger criticism waiting in the wings. If, as naturalism now
requires, we understand human beings as the product of a long evolution, the
psychological mechanisms that make morality possible must have some evolutionary
purpose. There is a chance then, that morality might be a kind of social veneer on
genetically useful drives, without any real world referent. Facing the facts of morality’s
evolution would on this view require us to become either fictionalists or abolitionists
about morality. I’ve argued that both options are socially and politically unattractive.
We have reason, I have claimed, to want a naturalistic picture of morality that
resists the skeptical conclusion. It must do so without reviving the specter of divine
authority. Of course, it is possible to want something, to have good reason to want
something, without it ultimately being possible. But thankfully, I do think a naturalistic
and non-deflationary picture of morality is in the offing. Its articulation, in light of a more
thorough treatment of Joyce’s skeptical argument, is the task I take up in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO

PICTURING MORALITY AFTER DARWIN

1. Introduction

Evolution has made us what we are. Our bodies are the products of evolution. Our
minds are the products of evolution. Specifically, the capability—the tendency—we have
to think (and feel) about the world and about our lives in moral terms is a product of
evolution. And like most products of evolution, it is with us today because it gave a
procreative edge to our ancestors. Technically speaking, a trait can emerge and persist in
a population without it enhancing inclusive fitness, so long as it does not have an unduly
negative effect on fitness. So I’m making the assumption that the mental capacities that
underlie moral thought, motivation, and behavior are not selectively neutral in this way.
Cross-culturally, moral norms tend to govern central aspects of human life (reciprocity in
social relations, reputation, sexual behavior, etc.), and this strongly suggests that the
tendency to moralize is unlikely to be fitness-neutral.55 On the assumption then that the
human tendency to moralize was naturally selected for, we are left with something of a
dilemma. Morality is supposed to be about what is good or right, and what is bad or
wrong. But evolution is concerned only with procreation. Is this a problem?
In this chapter, I tackle the claim made by evolutionary moral skeptics that a close
examination of morality strips it of its power. Daniel Dennett, for example, suggests that
evolution has made moral terms into “magic words” that trick us, as it were, into
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behaving prosocially, for the good of our genes.56 And Michael Ruse argues that our
minds deceive us into viewing moral norms as objective. “If our biology did not make us
think that [morality] has an objective referent, even though it does not,” he says, “then
our substantive ethics would break down. We would start to cheat, and before long
everyone would be cheating and the selective advantage of substantive ethics would be
lost.”57 On the skeptic’s view, in other words, the advance of naturalism is a genuine
threat to morality, the knowledge of morality’s origins, dangerous knowledge.
Richard Joyce’s book-length presentation of the skeptical case in The Evolution of
Morality is my target here. On Joyce’s view, our tendency to make moral judgments
evolved because of its contribution to genetically beneficial social cohesion. While this
provides morality with a kind of instrumental justification, it falls short of an epistemic
justification. If evolution can enhance the fitness of an organism by predisposing it to
believing falsehoods, there is nothing to prevent it from doing so. Our moral beliefs,
Joyce says, may well be such falsehoods.
As I shall argue however, Joyce’s case depends on a peculiar understanding of
morality’s authority. In a brief response to Ruse, Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian, and
David Wong offer what I find to be a plausible suggestion, namely that,
Moral imperatives and judgments can guide action and motivate individuals not
because of anything internal to their syntax, semantics, or logical structure, still
less because our biology makes us think that they refer to something objective (as
Ruse claims), but rather because of how they relate to vital human needs, desires,
and interests, such as a need for safety, security, friendship, reciprocity, and a
sense of belonging.58
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My response to Joyce fleshes out this insight. I argue that morality’s authority can be
seen as flowing from its role in structuring fundamental human institutions that intersect
with basic human needs. This hints at the possibility of a social conception of moral
authority, and with it, a social conception of morality itself. On that view, morality is
seen as a tool for social living, rather than as something external to ordinary human life.
My response to Joyce moves from a social conception of moral authority to a
social picture of morality itself, and then to a social understanding of moral justification.
Viewing justification as something we do amongst ourselves, rather than as something
we must do to the universe, to the academy, or which philosophers must do for us, I
argue, helps capture the dynamic tension inherent in moral practices—the possibility for
critique and for change. It also answers Joyce’s contention that moral judgments can
never be epistemically justified.
Briefly put, my goal in this chapter is to show how taking naturalism seriously
need not lead to moral skepticism. There is a way of thinking about morality—the social
view—that captures both the seriousness of existing moral norms and the possibility for
creating new and possibly better norms. I begin with a reconstruction of Joyce’s master
argument.
2. Joyce’s Master Argument

Practical Clout

According to Joyce, moral norms have practical clout. “Practical clout” is a term
of art. Joyce employs it to denote the conjunction of inescapability and authority.59 The
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terminology is borrowed from David Brink, who uses it to isolate the component parts of
categoricity in Kantian ethics (according to which moral norms always take the form of a
categorical imperative).60 To say that a norm or an imperative is inescapable is to say that
it is non-hypothetical. (For the sake of this discussion, I will use the terms “norm” and
“imperative” interchangeably, as denoting the type of proposition that indicates what one
ought to do.)
A hypothetical imperative is an imperative that takes for granted certain personal
ends. One might tell a friend that he ought to quit smoking, for example. The imperative
assumes that the friend prefers to be healthy or at least to not die young. The underlying
logic is thus of the form: if you want to be healthy, you ought not smoke. If the friend
cares nothing for his health, or if he is trying to set a smoking record, say, the force of the
imperative vanishes.
The significance of inescapability is that non-hypothetical norms apply to
individuals irrespective of their ends. If, for instance, the rules of etiquette make it
improper to use one’s dinner fork to eat one’s salad, the fact that one cares nothing for the
rules of etiquette is irrelevant to the fact that one has done something improper in using
the wrong fork. The institution of etiquette does not exempt one from its rules on any
private grounds. To be clear, one may have good reason to break the rules. For example,
if one’s dinner companion is about to inadvertently eat a wasp, one may choose to break
a rule of etiquette forbidding speaking with a mouth full of food.61 But that does not
mean the rule ceases to apply (otherwise one wouldn’t be breaking it). The rules of
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etiquette and of similar institutions are thus “inescapable” on this account. They apply to
us not in virtue of our personal ends, but simply in virtue of our being in the relevant
social context (a dinner party, say). Some have called the relevant norms or imperatives
“categorical” because they are not hypothetical. I will simply call them “institutional” or
“non-hypothetical.”
A norm can be non-hypothetical, and a norm can be practically authoritative, but
these are distinct qualities, Joyce says. This is evident from the fact that moral norms
have deliberative importance beyond that which follows from simply being nonhypothetical. In and of themselves, Joyce says, non-hypothetical imperatives are in fact
quite “wimpy.”62
Suppose that some strange cult in Idaho believes that everyone ought to dye their
hair purple. This isn’t, let me stipulate, a piece of advice; they aren’t saying that
we ought to do this in order to avoid the wrath of the Great Purple Lizard God or
whatever. Rather, it is, like etiquette, just a set of rules that is applied to people
irrespective of whether they care. If you were to say to one of these cult members
“I’m not going to dye my hair because I don’t care about your silly cult,” he
might reply “There is nothing in the rules about their depending on whether you
care about them; you simply must dye your hair purple.” It is obvious that you
would (and should) remain unmoved.63
The norms of the purple hair cult leave us unmoved. But moral norms, Joyce contends,
are supposed to move us. They are supposed to be importantly unlike the norms of the
purple hair cult. To say that moral norms have authority then, is to say that they are the
kinds of norms that essentially have some kind of deliberative weight. Crucially, they
have this weight not because we are a part of the “morality cult,” but just because they
are moral norms (or in other words, just because). If moral imperatives were merely
institutional imperatives, their authority, Joyce thinks, would be fundamentally illusory.
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We would be as free to ignore them as we are to ignore the dictates of the purple hair
cult.64
On Joyce’s account then, moral norms are essentially non-hypothetical and
authoritative. They have practical clout (or a certain “oomph,” as he sometimes says).
This is Joyce’s first premise: (1) Moral norms have practical clout.
The Evolution of Conscience

Let us simply assume what I will call Joyce’s second premise: (2) Social cohesion
was important for the genetic success of our ancestors. The emergence of prosocial or
cooperative behavior is well accounted for in mainstream evolutionary theory. As Joyce
notes, there are a variety of ways in which collaborativeness can benefit the genetic
fitness of individuals in a social group.65 Given that ours is an exceedingly social species,
we have every reason to assume social cohesion played an important role in our
evolution.
There is, however, an important difference, on Joyce’s view, between simple
prosocial feelings and a moral sense. We can imagine individuals in a community, he
says, “all of whom […] want to live in peace and harmony, and violence is unheard of.
Everywhere you look there are friendly, loving people, oozing prosocial emotions.
However, there is no reason to think that there is a moral judgment in sight.”66
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A clarification: “prosocial” can be taken in a narrow sense or in a wide sense. In
the narrow sense, prosocial feelings are positive feelings correlated with cooperation—as
with the love we feel for our children, or the mood lift we sometimes experience when
choosing to help others in need. In the wide sense, prosocial feelings are simply feelings
that structure our social lives. Narrowly prosocial feelings obviously play that role, but so
do some negatively valenced emotions. In his landmark article on reciprocal altruism, for
example, Robert Trivers identifies the human capacities for dislike, moralistic aggression,
and suspicion—among others—as aspects of our psychology that transparently function
to regulate social life.67 Joyce sometimes slips from the one sense of “prosocial” to the
other. I am not sure which he intends here. No matter. His point that prosocial feelings do
not by themselves constitute a moral sense can be interpreted in a wide sense.
Inclinations are not prescriptions; inhibitions are not prohibitions; thus there is something
more to the moral sense than prosocial feelings.
That “something more,” on Joyce’s view, is the conceptualization of projected
emotions. At some point in recent evolutionary history, Joyce suggests, our ancestors
underwent a psychological change that took them from desiring certain things to viewing
them as desirable.68 By selecting for this psychological propensity to project our feelings
onto the world, evolution pushed us from having inclinations, aversions, desires, and
inhibitions to viewing certain courses of action as prescribed or prohibited. In
conjunction with our ancestors’ newfound linguistic capabilities, this emotional
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development made available a conceptual space rich with what we recognize as distinctly
moral concepts (desert, guilt, and so on).
Why did this transition occur? Joyce argues that prescriptions and prohibitions are
more powerful, more effective in maintaining social cohesion, than mere inclinations and
inhibitions.69 Simple desires, Joyce suggests, are easily overridden. One might desire to
live a long and healthy life, for example. The desire may be genuine, but it might also be
quite weak in the face of temptation. The prospect of immediate gratification for some
other desire (fatty food, say) might unceremoniously overwhelm the desire for long-term
health. Joyce hypothesizes that evolution may have favored the development of the moral
sense as a general solution to this problem of weakness of will. Suppose theft of some
person’s property is likely to result in my ostracization. I may prefer not to be ostracized,
but that preference might find itself overridden if the easy-to-steal item is just too
tempting. The moral sense, on this view, serves as an inhibition booster in such
situations. Rather than simply reminding me of my preference not to be ostracized and
therefore not to steal, my conscience tells me stealing is wrong.70
Thus the psychological capacity to view certain norms as having practical clout
(which is to say, to view certain courses of action as being prohibited, rather than merely
undesirable), Joyce argues, tends to silence further calculation. Moral considerations
provide a predetermined terminus for practical reason beyond and greater than the merely
self-regarding. Joyce endorses, in other words, Daniel Dennett’s suggestion that moral
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principles can be viewed as “magic words” and “conversation-stoppers.”71 These moral
terms, moral ideas, and associated emotions, thus foster social cohesion by overriding
more egoistic and socially disruptive desires and inclinations. We have here Joyce’s third
premise: (3) The moral sense (which imbues certain norms with practical clout) functions
to enhance social cohesion.
In brief then, to think and feel in moral terms is to be governed by more than
inclination and inhibition. It is, on Joyce’s view, to be governed by a sense that stands
above, that judges, those personal preferences, and to which those preferences are
accountable. And the evolutionary purpose of the moral sense, on Joyce’s view, is to
foster social cohesion. “Natural selection […] has designed us to think of our relations
with one another in moral terms. Why has Mother Nature granted us this bounty? Not for
any laudable purpose […], but simply because being nice helped our ancestors make
more babies.”72 Let this be Joyce’s fourth premise (which follows loosely from premises
2 and 3): (4) The moral sense probably evolved because it was genetically useful to our
ancestors.
Usefulness and Justification

On Joyce’s view, evolution helped our ancestors “make more babies” by making
them hyper-social animals. And it made them hyper-social animals by giving them a
moral sense that was stronger, motivationally speaking, than their most socially
disruptive desires and inclinations. With this picture of human nature in mind, one might
be tempted to suggest that our prosocial natures provide sufficient justification for
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morality. With Richmond Campbell, for example, one might say, “Since the biological
explanation for the existence of morality implies that having some morality rather than
none overwhelmingly improves the life prospects of everyone in the group, it follows
[…] that having some morality rather than none is justified.”73 Its evolutionary
genealogy, on Campbell’s view, would thus vindicate morality.
Joyce is skeptical. We should consider, he says, for the sake of an analogy, the
proposition that religious belief is comforting, that it brings happiness, or that it fosters
social cohesion. “Suppose we could show that having religious beliefs (in comparison to
having none) improves the prospects of everyone in a group. Perhaps it is simply
comforting to believe that one’s life fits into a Grand Scheme, that there are larger forces
at work than we observe.”74 We could then transpose Campbell’s logic and call such
religious and metaphysical beliefs “justified.”
But the notion of justification at work in the religious case is suspect. And if it is
suspect in the religious case, it is suspect in the moral case too. We must distinguish,
Joyce suggests, between instrumental justification and epistemic justification.
“Something is instrumentally justified for a person if it contributes toward the satisfaction
of her ends,” he says.75 Belief in an afterlife, for example, might well be instrumentally
justifiable for some. It might ease a person’s grief, speed up the mourning process, or
bring people together in the face of tragedy. But the comfort and other benefits one draws
from a belief say nothing as to the truth of that belief.76 Naturalists do not generally
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countenance the continuation of conscious experience beyond biological death. If the
naturalist view is correct, then a false belief might in some sense be “justified.” It would,
however, still be false. For now then, Joyce will allow us to say only this, and this is his
fifth premise: (5) The mode of its evolution provides morality with an instrumental
justification.
Non-Cognitivism

Morality, on Joyce’s view, may well be instrumentally justified. Evolution seems
to have wired us for social life, and morality seems to serve social life better than
amorality. Our lives might accordingly be richer and more satisfying if we accept our lot,
if we content ourselves with being animals of conscience—moral animals. But we should
not confuse this instrumental justification of morality with epistemic justification.
As suggested above, in what I will now call Joyce’s sixth premise: (6)
Instrumental justification is not epistemic justification. Epistemic justification, on Joyce’s
view, has to do with a belief being sensitive to the available evidence, being the product
of a process that reliably yields true beliefs, or more generally, satisfying the appropriate
epistemic standards.77 But the evolutionary genealogy of morality explains why we hold
our moral beliefs while nowhere appealing to moral facts. Thus it gives us no reason to
think our moral beliefs are epistemically justified. The epistemic justification of our
moral beliefs would require that those beliefs be responsive to a realm of moral facts. But
no such realm appeared in the genealogy. On this point Joyce echoes John Mackie,

assistance to those in need, rather than taking flight. […] So belief in Heaven may be narratively
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according to whom the intended referents of ordinary moral discourse—namely,
objective moral norms—fail to exist.78
To this line of reasoning, Joyce considers two possible rejoinders. According to
the first, it is a mistake to assume that moral judgments are in the descriptive business.
“Moral beliefs,” Campbell says, “are […] essentially dispositions to think, feel, and act in
accordance with certain norms.”79 Moral judgments do not describe the world, but rather
structure our attitudes towards the world. Thus there is no question as to the
correspondence of our judgments to a realm of moral facts. There is no question as to
their truth. If moral statements are not truth-apt, then moral beliefs are justified if and
only if they are instrumentally justified. The question of epistemic justification is on this
view irrelevant.
As Joyce notes, Campbell’s evolutionary “vindication” of morality thus requires a
non-cognitivist rendering of moral judgment. Pure non-cognitivism (roughly speaking,
the view that moral judgments do not express moral beliefs) is controversial. On Joyce’s
view, it is implausible. It is much more plausible, according to Joyce, that “moral
judgments (as speech acts) express both beliefs and conative non-belief states.”80 To say
that someone is “evil,” for example, would on this view be both to describe them in a
particular way and to express one’s feelings about them (or express one’s adherence to a
normative system according to which their behavior is to be condemned). Thus Joyce
rejects both pure cognitivism, according to which moral judgments express only beliefs,
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and pure non-cognitivism, according to which moral judgments express only conative
non-belief states. This explains his dissatisfaction with Campbell’s non-cognitivist
vindication of morality. And it gives us Joyce’s seventh premise: (7) Morality needs
epistemic justification because moral judgments express moral beliefs.
Beyond the rejection of these metaethical extremes, Joyce does not take a detailed
stance on questions of moral semantics. Having rejected pure non-cognitivism, he finds
Campbell’s defense of morality’s instrumental justification unsatisfactory. For my
purposes, it is enough to note that Campbell’s defense of morality’s justification is
available only to strict non-cognitivists. It is for that reason controversial. If an alternative
justification of morality can do without the commitment to pure non-cognitivism, it will
have broader appeal. I do think an alternative justification is in the cards, and so I bracket
the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate in what follows.
The Failure of Moral Naturalism

We should now consider the second rejoinder to Joyce’s skeptical train of
thought. It may be the case, as Joyce argues, that a genealogy of morality can be given
without making reference to “moral facts” as such. However, if moral properties
supervene on non-moral properties, then that genealogy does not imply that there are no
moral facts. Moral facts might be implicit in the genealogy, so to speak. This Joyce’s
eighth premise: (8) Moral beliefs would be epistemically justified if moral facts were
reducible to natural facts. Joyce calls this view—that moral properties supervene on
natural properties—“moral naturalism.”81 (This is, I should note, a narrower conception
of moral naturalism than the one I sometimes make use of in this dissertation.)
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Very briefly, Joyce’s response is as follows. The success of moral naturalism
(thusly defined), he says, depends on the reducibility of the moral to the non-moral.
Attempted reductions along these lines however, are bound to fail. Whatever norms or
prescriptions can be pulled out of the details of human evolution, Joyce argues, none
amount to practical clout. We might be able to specify what constitutes species-typical
functioning, evolutionary stable strategies, or whatever. But without norms that are nonhypothetical and especially authoritative, the “oughts” of various moral naturalisms will
be merely predictive—“wimpy”—“oughts.” It may be the case that a chimp “ought” to
help a vulnerable conspecific, for example, if it is to behave in typically chimp-like
fashion. But this is not the deeply moral ought that Joyce has gone to great lengths to
argue is characteristic of human morality. It may be the case that I “ought” to help
someone in need, if I am to be true to my characteristically human, evolved, prosocial
drives (and even this is controversial). And yet I don’t really have to.
The mistake made by evolutionary ethicists, Joyce says, “is that of locating the
wrong kind of normativity in the evolutionary process. Richards and Casebeer,”—the two
“moral naturalists” (in his sense) whose views Joyce considers in depth—“recognize that
what is needed is epistemic, not instrumental, justification, but fail to appreciate the
special kind of practical oomph with which moral values and imperatives are imbued.”82
There is no practical clout to be found in the natural world, Joyce says. Hence his ninth
premise: (9) Moral facts are not reducible to natural facts.

82

Joyce, 176.

49
Joyce’s Conclusion

“[D]escriptive knowledge of the genealogy of morals,” Joyce says, “(in
combination with some philosophizing) should undermine our confidence in our moral
judgments.”83 To understand how evolution has made us moral animals is to see through
the felt force of conscience. We feel so strongly about certain behaviors not because they
have the objective properties of rightness or wrongness, but because having those strong
feelings was good for the social cohesion of our ancestors. This is Joyce’s conclusion:
(10) The fact of morality’s evolution should undermine our confidence in the truth of our
moral judgments. The conclusion may be troubling; but we should face the truth “like
intellectual adults,” Joyce says, “rather than eschewing open-minded inquiry or
fabricating philosophical theories whose only virtue is the promise of providing the
soothing news that all our heartfelt beliefs are true.”84
The reconstructed master argument runs as follows:
(1) Moral norms have practical clout.
(2) Social cohesion was important for the genetic success of our ancestors.
(3) The moral sense (which imbues certain norms with practical clout) functions to
enhance social cohesion.
(4) Thus the moral sense probably evolved because it was genetically useful to our
ancestors.
(5) We can accordingly say that the mode of its evolution provides morality with an
instrumental justification.
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(6) However, instrumental justification is not epistemic justification.
(7) Morality needs epistemic justification because moral judgments express moral beliefs.
(8) Moral beliefs would be epistemically justified if moral facts were reducible to natural
facts.
(9) But moral facts are not reducible to natural facts.
(10) Therefore the fact of morality’s evolution should undermine our confidence in the
truth of our moral judgments.
In the brief conclusion to his book, Joyce comes out cautiously in support of
moral fictionalism. Moral fictionalism is the view that we are better off with our moral
vocabularies and practices left more or less intact, and that those of us who are
philosophically inclined might withhold assertoric force in moral utterance. The
fictionalist speaks perhaps not ironically, but with the mental acknowledgment that moral
talk is a useful fiction.
I gave some reasons for resisting moral fictionalism in the previous chapter. So
far as I can tell, Joyce’s argument would (if correct) force us to choose between social
cohesion and truth, roughly speaking. We can either reap the benefits of moral talk and
moral motivation, so long as we don’t scrutinize our moral talk too closely, or we can live
with both eyes open, understand that morality is a fiction foisted upon us by our genes,
and live with the potentially destructive social consequences of that understanding.
Neither option is attractive. Mercifully, there is a third option, as I shall presently
argue. The point is not to provide “soothing news that all our heartfelt beliefs are true,”
but rather to show how we can, as moral animals and intellectual adults, be both clear
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sighted and sincere. It is possible, on my view, for our moral beliefs to have all the
epistemic justification they need.
3. Revisiting Moral Authority

Two Sources of Authority

My point of entry will be Joyce’s remarks about the “morality cult.” You’ll recall
that Joyce invites us to consider a fictional cult out in Idaho according to which we must
all dye our hair purple. Though the prescription is non-hypothetical, Joyce says, it is
laughably weak. It certainly does not have the same weight as a moral prescription. These
are his words:
We do not, I suggest, think of moral requirements as like this. No human culture
allows the authority of its moral rules to be so easily shrugged off. Now, it is
possible that, despite this observation, moral imperatives really are just a species
of Foot’s non-hypothetical (i.e., inescapable but non-authoritative) imperative, but
we’re all just too deeply embedded within the “morality cult” to recognize this
(for presumably the cult members from Idaho will also not agree that you are free
to opt out from their normative system). But the price of accepting this is to
acknowledge that the authority of morality is an illusion, that people who
genuinely don’t care about it are as a matter of fact as legitimately free to ignore it
as we are all free to ignore cult members telling us to dye our hair purple, that if
we were able to see things as they really stand we’d recognize that it may be
perfectly reasonable for a person to scoff “Morality, schmorality!”85
(Etiquette and this purple hair prescription of the fictional Idaho cult are Joyce’s two
main examples of non-hypothetical but non-authoritative norms.)
I think Joyce is right to say that the purple hair prescription has no authority. But
the simplest explanation for this lack of authority, on my view, is the fact that the
imagined cult is in Idaho. The point is not that Joyce’s readers are most probably not in
Idaho (though that is likely true). Rather, the point is just that the interests of the purple
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hair cult are utterly foreign to the real-world concerns of Joyce’s audience. The example
is exotic enough that, even for Joyce’s readers who are in Idaho, the prescription can
have no traction. The purple hair cult is governed, in brief, by an entirely alien normative
system—one that has no point of contact with the lives of ordinary human beings, with
Joyce’s readership. We would do better, I submit, to look for moral authority in the
requirements of social living, in the demands of everyday life.
One can have a stake in a normative system or institution, I propose, in two ways.
First, one can be a willing participant in that institution. Chess is governed by a very
specific system of rules, for example, and those rules are authoritative for participants
simply to the extent that they care about playing chess. If they have a personal investment
in chess, then that grounds the authority of the rules of the game. Absent that investment
(and perhaps also a similar investment of their opponent’s), they are free to break the
rules—to play a different game, or no game at all. Chess, tennis, debate, etiquette, and so
on—let us call these elective institutions. They are governed by systems of norms that
become authoritative for us when we choose to participate in the discrete activities they
define.
There is a second way one can have a stake in a normative system however. If a
normative system is materially inescapable for an individual or set of individuals, then its
rules are de facto authoritative for those individuals. Let us call such institutions
fundamental institutions. This kind of “inescapability,” it should be noted, has nothing to
do with the semantics of non-hypothetical norms. Such norms are in fact inescapable, in
the straightforward sense that one cannot escape the social space they structure.
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Consider for example the “institution” of normal public dress. We commonly
assume fellow members of our human societies will dress in ways appropriate to the
social situation. In some contexts those expectations are loose (for example, the mall). In
others, those expectations are rather precise (a business meeting, a costume party, the
APA). But these expectations are not just predictive expectations; they are normative
expectations. Which is to say they are expectations that we enforce. To take one of the
more clear-cut examples, we do not allow public nudity (here in the U.S. at least). The
point is not that nudity is illegal—though it is in fact illegal in most public spaces, to the
best of my knowledge. The point is that we do not allow people to be naked in public. We
dress ourselves, and our children, when we leave home. We reprimand those who fail to
comply. The law, in this case, is a reflection, an expression, of popular preference, and
not an imposition upon it.86
Is the institution of normal public dress really inescapable? The committed rebel
might attempt an escape, by joining a nudist colony, say. But this is a radical move (and
the nudist might just be trading one set of normative expectations for another: perhaps
nudists frown on those who are clothed87). A more decisive escape, such as never
wearing clothes again, is for most people not possible. North American nudists, at least,
still have to work, to buy groceries. They can be called for jury duty. A complete opting
out of the system—of the sort only owners of well-stocked private islands are capable
of—would require a loss of face-to-face contact with family and friends, at the very least.
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It would require opting out of society. This is what I mean when I say norms surrounding
dress are materially inescapable or fundamental.
The authority of a system of norms can thus be grounded, I am suggesting, either
in one’s voluntary participation in a discrete institution, or in one’s materially inescapable
social situation. I have characterized institutions of the former type as “elective,” and of
the latter type as “fundamental.” Elective institutions include various sports, hobbies,
occupations, and other activities in which participation is not meaningfully required.
Fundamental institutions might be thought to include (among others) normal public
behavior and dress, the legal order, gender, and so on. Participation in such institutions is
essentially forced upon us simply in virtue of being who we are, as we are, where we are.
They can be seen as flowing from the social nature of our species. Though I have
described them as distinct types of institutions, I am eager to add that these types are
undoubtedly ends of a long spectrum. The more elective an institution, we might say, the
easier it is to move out of its sphere. The more fundamental an institution, the more
difficult it is to move out of its sphere. More elective institutions are typically nested
within more fundamental institutions, and take for granted their norms. What matters for
my purposes is the simple point that one’s social situation, one’s material limitations,
impact what norms have authority for a person.
Convention and Convention-Transcendence

The authority of moral norms, on Joyce’s view, far exceeds that which follows
from their being non-hypothetical. Strictly speaking, he says, one is free to ignore nonhypothetical or institutional norms in the event of a mismatch between one’s private ends
and those norms. Institutional norms, according to Joyce, are merely conventional.
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In light of the foregoing however, this is too quick. What Joyce misses, I submit,
is the way in which certain institutions fundamentally structure our lives. When an
institution is fundamental, one is not free to ignore its norms in any meaningful sense. If I
fail to perform my gender properly, if I openly break the law, if I walk around town
naked—I do not “escape” the relevant norms; on the contrary, I am subject to normative
retaliation—a sign I am still in normative space. This is significant because Joyce
substitutes “convention” for “institution” on a variety of occasions (as when he describes
the practical clout of moral norms as “convention-transcendent”88). If something is
“conventional,” Joyce assumes, it can legitimately be ignored. Given that ordinary
language users do not view morality as something that can legitimately be ignored, he
concludes, the authority of morality must be “convention-transcendent.” This conclusion
fuels Joyce’s skepticism. Though ordinary moral discourse seems committed to it, Joyce
does not think there is any way to make sense of convention-transcendent normative
authority on a naturalist view of the world.
But to say something is “conventional,” in ordinary parlance, is just to indicate
that some aspect of a practice serves a coordinating function. That function might be
served equally well by an alternative norm (e.g. the side of the road we drive on).
However, to say that a particular norm could in principle be exchanged for some other
norm is not to say we could have done without any norm. A traffic system can have
drivers on either the right or the left side of the road. But no workable traffic system, I
think, can do without specifying some side of the road.
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“Convention” in this coordinating sense might play some part in both elective and
fundamental institutions. The number of squares (one or two) a pawn is permitted to
move from its initial position on a chessboard is plausibly “conventional” in this sense.
So also the legal voting or drinking age strikes me as conventional, within limits (given
the ends it serves). The relevant system of norms (here: the rules of chess, and the legal
system) incorporates to this degree a measure of arbitrariness. It is “conventional” to do
things in precisely this way. But this arbitrariness does not signify that one is “free” to
ignore the rules. To the contrary. Conventions arguably exist for coordination’s sake, and
coordination requires not granting fellow participants in an institutional practice the
“freedom” to flaunt the rules.
In brief then, to call something “conventional” is not to say that one is free to
ignore it. One is free, by definition, to ignore the norms that undergird an elective
institution. One is not free, again by definition, to ignore the norms that undergird a
fundamental institution. Perhaps someone will suggest that the “conventional” nature of
certain fundamental norms implies that they can be renegotiated (as when a U.S. state
changes the legal drinking age, say, or comes to allow same-sex marriage). And this is
true. Crucially, renegotiating is not the same as ignoring.
By substituting “convention” for “institution” and playing off the “arbitrariness”
of convention, Joyce is able to claim that morality has “convention-transcendent”
authority. The authority of morality, on Joyce’s account, is not grounded in any concrete
aspect of human life. It transcends the merely human. Moral demands, he says, “do not
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acquire their authority from any human source.”89 Let us call this an objectivist
conception of moral authority.
If, however, we define morality as a fundamental institution, we can articulate an
alternative account of moral authority. On this view, the authority of moral norms flows
from the material inescapability of certain social institutions. Let us call this a social
conception of moral authority. Whereas Joyce views moral norms as demands that “float
around in the world waiting to be perceived by moral agents,”90 this alternative view sees
moral norms as demands that emerge from shared forms of life. Moral norms are
demands we make, directly or indirectly, of each other. Moral considerations on this
account are authoritative for me simply because I share an inescapable social world with
others.91
My goal here is not to develop the social conception of moral authority, nor is it
to pick out morality from other fundamental institutions (if it can be picked out). For
now, my intent is simply to carve out some space between the two spheres of authority
recognized by Joyce. Practical or instrumental reason is authoritative for me, according to
Joyce, simply because it allows me to fulfill my personal ends. And morality is
authoritative for everyone—or at least purports to be so—simply because. This way of
thinking about authority, I have argued, is blind to the possibility that one might have a
stake in an institution by virtue of one’s material circumstance. If an institution is
fundamental, which is to say, materially inescapable, then that is why and how its norms
are authoritative for me. This is a social conception of moral authority.
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The Moral-Conventional Distinction

Joyce’s account of moral authority, and hence of the practical clout of moral
norms, does not simply depend on the intuition that human institutions are insufficient to
give morality its “oomph.” Joyce relies also on the large body of empirical evidence that
documents the divergence of the moral from the conventional in ordinary thought.
Children as young as three mark the distinction, Joyce points out. And the phenomenon is
cross-cultural.92
The psychologist Elliot Turiel makes the now canonical distinction between the
moral and the conventional along four axes.93 “Moral transgressions are taken to be more
serious, more generalizable (e.g., wrong in other countries too), are justified differently
(e.g., with reference to harmful consequences), and are considered independent of
authority.”94 On Joyce’s view, this last demarcating criterion is of special importance.
Conventional rules, Joyce reports, are responsive to human authority. For example,
children tend to revise their judgment that a boy shouldn’t wear a dress to school when
the teacher says it’s okay. However, rules prohibiting striking others (for example) are
not flexible in this way. It would still be wrong to punch a classmate even if the teacher
said it was okay.95 These empirical findings, on Joyce’s view, mesh well with his
contention that moral norms enjoy a special status in ordinary moral thought—what he
calls “practical clout.”
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Above I introduced the distinction between elective and fundamental institutions.
What I’d like to suggest now is that, as a general rule, fundamental institutions emerge
(or become fundamental) not for arbitrary reasons, but because they serve some of our
basic needs and desires. Whereas elective institutions do serve felt needs and desires,
these are more often than not somewhat superficial. A desire to play chess, for example,
may be a genuine desire. But it undoubtedly does not run as deep, so to speak, as the
desire to survive, the desire to eat, the desire for bodily integrity, and so forth. We mark
this distinction in everyday speech by distinguishing desires from needs. I don’t intend to
make that distinction any clearer here than it is in everyday speech. My claim is just that
fundamental institutions more often than not aim to serve basic human needs. The claim
is problematic to the extent that fundamental institutions have often not served the basic
needs of (all) those they have claimed to serve. Nevertheless, where fundamental
institutions fail to serve the basic needs of all, their existence is typically justified by
claims that they serve such needs. For now then, I will assume a general correlation
between the fundamentality of an institution and the basic-ness of the needs it serves,
without denying that, in situations of unequal social power, the needs of some might
matter more as a matter of fact than the needs of others.
If this connection holds, then the empirical evidence can be made to fit a social
view of moral authority just as well as it can Joyce’s objectivist view.96 The seriousness
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of moral norms is a function of their role in serving basic needs and desires. Their
generalizability is a function of the generality of basic needs and desires. Their
justification makes reference to these characteristically human needs and desires. And
their independence of authority is in fact an independence of particular authority.
Fundamental institutions are community-wide. Only much smaller, much more elective
institutions can typically be changed by individual decree. A teacher can’t make hitting
someone “okay” simply because the desire to be free from harm is a human universal that
remains unchanged by the edicts of teachers or other authorities. Another useful way of
distinguishing elective from fundamental institutions (and it is a rough distinction once
again) is thus in terms of the flexibility of the desires served. An inclination to play chess
is, for all but the most hardened chess enthusiasts, easily redirected towards backgammon
or some other game. The “desire” not to be tortured is not so easily recalibrated.
In brief, a social view of moral authority can be made to fit the psychological
evidence as well as Joyce’s objectivist view. The data do not force us to view the
“practical clout” of morality as supra-institutional, so long as our ideas about human
institutions are sufficiently rich. The data only suggest that most people think morality is
serious business. And if morality intersects meaningfully with basic human needs and
desires, then that’s a reasonable stance to take.
4. Transparency and Justification

Pictures of Morality

The objectivist and social views of moral authority are at home in different
conceptions of morality itself. There are, we might say, two pictures of morality here.
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The objectivist view of moral authority is at home in an objectivist picture of morality
itself. The social view of moral authority is at home in a social picture of morality itself.97
On the objectivist picture of morality, the moral matrix is just there. In it we live
and move and have our being. Morality is a part of the fabric of reality, and it exists with
or without us. It is not human, it is natural. Or perhaps supernatural. To behave morally is
on the objectivist picture to respond properly to the demands made upon us by the
universe itself (or by its author). To behave immorally is to be epistemically or
motivationally deficient—misaligned—in some way.
On the social picture, morality is the fabric of our relationships. It is the means by
which we make sense of ourselves to each other. Like our relationships, it can be
strengthened or torn; it can unravel completely (when our relationships fall apart, as in
war). It is how we get along together, if we get along, and it is our picture of what it
means to “get along.” It is negotiated through gestures, through practices of
accountability, through reactive attitudes, through reasoned discussion, through power
struggles, and so on. It depends, that is, on the needs, priorities, and choices of human
agents. It is a human creation—a human project.98
The objectivist picture is hard to make sense of. Metaphysically, it seems out of
place in the world revealed by the natural sciences. It is largely on this basis that Joyce,
like Mackie before him, embraces skepticism. What is more, it is difficult even to
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imagine an adequate moral epistemology that is simultaneously compatible with the
objectivist picture and that explains why people throughout history and across the world
have made the moral judgments they have made. Moral codes seem to co-evolve with
forms of life. What then is the relationship between these shifting moral codes and
morality itself? If our evolving moral codes are not the universal morality of the cosmos,
how do we come into epistemic contact with that morality? There may be ways of
answering these questions. But I think Mackie is right to suggest that the moral
metaphysics and moral epistemology of an objectivist view are not very far from a
Platonic picture of the world.99 Few contemporary philosophers are willing to go that
route.100 The chasm between Platonism and naturalism is quite deep.
The social picture, on the other hand, has this much going for it: neither its
metaphysics nor its epistemology are mysterious. Moral facts are social facts, and social
facts are natural facts. To that extent, we may speak loosely of the “reducibility” of the
moral to the natural. But the point is not that moral talk redescribes certain natural
features of the world. Rather, moral talk is used to navigate and when necessary construct
or reconstruct a social world that inescapably surrounds us. To say moral talk is used to
navigate social life is not to endorse non-cognitivism. I take no stance in this chapter or in
this dissertation on the question of whether moral judgments express beliefs. The point is
simply that morality, on the social picture, is a tool, or a social technology of sorts, and
not a fixed feature of the natural (or supernatural) order human beings inhabit.101
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The transition to a social picture of morality has important implications, three of
which I want to emphasize here. First, if morality is a tool for social living, then moral
codes are essentially negotiable. It is not a matter getting morality “right” (“perceiving” it
correctly) but of crafting with others workable forms of life governed by shared
understandings.102 Moral negotiation of course makes little sense on the objectivist view.
Second, if morality is a tool for social living, then there are no moral experts. Some
people are better at getting their way no doubt, and others are better at perceiving and
attending to the needs and desires of others. But no one can claim any full or final moral
revelation. And third, there may be but there need not be any disconnect between moral
life on the one hand and the examined life on the other. If we could only picture morality
as an objective, supra-institutional reality, then self-understanding would always be
morally destructive. But on a social view, morality is a tool for social living and can be
seen as such, so moral language can be used and moral life lived in good faith. Moral life
can be lived transparently.
These three points are interrelated. In denying the existence of moral expertise as
such and emphasizing the negotiability of moral norms and ideals, I am hinting at the
possibility of a social view of moral justification, which will be important in completing
my response to Joyce. But I want to shift to this topic by focusing specifically on this last
point: the possibility of transparency.
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Opacity and Transparency

There is no philosophical difficulty surrounding the epistemic justification of
normal institutional beliefs. Judgments about what is required, permitted, or prohibited in
chess, for example, are epistemically justified under rather mundane conditions related to
the undistorted social transmission of codified rules. If there is no dispute about the
official rules of chess, and my judgment about the permissibility of a particular move is
informed in the relevant way by my epistemic access to those rules, then that judgment is
justified.
Things are a bit more complicated if access to the official rules is limited, or if
there are multiple, conflicting sets of “official” rules. But so long as players agree to the
same set of rules, there is no need to be worried about their judgments being
epistemically unjustified. We can even imagine two intrepid players attempting to play a
more freeform kind of chess. Perhaps they negotiate the rules on the fly. Pawns can move
sideways, kings can move like queens, and so on. The rules might even be asymmetrical,
with one player being allowed more flexibility than the other, say. Even in this case, there
is no special problem about the epistemic justification of judgments made by the players.
So long as the players are clear about what they’re doing, what game they’re playing,
everything is as it should be. When the game is transparent to the players, we might say,
their game-related judgments can be epistemically justified—as epistemically justified as
they need to be. More generally then, when the workings of an institution are transparent
to its participants, I am proposing that their institution-related judgments can be
epistemically justified—as epistemically justified as they need to be. (Putting things this
way is intended to leave my account neutral on the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate.)
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The question of morality’s epistemic justification arises for Joyce because of
morality’s alleged supra-institutionality. We talk and act as though responsive to
objective, “official” rules not written by human hands. That is the heart and essence of
the moral game. But there are in fact no official rules. And so we’re blind to the logic of
our own moral practice. The game we’re playing is rigged (not by any particular person,
but by our evolved minds). So says the skeptic.
The problem here is helpfully reframed as a problem of opacity. On the skeptical
view, evolution has wired us to be ignorant. Our moral institutions function properly so
long as we are blind to their institutionality. This is what is hanging on all this talk of
epistemic justification. The problem is that we are prevented from taking responsibility
for moral rules that are ultimately rules of our own making. Instead, we are condemned to
relinquishing responsibility for our moralities by a “moral sense” that externalizes the
authority of morality.
But in fact we are not “condemned” in this way. At least, Joyce has marshaled no
evidence to support such a claim. At best, to judge from the empirical literature, some of
us (especially children), at this historical juncture in Western culture, may have a
predisposition to project or externalize the authority of moral norms and ideals. And the
legacy of Christianity in Western culture here is not inconsequential. But none of this
means that a social picture of morality is psychologically impossible for most adult
human beings. And I have argued that the distinguishing marks of moral norms in the
psychological literature can be reconciled with the social view. If we substitute a social
view of moral authority and of morality for the objectivist view, then there is no obstacle
to moral agents understanding the true nature of their “game.” To say this is to say that
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morality, on the social view, can be practiced transparently. And if that’s the case, then
on my analysis, our moral judgments can have all the epistemic justification they need.
Moral Justification

I’ve been arguing that Joyce’s skeptical argument misses the possibility of a
social understanding of moral authority, and with it, a social picture of morality itself.
While the norms of elective institutions are not inescapably binding for us simply
because we can opt out of the institution at any point, most of us cannot, in any
meaningful sense, opt out of social life as a whole. For this reason, fundamental
institutions—those that structure our basic social existence—are literally inescapable for
us. If we think of morality as a fundamental institution then, moral authority can be
pictured as a social phenomenon, and morality as structuring the complex web of our
relationships. Morality may be “conventional” to the degree that norms and ideals can be
renegotiated, but it is not escapable—unless what one “escapes” is social life itself.
Joyce’s concern about the epistemic justification of our moral judgments can be
reframed, I have suggested, as a concern about opacity. But institutional judgments made
by clear-sighted participants in the relevant institution have all the epistemic justification
they need. Thus, to the extent that our moralities can be made transparent, our moral
judgments can also have all the epistemic justification they need.
At this point, it behooves me to clarify the manner in which my account captures
a tension inherent in philosophical accounts of morality. By suggesting that we picture
morality as a fundamental institution (or as the set of our fundamental institutions—it
makes no difference), I have offered what might be called an anthropological picture of
morality. To view things in the way that I propose is to see all human communities as
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having a morality of some sort, and all moral norms as being authoritative in the social
sense (as a simple matter of definition). This is the picture of morality and of moral
authority I want for my account—to be supplemented momentarily in a very important
way.
According to Joyce, however, the “value systems that clearly count as moralities
[include] Christian ethics, deontological systems, Moorean intuitionism, Platonic theories
about the Form of the Good, and so on.”103 I do not intend to argue for the “correctness”
of my account of morality, or for the “incorrectness” of Joyce’s. I think my
“anthropological” account of morality is generally more useful, but no doubt that could
be debated as well (useful for what?).
What Joyce’s examples share in common, and what my account might be thought
to forfeit, is a perspective from which to judge existing moral norms and ideals. What
Christian ethics, deontological systems, Moorean intuitionism, and Platonic theories
about the Form of the Good each in their own way provide is critical leverage, or the
possibility of critique (and of progress). One might worry that a merely anthropological
account of morality could only be crudely relativistic, christening all social norms and
ideals as equally “moral.” But this is not what I intend.104
To suggest that morality is first and foremost a social phenomenon is not to
suggest that we are mere vessels or mouthpieces for inherited norms. On my view, rather,
we interpret, extend, reinterpret, or reject moral norms as we use them in the process of
making ourselves and our form of life intelligible to each other and to ourselves. Or, to
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put the point schematically, I view moral justification as a social process. I am inspired
here by Alison Jaggar and Theresa Tobin, who argue that a moral conclusion “is justified
by the account that is given to others about why the action is wrong, by the
argumentation and reasons offered, and by others’ responsive uptake of that account,”105
with the result that “No claims are justified in general, for all time, or sub specie
aeternitatis.”106 Moral justification, in other words, is not something we do in the
abstract, or to God, or even to the Academy, but rather something we do amongst
ourselves. And this is how the social view captures the possibility of moral critique.
Moral authority and moral justification, on the social view I am articulating, are
bookends of the tension that any philosophical account of morality needs to capture. For,
on the one hand, moral norms are all around us, and inescapable, in what is sometimes a
distressing way (think of a Black person under Jim Crow, or of a queer person in
normatively hostile environments); and, on the other hand, when these socially enforced
and authoritative norms are distressing, we are tempted to call them bad moral norms, or
simply immoral norms. On a social view of moral justification then, norms and ideals are
justified (or not) to particular others, in real time, when they pass muster (or not) with
those they guide. Previously “passing” norms can in principle always be problematized,
and moral systems always be renegotiated. Thus moral justification, when and where it
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happens, is a social and political achievement, rather than a distinctly philosophical one.
It consists in our being at home in a system of fundamental norms.107
Of course, to say moral justification is social is only to provide a formal
framework for making sense of the justificatory project, rather than to provide a
substantive account of justification. But this is because justification, on the social view, is
not something a philosopher as such can provide. Neither my colleagues nor I occupy a
privileged normative space from which we can definitively rule on the moral status of the
fundamental norms and ideals that govern and guide our lives with others. We are rather
participants, among many, in a conversation about the norms and ideals that inescapably
structure our many and very different lives. With that caveat in place, I concede that there
is a lot more to be said about moral justification on a social view, and specifically, about
how moral justification can be driven and guided by the kinds of concerns voiced in
Joyce’s skeptical arguments. I take up that task in the following chapter.108
5. Conclusion

To the best of my knowledge, Joyce’s argument for evolutionary moral
skepticism in The Evolution of Morality is the most extensive and compelling
philosophical case for what we could call a deflationary moral naturalism, for the view
that the knowledge we get from the sciences is morally dangerous. On Joyce’s view,
natural selection has predisposed us to view certain social norms as having conventiontranscendent practical clout. Realizing that our moral convictions can be accounted for in
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evolutionary terms, without reference to any objective moral facts, should undermine our
confidence in the truth of our moral judgments, he says.
I have argued that Joyce misses the possibility of a social understanding of moral
authority according to which moral norms become authoritative for us by structuring our
fundamental forms of life. Morality is a fundamental institution, not an elective
institution like chess or etiquette. It has become fundamental, in at least some cases,
because it intersects in important ways with basic human needs, rather than merely with
superficial desires. It is for most of us effectively inescapable. We are social animals, and
morality is how we get along—how we must get along, lest we not.
A commitment to naturalism, in brief, need not incline us to adopt a deflationary
moral naturalism. That has been the central thesis of this chapter. We can instead adopt a
social picture of morality, according to which the authority of moral norms is social—it
flows from the inescapability of those fundamental institutions that structure our lives as
social animals—and according to which the justification of moral norms is social as well.
The heart of morality on this picture is in social exchange, in dialogue, in the work of
making ourselves and our form of life intelligible to each other. The social construction
of morality is a joint project in which we justify ourselves to each other in shared terms,
replicating or adapting and reinterpreting extant norms and ideals to suit our evolving
needs.
The largely schematic nature of my remarks in this chapter calls for
supplementation. In particular, it would be helpful to see how the social process of moral
justification works in more detail—how, in conversation with others, we make sense of,
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or fail to see the sense in, existing norms and ideals. That is the process I offer to
illustrate in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE

MORAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE ETHICS OF CARE

1. Introduction

Considered in isolation, the social view of morality appears to have one major,
glaring flaw. Because it incorporates a social understanding of moral justification, it
might be taken to simply baptize all extant moralities (morality in the descriptive sense)
as moral or good. If I don’t have to justify myself to God or to the academy or to pure
reason or any other transcendent force, agent, or thing, then isn’t it just open season?
Can’t I just “justify” myself and my actions to others by beating them over the head with
a stick, or lying to them, or in any other way I happen to fancy? A person might
legitimately wonder, that is, if saying that moral justification is a social and political
matter (rather than a distinctly philosophical one) isn’t opening the field to marketers and
sophists and an impure legion of evil deceivers. But of course, the field is already open.
And our operant moralities are already a reflection of that fact. It is a strength and not a
weakness of the social view that the plain fact of morality’s messiness should be
accounted for in this way.
We can say more. There’s a plain sense in which, if I “justify” myself to you by
clubbing you over the head and proclaiming “it’s my way or the highway,” I haven’t in
fact justified myself to you at all. What I’ve done is beaten you over the head and maybe
gotten my way. To say that moral norms and ideals are justified in and through
interpersonal exchange is already to say that such norms and ideals at least purport to be
more than a club over the head. The more difficult case is the one in which the conditions
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of our co-construction of moral norms and ideals are opaque—when one, many, or all of
us are deceived or mistaken in some way about the nature of our project, our language,
our practice. We (or some of us) might think in such cases that our shared understandings
are justified, when in fact they are not. They lack the epistemic justification Joyce was
concerned with in the previous chapter.
According the social view, this problem of opacity can in principle be resolved.
That resolution, as I suggested in the previous chapter, involves efforts towards
transparency. It involves trying to understand, to see clearly, our form of life. In a sense
then, it is the spirit of empirical project that not only generates the skeptical question
about morality, but also provides the resources for an answer. In this chapter,
accordingly, I narrate the emergence and evolution of the ethics of care as a case study in
moral justification driven by this concern for transparency—for truth. The payoff is both
an illustration of how moral justification can work and a positive example of how to “do”
moral justification for those of us who, in the spirit of the Enlightenment tradition, share
a concern about unacknowledged power in social exchange, and an aversion to
oppression, whether overt or covert.
The account of this chapter hinges on seeing a certain kind of investigation as part
and parcel of the empirical project. The type of investigation I have in mind seeks to
bring to light the social mechanisms by which certain norms and ideals, along with
representations of morality, come to cultural prominence. From the perspective that I
favor, such social-genealogical scrutiny can be said to describe the means by which our
moralities are created and sustained. This is consistent with my (naturalistic) refusal to
picture morality as a “real” or transcendent thing beyond the realm of human practice.
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But we can bracket this naturalistic commitment, and start with the observable truth that
claims about moral norms and ideals and claims about morality come from somewhere,
socially speaking.
While social-genealogical inquiry can begin by tracing the social generation and
propagation of claims about moral norms and moral ideals, and about morality itself, the
picture that emerges from such inquiry fits nicely with the social picture of morality I
have outlined. Thus we can appropriate the results of social-genealogical inquiry for the
social picture of morality. Those results suggest that transparency is transformative. The
empirical project does not simply leave morality alone, christening all extant moralities
with naturalism’s “thumbs up,” but rather requires revisions in our moral understandings.
Some of our moral norms and ideals can survive in the light of day; others cannot.109
Thus, to take the empirical project seriously is neither to become a global skeptic nor,
conversely, to just leave morality alone. It is, rather, to see the need for ongoing revision,
for ongoing conversation, in the co-creation of our shared forms of life.
2. The Ethics of Care

A Different Voice

The American psychologist Carol Gilligan first published her landmark book In a
Different Voice in 1982.110 Gilligan’s work focuses on models of human moral
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development, and takes as its central critical target the six-stage moral development
scheme of her colleague Lawrence Kohlberg.111 On Kohlberg’s model, human moral
development can be traced through six distinct stages. The stages are clustered in twos,
the first two under the header of pre-conventional morality (in which reasons for action
center on the self), the second two under the header of conventional morality (in which
reasons for action center on social order), and the last two under post-conventional
morality (in which reasons for action center on abstract principles of justice and human
rights). In principle, it is possible to situate individuals at one of the stages, on the basis
of their response to (hypothetical) moral dilemmas.
Though sympathetic to Kohlberg’s normative goals—of making judgments of
maturity in moral thought—Gilligan reports being troubled by the tendency of girls and
women to appear morally immature in these studies. Whereas boys and men in her
studies strongly prefer abstract analyses of moral problems, girls and women frequently
offer more contextual, relational approaches. For example, Jake and Amy, two elevenyear-olds in one of Gilligan’s studies, offer very different answers to the question “When
responsibility to oneself and responsibility to others conflict, how should one choose?”
Jake says, “You go about one-fourth to the others and three-fourths to yourself.”112 Amy
says,
Well, it really depends on the situation. If you have a responsibility with
somebody else, then you should keep it to a certain extent, but to the extent that it
is really going to hurt you or stop you from doing something that you really,
really want, then I think maybe you should put yourself first. But if it is your
responsibility to somebody really close to you, you’ve just got to decide in that
situation which is more important, yourself or that person, and like I said, it really
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depends on what kind of person you are and how you feel about the other person
or persons involved.113
Examples of this sort abound in Gilligan’s work.
The relationship between self and other, Gilligan claims, “differs in the
experience of men and women”—something she says is “a steady theme in the literature
on human development and a finding of my research.” Male voices typically speak of
“the role of separation as it defines and empowers the self,” whereas female voices
typically speak of “the ongoing process of attachment that creates and sustains the human
community.”114 While she is careful not to suggest that one perspective is better than the
other, Gilligan notes the invisibility of the female voice in traditional developmental
models, such as Kohlberg’s. Kohlberg’s model, she points out, was initially developed
from an all-male sample. Left unmodified then, Kohlberg’s model effectively masks the
moral maturity of women, Gilligan contends.
The relational moral reasoning, or “care perspective” of women, Gilligan claims,
can be seen to develop through its own pre-conventional, conventional, and postconventional phases. On Gilligan’s analysis, the difference between the “justice”
perspective, associated with almost all men, and the “care” perspective, associated with a
number of women, is that the latter culminates in multifaceted contextual and relational
reasoning, which balances responsibilities to others and responsibilities to the self.115 The
takeaway, according to Gilligan, is that researchers who care about understanding and
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mapping human moral development in its fullness need, at the very least, to pay attention,
to listen, to the “different voice” of women in order to rectify the male bias of dominant
psychological models. The troublesome thought is that, prior to Gilligan, the unmarked
male bias of developmental models made such listening difficult or impossible. Or rather,
researchers had been listening to female voices—voices filtered through and distorted by
an inadequate psychological model.
Feminine Ethics

American ethicist and education theorist Nel Noddings argues that we need a
relational ethics, one that is “feminine.” She aims to provide an ethics of precisely this
sort in her 1984 book, Caring.116 Such an approach is needed, on Noddings’ view, to
counterbalance the detached and “paternal” ethics of law and principle enshrined in the
Western canon. “It is feminine in the deep classical sense,” she says, “rooted in
receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness.”117 Whereas “masculine” approaches oppose
morality to feeling, Noddings views morality as growing out of feeling, and specifically,
out of caring relationships.118
On Noddings’ account, a caring relationship “requires the engrossment and
motivational displacement of the one-caring, and it requires the recognition and
spontaneous response of the cared-for.”119 Caring is thus fundamentally relational and
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affective. In the absence of pathology or serious abandonment, all of us have already
been in and benefited from at least one such caring relationship. Having survived the
extreme vulnerabilities of infancy and early childhood, we have our mothers to thank,
and/or our fathers and extended and adoptive families. This caring can be called natural.
It is natural in the sense of being uncoerced—we parents, siblings, and friends care
because we want to care. It (usually) takes no great effort to be responsive to the cries and
concerns of a newborn, or of a child in need. We are moved to action by feelings that
well up inside of us apart from any conscious effort. This response is near universal in
our species. It can be “identified as the human condition that we, consciously or
unconsciously, perceive as ‘good’.”120 We want to be moral, Noddings says, “in order to
remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring.”121
Morality, on this account, has its roots in natural caring. What grows from these
roots, Noddings says, is an ideal. In response to the experienced goodness of our early
caring relationships, we develop an ideal of ourselves as caring and responsive beings. It
is because caring relationships give our lives meaning that we come to value them, and
thus come to value those traits in us (and in others) that make those relationships work.
This ideal in turn gives rise to what Noddings calls ethical caring.
Ethical caring, unlike natural caring, is an effort. We will ourselves to care (as
opposed to simply finding ourselves caring), Noddings suggests, under guidance of the
caring ideal. Because we have come to value caring relationships and ourselves as carers,
we care actively, ethically, even when affectively ambivalent.122 This might be caring for
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an infant when we ourselves are tired and hungry, or it might be caring for a stranger, at
some inconvenience to ourselves. We are carried in such effortful activity by an ideal
with its roots in essentially effortless caring, and by the joy and satisfaction of living in
congruence with that ideal. Though ethical caring constitutes what we sometimes
recognize as stereotypically “moral” behavior, Noddings insists that natural caring is just
as important as ethical caring. We would be just as impoverished without the one as we
would without the other (although natural caring could conceivably exist without ethical
caring, but not vice-versa).
Although women are capable of arranging principles hierarchically and reasoning
to logical conclusions, Noddings says, they seem to have a heightened capacity for
relational thought and insight—for care. The general difference between men and women
is thus not one of capability, but rather of orientation, of preference. Women, she says,
“enter the practical domain of moral action […] through a different door, so to speak.
[…] Faced with a hypothetical dilemma, women often ask for more information. We
want to know more, I think, in order to form a picture more nearly resembling real moral
situations.”123 She speculates that this capacity might be grounded in biology.124 “If it is
the case that females have easier and more direct access to caring through biologically
facilitative factors,” she says, “this does not imply that males have no access, but it might
help to explain why men intellectualize, abstract, and institutionalize that which women
treat directly and concretely.”125 Noddings’ work accordingly aims to represent the voice,
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perspective, and moral orientation of women in a culture that has been shaped by the
voice, perspective, and orientation of men.
Maternal Practice

Although her work can be seen to reprise some of the themes that emerge in
Gilligan’s research, Noddings’ emphasis on femininity and her easy attribution of
“feminine” traits to women is controversial. In contrast to Noddings’ conception of care
as a psychological (and largely female) predisposition to think about life in concrete and
relational terms, many feminists have preferred to talk about care as a practice—as work.
Caring, on this view, is a kind of interpersonal labor. This is the approach adopted and
developed at length in Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking, which was originally
published in 1989, seven years after Gilligan’s In a Different Voice.126 Early versions of
Ruddick’s work were published in article form in 1980—before Gilligan.127
Ruddick’s original contribution to philosophical discussion of care and its
implications involves an explicit appeal to what she calls “practicalist” philosophy. To
the question “What is the relation of thinking to life?” practicalist thought responds, “All
thinking […] arises from and is shaped by practices in which people engage.”128 The
significance of this approach lies in its ability to offer an informative and meaningful
answer to the question “how do women think?” The thought of women grows out of the
practices of women. And in the history of Western culture, one prominent practice of
women has been that of mothering.
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Maternal practice or mothering, on Ruddick’s account, is an activity or practice, a
job. It is therefore essentially genderless. One is a “mother” on Ruddick’s view “just
because and to the degree that [one is] committed to meeting demands that define
maternal work.”129 The demands that define maternal work in turn flow from the needs
and capabilities of children, and from the desires of society. Those needs are (1) to be
kept alive (preservation), (2) to grow, mature, and develop (nurturance), and (3) to be
made socially acceptable (training). Children need to be kept alive, before they need
anything else. Assuming they are safe from bodily harm, their emotional and
psychological needs and potential call for nurturance, for a safe and welcoming world to
accept and embrace the persons they are becoming. That acceptance is never
unconditional however, and so mothering also involves shaping a child to “fit” society in
some way. Ruddick recognizes a potential for deformation here, when society’s norms
are harmful, and she insists that because social acceptability is never automatic, maternal
practice triggers reflection on the nature of “acceptability.” Maternal practice, in other
words, gives rise to maternal thought—to reflection on maternal practice, the values it
assumes, and the values it creates.
Mothers are not naturally good, Ruddick says, but at its best, mothering is
nonviolent. In her words:
The four ideals of nonviolence – renunciation, resistance, reconciliation, and
peacekeeping – govern only some maternal practices of some mothers. Yet it is
also true that to elucidate these ideals is to describe, from a particular perspective,
maternal practice itself. Peacemaking mothers create arrangements that enable
their children to live safely, develop happily, and act conscientiously; that is, they
preserve, nurture, and train, exemplifying the commitments of maternal work.130
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When they learn to respond to the needs and desires of children, to negotiate with them,
and to help them negotiate with others, mothers at their best resist violent coercion and
create peace. The ends specific to maternal practice, in other words, generate a preference
for some ways of being in relationship over others. This maternal nonviolence, Ruddick
argues, can set the stage for a politics of peace.131 The caring practice of mothers has the
potential to change our world for the better.
Intersectionality

The practical shift evident in Ruddick’s work is no mere accident. Claims made
about “women” simpliciter, such as those found in Noddings’ work, and sometimes in
Gilligan’s, came under critical scrutiny through the work of feminists like bell hooks,
Maria Lugones, and Elizabeth Spelman.132 hooks, for instance, recounts an experience
from the first women’s studies class she attended. Gender, it had been claimed, would be
the most important factor in determining the kind of life a newborn child would live in
our society. hooks, the only non-white person in the class, objected. “[W]hen the child of
two black parents is coming out of the womb,” she said, “the factor that is considered
first is skin color, then gender, because race and gender will determine that child’s
fate.”133 hooks directs some pointed criticism in this vein at the influential work of Betty
Friedan in The Feminine Mystique.134 What Friedan portrays as the predicament of
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“women” in the 1950s and 60s, hooks shows, is in fact the predicament of some
women—namely, white middle-class women. If female children who are also Black face
systematically different social prospects than, say, white female children, and if the lives
of white women are importantly unlike the lives of non-white women, then gender is only
one of potentially many social categories that deserve close critical scrutiny. Refusing to
broaden the analysis along the axis of race would only replicate for non-white women the
erasure that white feminists had learned to fight in male representations of “humanity.”
Likewise with respect to class. Thus the intersection of gender with other social
categories such as race and class problematizes representations of “women”
simpliciter.135
Though Gilligan is aware of this problem of representation, she nevertheless slips
into broad generalizations about women. And yet class shapes performance on the
standard moral development scale, as Kohlberg himself notes,136 and subsequent studies
on the influence of race in moral development likewise problematize those
generalizations.137 In Carol Stack’s study with a community of African-Americans, for
example, participants employed both “justice” and “care” arguments in their response to
a moral dilemma. And Stack’s study found no gender difference in the group.138 Joan
Tronto traces the problems with Gilligan’s research back to her chosen lens of objectrelations theory, which “posits two universal human psychological problems: oppression
[…] and abandonment.”139 The voices of subjects in Gilligan’s studies, examined in this
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light, speak of rights that prevent oppression (the justice perspective) or of connections
that prevent abandonment (the care perspective). Whatever insight this framework
succeeds in capturing, Tronto claims, “the problem with this view of psychological
development is that it makes gender the only relevant category of difference.”140
Ironically then, from this intersectional perspective, Gilligan is largely guilty of
the same methodological sin she exposes and critiques in Kohlberg—that of generalizing
from an unrepresentative sample. Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman argue for the
importance of this lesson, and offer a caution for theorists: “Categories are quick to
congeal,” they say, “and the experiences of women whose lives do not fit the categories
will appear as anomalous when in fact the theory should have grown out of them as much
as others from the beginning.”141 Feminists have since been typically very cautious about
claims to represent women (or human beings, or Blacks, or whomever). With the
publication, in 2000, of a second edition of Feminist Theory, hooks says, “There has been
no other movement for social justice in our society that has been as self-critical as
feminist movement.”142
Meeting Needs

As Virginia Held notes, “the practice of mothering had been virtually absent from
all non-feminist moral theorizing” until the emergence of care ethics in the 1980s.
“[T]here was no philosophical acknowledgment that mothers think or reason,” she says,
“or that one can find moral values in this practice.”143 On the standard feminist view, the
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invisibility of caregivers in Western moral theories can be traced back to their typically
marginal societal position. Those at the centers of power—typically propertied white
men—have passed off care work to those at the periphery: women, non-whites, the lower
classes. The focus here is on practical caring: meeting the needs of children, the ill, the
disabled, the elderly. The experience of the less powerful and the powerless has been
eclipsed in Western moral theories, on this analysis, by the experience of the powerful,
which has not usually included caring for the weak and the vulnerable.
Joan Tronto argues that this analysis can be refined. Care, she suggests, “consists
of four analytically separate, but interconnected, phases. They are: caring about, taking
care of, care-giving, and care-receiving.”144 To care about something or someone is to be
motivated by the state of that object, event, or person. It is to be moved to respond. When
one takes care of something or someone, motivation has been transformed into action. If I
come to care about victims of a natural disaster on the other side of the globe, say, I
might make a donation or raise money for those victims. To that extent I am taking care
of the problem, even if only in a very small way. One can take care of something or
someone at a distance. Being a caregiver however, in Tronto’s sense, requires proximity
to the object of care. I might write a check for tsunami victims, but it is the relief worker
who feeds, clothes, and provides housing for those victims. I am “taking care,” but the
relief worker is giving care—concretely. Finally, care cannot properly be given without
being received. Attention to whether and how care is received differentiates good care
from bad care. To ignore how a gesture intended as help is received is in fact to be
careless.
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On this analysis, care is a multifaceted process that must be conscientiously
carried out from beginning to end to count as genuine or successful care. Gender enters
the picture (as do race and class), on Tronto’s account, insofar as “caring about, and
taking care of, are the duties of the powerful. Care-giving and care-receiving are left to
the less powerful.”145 Doctors, politicians, and professors, may lay claim to care—they
“care” about patients, the poor, students—but more often than not delegate the work of
concrete caring to others—nurses, social workers, teaching assistants, etc. This is how
powerful people can do so little actual care work and still view themselves as caring
individuals (as with the traditional “bread-winning” middle-class North American father
of the 1950s and 60s).
Tronto’s view of care can be called “holistic” insofar as it insists on the unity of
the four phases. Good care is caring about and taking care of (abstract care) with followthrough: care-giving and care-receiving (concrete care). This holism is philosophically
and socially significant because care has been marginalized and made invisible in
Western culture and thought precisely through its fragmentation and through the
delegation of its concrete phases to the less powerful. Coming to see care as a unity thus
requires questioning the effectiveness of this partitive strategy.
To the extent that the needs of the vulnerable remain poorly met or unmet, Tronto
insists, we have no legitimate claim to care. She explains: “The qualities of attentiveness,
of responsibility, of competence, or responsiveness,” which correspond to the four phases
of care, “need not be restricted to the immediate objects of our care, but can also inform
our practices as citizens. They direct us to a politics in which there is, at the center, a
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public discussion of needs, and an honest appraisal of the intersection of needs and
interests.”146 In such a political ethics of care, it is therefore insufficient for the powerful
to say, “we care.” The effectiveness of that care, holistically understood, must be given
clear-sighted scrutiny. Are we as a society sufficiently attentive to the needs of those
among and around us? Are we sufficiently responsive to their needs? Do we meet those
needs competently? Is our care being met with the expected response? These are the
questions an ethics of care puts front and center, according to Tronto.147 The distribution
of care and of care work, she says, must be just.148
3. An Interpretation

Feminist Skepticism

The thinkers I mention above all reflect in some way on “care,” but their
approaches are very different. Gilligan is concerned with moral maturity, Noddings with
“femininity,” Ruddick with mothering, hooks, Spelman, and Lugones with differences
between women, and Tronto with the politics of care work. Is there any thread of
continuity here? Yes: the emergence and evolution of the ethics of care, as reflected in
the work of these thinkers, can, I submit, be read as a kind of dialectic, driven from start
to finish by the engine of feminist skepticism.
Feminist skepticism in ethics, explains Margaret Walker, is skepticism “about
whose experiences and judgments are taken as definitive or representative of moral
thinking, whose self-images and motivations are normative for moral personhood, and
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whose presumed entitlements and liabilities set the standards for moral
responsibilities.”149 It is, in other words, a kind of reflexive “who says?” leveled at claims
about morality that purport to represent others in some fashion, whether human beings,
women, or some other subset of humanity.
As Walker notes, Gilligan’s own work centers on the idea that “the failure of
women to fit existing models of human growth may point to a problem in the
representation, a limitation in the conception of human condition, an omission of certain
truths about life.”150 Psychological models that take (some) men as the benchmark of
moral maturity effectively mask the moral maturity of “deviant” women (and “deviant”
men). The point is not that the project of devising models of moral maturity is doomed, or
that it has to make everybody look good. Gilligan’s own positive work presupposes the
viability of Kohlberg’s normative project. The point is that social facts, social boundaries,
may create limits to generalizability. Gender, in Gilligan’s work, is shown to be one of
the variables with a non-negligible impact on the relevance—on the truthfulness—of
Kohlberg’s model in mapping the moral maturity of various subjects.
Likewise, Noddings’ “feminine” approach can be read as a response to the
marginalization of certain traits (“receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness”151) in
philosophical ethics. “Human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for,” she
says, “have not received attention except as outcomes of ethical behavior.”152 Noddings
aims to broaden the landscape of ethics by emphasizing care as a source of ethical
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behavior. As with men and “masculinity,” the relationship between women and
“femininity” is problematic. Insofar as the principal features of mainstream ethics
(abstract principles and deductive logic, for instance) are coded “masculine” in our
culture however, and insofar as the producers of mainstream ethics have predominantly
been men, Noddings’ attempted recovery of “femininity” can be seen as a challenge to
the representativeness of mainstream ethics, in both form and content.
Ruddick’s work remedies the complete invisibility of mothering in philosophical
ethics. Consider the framing of a recent introductory text on ethics.
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that deals with how we ought to live, with the
idea of the Good, and with such concepts as right and wrong. […] The theoretical
aspect, ethical theory, deals with comprehensive theories about the good life and
moral obligation. […] The applied aspect, applied ethics, deals with specific
moral problems such as abortion, suicide, euthanasia, sexuality, capital
punishment, affirmative action, business dealings, environmental issues, and
war.153
Ethical thought, on this account, solves ethical problems—few or none of which,
apparently, emerge in parenting, or in domestic life. This is not to say that good human
living, moral obligations, or any of the issues mentioned don’t deserve close attention.
They do. But it is at least curious that a practice we have all benefited from doesn’t
appear at all on this particular map of the moral terrain. The fact that this theoretical
invisibility of mothering is widespread, more than ironic, might be judged pernicious—
damning, in fact, for a field of study that “deals with how we ought to live.” There is
nothing wrong with being selective in one’s inquiry. But if philosophical ethics is
consistently selective in ways that do not flag mothering or other forms of care work as
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morally noteworthy, it can hardly claim to study “how we ought to live.” Its paradigmatic
moral agent “is none of us at all times, and many of us at no times.”154
What Gilligan, Noddings, and Ruddick do—namely, identify and attempt to
correct incomplete representations of human life (posturing as complete
representations)—later care ethicists generalize to a methodological point. Theories do
not come to us directly from the world. Rather, particular theorists create theories (ideally
in dialogue with the world!). And in societies politically stratified along the axes of
gender, race, and class, those theories will inevitably carry the social fingerprints of their
makers. When hooks, Spelman, Lugones and other social theorists point to evidence in
theories that situates their makers (as white, well-off, or whatever), the point is not to
play an interminable and ultimately fruitless game of “gotcha!” Their aim is rather to
foster reflexive theory-making. As Cheshire Calhoun puts it, “If we hope to shape
culture, and not merely to add bricks to a philosophical tower, we will need to be mindful
of the cultural/political use to which our thoughts may be put after leaving our
wordprocessors.”155 Theories are often produced in institutional contexts that bestow a
kind of authority on those theories—as when they inform psychological research, or
policy proposals—and that authority should be able to withstand the laying bare of the
concrete mechanisms of theory-production. Otherwise their authority is shown to be
illegitimate.
Likewise, Tronto’s ethics of care can be seen as proposing a reflexive
transformation for politics. In order to adequately care for all citizens, lawmakers cannot
simply claim to “care.” A society’s political structures must make possible a true
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representation of the needs of citizens. Insofar as the concrete phases of care, in which
human needs are actually met, are passed off to the politically voiceless, a society’s
provision of care is bound to be inadequate, regardless of its public discourse about care
and needs.
On my reading then, the common thread that runs through the ethics of care, from
its emergence to its ongoing evolution, is this feminist skepticism, this wariness about
representation, and about socially recognized “expertise”—socially granted power—that
often outruns the empirical foundations of the relevant theories. Feminist skepticism can
be seen as concerned with truth. But the issue is not just the empirical adequacy of our
social, psychological, and moral theories, abstractly considered. The central issue is the
harm for outliers of being theoretically “disappeared” by accounts of human life
formulated at a considerable social distance from them. Women do not benefit from and
can be harmed by psychologists who hear them through male-biased developmental
models. Black women do not benefit from and can be harmed by white feminists
claiming to know what “women” want and need. So also along other axes of difference
that mark differential positions of access to opportunity and power in society.156
Moral Equilibrium

Feminist skepticism, I have claimed, is the driving force in the emergence and
evolution of the ethics of care. Two points remain to be made: first, that feminist
skepticism is morally transformative; second, that it is an extension of the empirical
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project. I’ll elaborate on that first point here, and on the second in the next section. My
central thesis remains that the overlapping of the empirical project with moral practice
and thought is transformative—that naturalism neither destroys morality nor leaves it
alone, but rather transforms it.
What feminist skepticism does is put pressure on the norms and ideals that
structure our fundamental institutions. “It puts the authority and credibility of
representative claims about moral life under harsh light, and challenges epistemic and
moral authority that is politically engineered and self-reinforcing.”157 Feminist skepticism
involves taking a hard look about what “we” supposedly know—about human beings,
women, or whomever—sourcing these authoritative claims, these authoritative
representations of humanity or parts of it, and asking whether or not the theorist or
theorists who theorize are in a position to know what they claim, on behalf of us all, to
know. The history of feminism is replete with illustrations of this line of inquiry, and
with embarrassing revelations about the smallness of the lived experience of those
privileged men who have claimed, in socially sanctioned, authoritative ways, to know all
about “man” or about “women” or what have you. In the ethics of care and in much of
contemporary feminist theorizing, we see that skeptical eye turned inward as well.
When does it end? Is the skeptical feminist stance an eternal unmasking with no
positive contribution? Can it offer anything constructive without undermining itself? The
positive vision of feminist skepticism in ethics can best be articulated, I submit, on a
social picture of morality. On the social picture, you will recall, morality is a tool for
social living, for coexistence and cooperation. Walker calls it a “socially embodied
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medium of understanding, adjustment, and accounting among persons in certain terms,
especially those defining people’s identities, relationships, and values.”158 It (at least
initially) takes for granted and seeks to preserve the value of a shared life. A shared social
life is made possible by fundamental institutions that are supported norms and ideals by
which we make ourselves and our behavior intelligible to each other. We may thus speak
of those norms and ideals as moral understandings—understandings which are in
principle, though often not in practice, mutual. They are the shared terms of our common
life. By laying bare the social workings and power dynamics of the production of moral
understandings, feminist skepticism ultimately aims to increase the intelligibility of those
understandings. For if those understandings collapse under conditions of full
intelligibility—what I, following Walker, have been calling “transparency”—then they
are not genuine, or not genuinely mutual, understandings.
Walker comments:
A system of complementary gender roles, for example, may support a shared
understanding between spouses of their different responsibilities in family life,
under a presumption of reciprocity and respect. But a wife’s depression, labor
department statistics on patterns of sex-segmentation in the workforce, or
sociological studies of relations between power and earned income in marriage,
might reveal to one or both that this arrangement is something other than it had
seemed.159
The spouses in this case think they understand each other. More precisely, their
respective, socially sanctioned roles are the means by which they understand each
other—their responsibilities, rights, and value in the relationship. Whole-hearted
performance of their respective roles is in turn grounded in an assumption of fundamental
fairness or appropriateness of the roles (the “presumption of reciprocity and respect”). If
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the particular picture of gender complementarity that governs their relationship is shown
not to grow out of a concern for fairness or appropriateness (or to do so under
demonstrably false assumptions), this then undermines the whole-heartedness of that
performance. This moment of destabilization is the necessary precursor to a more
mutually acceptable restabilization (assuming one can be found). Concretely, this might
mean adopting different roles, adopting a more fluid attitude towards gender roles in
relationships more generally, or perhaps ending the relationship, if no new equilibrium
can be achieved.
Feminist skepticism can be destabilizing in this way. But the destabilization is not
an end in itself. Rather, the destabilization makes possible moral recalibration, that is, the
search for better equilibrium, rewriting mutual understandings to make them more
intelligible and more mutual.160 In our contemporary context, this approach is appealing,
if it is appealing, in virtue of its resonance with liberal, democratic ideals we owe to the
Enlightenment. Perhaps these ideals will be found problematic on other grounds. In any
case, they express what Bernard Williams calls a “hope for truthfulness”—a hope “that
ethical thought should stand up to reflection, and that its institutions and practices should
be capable of becoming transparent.”161 Transparency here is not conceived as a state that
some society achieves once and for all, but rather as the outcome of a process of
examination, undertaken at a particular time, for a particular reason, and from a particular
vantage point. Likewise, moral justification, on the social view, is not accomplished once
and for all, but is that ongoing process of making ourselves and our behavior intelligible
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to each other in shared terms. Equilibrium can be found, justification can be had, but first
it has to be sought.
A ship at sea cannot be rebuilt all at once. Those concerned with staying afloat
can nevertheless patch leaks where they find them, replacing rotting wood or rusted metal
with whatever materials happen to be at hand. Feminist skeptics have a keen eye for rust
and rot. Feminist skepticism is relentless. It is well worth appreciating, however, that this
focus on rust and rot is not just that. It is not the expression of a love of criticism. It is
first and foremost the expression of a desire is to stay afloat.
Naturalism

Stephen Finlay has recently suggested that a certain form of moral skepticism
(namely, error theory) may be popular with Australasian philosophers (Mackie was
Australian, Joyce was raised in New Zealand) because such countries “are melting pots
made up of immigrants from a wide variety of backgrounds,” and accordingly feature
“the greatest diversity of cultural heritages and moral viewpoints.”162 In conjunction with
relatively few social problems, Finlay speculates, this inclines philosophers to “have an
acute appreciation of the contingency of moral standards and more sympathy towards
rival viewpoints.”163 Moral claims are ordinarily indexed to some largely shared
normative framework, on Finlay’s account, and it is the absence of this shared
background, in conjunction with relative social stability, that makes it easier for
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Australasian thinkers to miss how morality normally works.
Joyce’s response to Finlay is hostile.164 He says, “if a philosopher’s allegiance to
a metaethical theory can be explained by reference to the surrounding sociological,
economic, and cultural forces, then of course there is no need to take his or her arguments
entirely seriously.”165 Finlay’s comments “are most charitably interpreted as a joke.”166
Joyce’s desire to keep social details out of philosophical argumentation is understandable.
As in the philosophy of science, a person might reasonably distinguish between a context
of philosophical discovery, in which the social details of a person’s life may inspire him
or her to come up with some theory, and a context of philosophical justification, in which
the theory is critically scrutinized by fellow philosophers without reference to its
provenance. On this model of philosophical argumentation, which Joyce seems to be
assuming, Finlay’s sociological remarks are clearly inappropriate. But this model of
philosophical analysis is itself problematic.
If there is any lesson to draw from the ethics of care or from feminist theory more
broadly, it is that the social provenance of theories matters, as does the social location of
its allegedly dispassionate evaluators. In the history of ethical thought, theory makers
have been men in patriarchal societies. With few exceptions, this has had a predictable
impact on their theories, and on the reception of those theories. “Philosophical
reasoning,” as Cheshire Calhoun puts it, “is shaped by extra-philosophic factors,
including the social location of the philosophic reasoner and his audience as well as the
contours of the larger social world in which philosophic thought takes place.”167 After

164

See Joyce, “Enough with the Errors,” 1.
Joyce, “Enough with the Errors,” 1.
166
Joyce, “The Error in ‘The Error in the Error Theory’,” 534.
167
Calhoun, “Gender Bias,” 463.
165

97
documenting the pervasive gender bias of the received ethical canon, feminists have, as
good theorists, offered an explanation for the pervasiveness of that bias: the canon’s
theorists have mostly been men in patriarchal societies. This “inappropriate” reference to
the social provenance of the theories is required to make sense of the pervasiveness of
anti-female bias in the canon. It is, in a way, an error theory—an explanation of why so
many theorists have been blind to the fact of female rationality and female moral agency.
It is ironic then that Joyce, an “error theorist” according to whom morality is
misunderstood by the masses on account of their evolved cognitive biases, would be
closed to an error theory that accounts for his own errors (of course, he does not agree
with Finlay that his views are erroneous). Finlay’s “error theory” of Joyce, it is important
to note, is offered not in lieu of critical interaction with Joyce’s positive claims, but as a
cautious addendum to twenty-one pages of engaged analysis. While a sociological
dismissal of serious philosophical arguments is undoubtedly inappropriate in philosophy,
Joyce’s out-of-hand rejection of the possibility that social facts about a theorist may well
matter is unjustified. This is not to say that Finlay is correct in his speculation. Just that
tracing a geography or social genealogy of moral skepticism is not an illegitimate project
for an empiricist or naturalist. To the contrary.168
The empirical project, I suggested early on, expresses a natural human curiosity, a
desire to understand, to make sense of, to render intelligible, the world in its entirety.
What I want to suggest now is that feminist skepticism is an extension of that project. It is
a kind of social-genealogical inquiry that takes as its object the norms, ideals, and values
of a given culture. It is a search for transparency that can (in conjunction with the right
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political leverage, no doubt) destabilize coercive or otherwise less-than-mutual
understandings. It modifies moral norms and ideals by digging up and airing the stories
of morality’s construction. Motivated by a concern for truth—the same desire for
understanding that drives the empirical project more generally—feminist skepticism
leverages that concern to move our moral lives in the direction of greater intelligibility
and mutuality. Thus the empirical project, I submit, should be seen as transformative, as
revisionary, for morality. Once the lens of inquiry is turned on the social fabric of
morality itself, the results of that inquiry unravel parts of that fabric. Those critical
openings make possible (although never necessary) transitions to more new and more
robust, more genuinely mutual, moral understandings.
Feminist skepticism unquestionably goes beyond the kind of speculation we find
in Finlay’s analysis. But both are curious in (what an empiricist should see as) the right
way. Theorists are not simply observers of moral phenomena, but are also participants in
some moral space. Thus the connections between particular moral spaces and the theories
produced there are a proper object of empirical scrutiny as well.
4. Conclusion

On the social view, morality is a social tool we use to get along together. It helps
us get along in part by giving us an understanding of what “getting along” looks like for
us. The norms and ideals of our fundamental institutions, I have suggested, are the shared
understandings that make possible our shared moral life. From the perspective of the
social view, moral justification is not the province of philosophers as such, but is rather
the everyday process of employing, rejecting, or reinterpreting the normative resources,
the moral understandings, of that shared form of life. The point of this chapter has been to

99
illustrate this process, not only as an interesting phenomenon in its own right, but also as
a process that can be motivated by the same concerns that give rise to skeptical questions
about morality in the first place.
What Joyce considers a question about the epistemic justification of our moral
judgments, I have reframed as a problem of opacity in moral living. Our moral judgments
can be as epistemically justified as they need to be, I have argued, precisely to the same
degree that our moral life can be lived transparently. To say this much is not to give
blanket approval to any and all extant moral norms. It is rather to say that, to the extent
that we value the spirit of empirical inquiry, we can also extend that inquiry to the values
we live our lives by. The feminist skepticism at the heart of the emergence and evolution
of the ethics of care embodies that empirical spirit. Thus it shows us how transparency (or
in Joyce’s terminology, the epistemic justification of our moral judgments) is possible:
we must scrutinize the production of our ideals with an eye to the distorting effects of
social distance. If we are to live a shared life in the full light of day, we must seek to
understand how the norms and ideals that structure our fundamental institutions were
created. To the degree that they can withstand such scrutiny, the moral life and the
examined life can be one and the same.
The social view is my answer to the question of how morality can and should be
understood after naturalism. It incorporates a social understanding of moral authority and
a social understanding of moral justification. What I have emphasized here is that the
empirical spirit that generates the question “are our moral judgments epistemically
justified?”—Joyce’s question—also has social and political force. Contra the skeptics,
whose view of morality is static, the social view suggests that moral practice can be made
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reflectively sustainable. It views reflective sustainability as a social and political
achievement—one that requires ongoing efforts.
The conclusion to which I have come is that the examined life need not destroy
the moral life. Shedding light on our moralities can be transformative, I have argued, but
morality—the network of shared understandings by which our form of life is
fundamentally structured—remains. I turn in the following chapters to the topic of moral
progress. For the purposes of this dissertation, I am concerned with the naturalistic
respectability (so to speak) of expansive moral ideals. In the final tally, I do find
expansive, humanist ideals to be compatible with naturalism. However, getting from
naturalism to humanism is admittedly not so simple a matter.

101
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF REASON IN MORAL PROGRESS

1. Introduction

I argued in chapter one that naturalism poses a challenge to our inherited ideas
about morality. My concern in chapters two and three has been to turn back that
challenge by articulating and defending a naturalistic, social view of morality. We are not
forced to adopt a skeptical stance, for the fundamental institutions of our societies can be
made transparent—giving our moral norms and ideals all the justification they need. The
case study of the previous chapter illustrates how that process can work.
In this chapter and in the next, I tackle the question of moral progress.
Specifically, I take for granted a modern and humanistic understanding of progress as the
expansion of our moral categories and institutions in the direction of greater inclusivity
and universality, and I inquire into possible naturalistic foundations for such ideals. Here
my task is largely negative: I offer a critique of Peter Singer’s account of moral progress
as a distinctly rational phenomenon.169 In chapter five, my I will allow myself some more
constructive remarks.
Singer’s account involves two key claims about reason, one backward-looking,
and one forward-looking. Singer’s backward-looking claim is that reason explains how
we have transcended the more limited genetically and emotionally based forms of
altruism elucidated in standard sociobiological accounts. His forward-looking claim is
that reason charts a progressive path forward: it provides a solid foundation for ethics, for
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adjudicating conflicting moral claims. In a sense then, Singer is proposing that we get on
board with the work that reason has already been doing in human history. Our capacity to
reason has slowly and surely been expanding our moral categories. To the extent that we
care about overcoming moral disagreement, or about being rational, we should therefore
follow reason’s lead, and let it guide us to a fully impartial and fully ethical point of
view.
In what follows, I situate these claims in the broader context of Singer’s response
to sociobiology, and of his progressive moral vision. In addition to the two
aforementioned claims made on behalf of reason, Singer defends two theses on
sociobiology, which I find unproblematic, and he offers a thesis on progress, which I find
attractive. Thus my critique focuses on Singer’s two theses on reason. Regarding the
backward-looking claim, I argue both that Singer’s understanding of the sociobiology of
altruism is obsolete, and that his account ignores the significance of social and other
factors in the expansion of altruism. Regarding the forward-looking claim, I contend
simply that Singer’s arguments for a rational foundation for ethics fail.
The result of all this is not that expansive, humanist moral ideals are doomed.
Rather, the grounds on which such ideals commend themselves may simply be more
variegated than Singer imagines. But I must defer making my positive case for such
ideals until the next chapter. Here I begin with a detailed overview of Singer’s account.
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2. Singer on Progress

Sociobiology and Ethics

In 1975, the Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson published Sociobiology: The
New Synthesis.170 There Wilson advocates “the systematic study of the biological basis of
all social behavior.”171 In the opening pages, he writes,
The biologist, who is concerned with questions of physiology and evolutionary
history, realizes that self-knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional
control centers in the hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain. These centers
flood our consciousness with all the emotions—hate, love, guilt, fear, and
others—that are consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the
standards of good and evil. What, we are then compelled to ask, made the
hypothalamus and the limbic system? They evolved by natural selection. That
simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical
philosophers . . . at all depths.172
Wilson’s sprawling study of the evolutionary explanations of animal behavior can be read
as the beginning of a “takeover bid.”173 Philosophers, in Wilson’s estimation, have
treated the mind as a kind of black box. But science is now in a position to deliver
accounts of why the mind works the way it does, why we have the emotions and desires
we have. Accordingly, says Wilson, “Scientists and humanists should consider together
the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the
hands of the philosophers and biologicized.”174
Singer’s book, The Expanding Circle, is explicitly positioned as a response to
Wilson’s work (its original subtitle is Ethics and Sociobiology). Wilson’s remarks on the
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substance of ethics are often ambiguous, and so Singer is careful to distinguish several
ways in which sociobiology might be relevant to ethics. Sociobiology might paint a richer
picture of human nature or human society, shedding light on the consequences of certain
behaviors and institutions; it might debunk the aura of self-evidence or metaphysical
weight of particular values; it might even provide us with new values.175 Wilson flirts
with all three ideas, but Singer is clear: the first two are indeed live possibilities; the third
is not.
To ignore biology is to ignore one possible source of knowledge relevant to
ethical decisions. There is, however, no justification here for dramatic claims
about explaining ethics ‘at all depths’ or fashioning a biology of ethics which will
do away with the need for ethical philosophers. Even if we should uncritically
accept the sociobiological view of human nature in its entirety, the new facts we
would have learned would affect ethics only at a relatively superficial level. The
central question of ethics, the nature and justification of fundamental ethical
values, would remain untouched.176
Though his engagement with sociobiology has this critical edge, Singer
nevertheless finds value in its ability to illuminate the evolutionary origins of altruism.
Sociobiology can explain how behavioral altruism (apparent or actual self-sacrificing
behavior) can be reconciled with the evolutionary mechanisms that govern gene
dissemination. On this point Singer rehearses the now standard account of how kin
selection, reciprocal altruism, and maybe even group selection have shaped human
psychology. Parents share genes with their children, and to a lesser extent siblings and
cousins also share each other’s genes. Psychological tendencies to care for or even
sacrifice for kin could thus be selected for by ordinary evolutionary mechanisms. So also
in animals that have some means of recognizing individual, non-kin conspecifics or other
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organisms, a capacity for cooperation (along with the psychological traits that generate
the behavior) can evolve under ecological conditions that put non-cooperators at a
disadvantage. And in highly cohesive social groups in competition with other groups,
psychological attitudes favoring effective group function might also come to be selected
for.177 Let’s call this Singer’s first thesis on sociobiology, TOS1: sociobiology explains
the evolutionary origins of altruism.
In all the aforementioned ways, the psychological underpinnings of moral
emotion and moral judgment have been forged in the evolutionary fires of the past. This
is the solid body of findings Wilson is inspired by in hinting that the insights of moral
philosophers have been surpassed. But Singer is insistent: whatever empirical research
into the origins of our emotions and psychological capabilities for altruism might reveal,
no values will fall into our laps as a result. To think that biology can provide us with new
values is to commit “the naturalistic fallacy.”178 It is to jump illegitimately from fact to
value, and to confuse the observer stance of the scientist with the participant stance of the
normative ethicist.
Singer explains: “Facts, by themselves, do not provide us with reasons for action.
I need facts to make a sensible decision, but no amount of facts can make up my mind for
me.”179 What we value, on the other hand, is precisely what moves or motivates us to act.
If a person finds herself in possession of a large sum of money, for example, she can
spend it on herself, on her family and friends, on the well being of strangers, or on some
other cause. She can gather facts about the impact of these potential investments ad
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infinitum, but no fact can (by itself) tell her what she values. At the end of the day, she
must choose to spend her money in some way or other. “The gap between facts and
values,” Singer says, “lies in the inability of the facts to dictate my choice.”180 He presses
the point:
Would more facts, or facts of a different kind, bridge the gap? What about those
facts that sociobiologists think important: facts about the nature of human beings
as biological organisms with a specific evolutionary history; facts about the
genetic basis of altruism; and facts about the hypothalamus and limbic system of
the brain, which produce our emotions? . . . Our values and ethical systems are the
products of our evolved nature. Isn’t it then possible that as our knowledge of
biology and physiology advance, they should come to reveal ethical premises
inherent in our biological nature, thus bridging the gap between facts and values?
The short answer to this is: ‘No, it is not possible.’ . . . We do not find our ethical
premises in our biological nature, or under cabbages either. We choose them.181
Here we have Singer’s second thesis on sociobiology, TOS2: sociobiology cannot
provide us with a foundation for ethics.
Choosing Rationally

No scientific finding can, by itself, determine our fundamental values. These we
must choose for ourselves. This is a point that has been emphasized, Singer notes, by
existentialists. On his reading, existentialists “propose that the choice of ultimate values
is simply a commitment, a ‘leap of faith’, which is beyond any rational assessment, and
thus ultimately arbitrary.”182 Singer’s own account consists in an attempt to escape that
arbitrariness. The existentialist position, Singer says, “smacks of desperation, for it
implies that the leap of faith which one existentialist philosopher (Heidegger) made to
Nazism is, in the end, no less justifiable than the leap which another existentialist
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philosopher (Sartre) made to resistance to the Nazis.”183 So the existentialist view is not
an attractive position for Singer.
Singer is hopeful that reason might have something to offer us in our search for
non-arbitrary ultimate ethical premises. “Though we must choose our ethical premises,”
he says, “we may be able to choose rationally.”184 Thus the heart of his constructive
proposal is a substantive account of reason. Reason, Singer says, “is a special sort of
capacity because it can lead us to places we did not expect to go.”185 In mathematics, for
example, a particular equation can appear false or implausible, and yet be proven true by
a continuous line of mathematical reasoning. When Thomas Hobbes happened on a copy
of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry open at the 47th theorem, his initial response was to
swear it couldn’t be true. Yet as he worked through the proof, and through the proofs of
each theorem invoked in the proof, he realized he could not but concede the correctness
of the 47th theorem.186 What this shows, Singer thinks, is that reason is like an escalator
that leads up and out of sight. Counting one, two, three hyenas in the bush (for example)
is a long way off from articulating the concept of a prime number, and drawing squares in
the sand is a long way off from the Pythagorean Theorem. But the logic of the latter is in
a sense implicit in the former. It is not dependent on the human will. By learning to
count, our ancestors “stepped onto an escalator of reasoning that leads by strictly logical
steps to square roots, prime numbers, and the differential calculus.”187 We can decide not

183

Singer, 84.
Singer, 86.
185
Singer, 88. I think what Singer is getting at here is that reason is uniquely difficult to bend to our wills if
we play by its rules. But I think many of our psychological drives lead in unexpected directions. How many
of us choose or expect to fall in love, or to get addicted to cigarettes, for example?
186
The story is from John Aubrey, Brief Lives, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1898), 332; cited in Singer,
88.
187
Singer, 89.
184

108
to step onto it, but if we do, it has the power to take us to unexpected places. Singer
characterizes this feature of reason as a kind of autonomy.188
On Singer’s view, the autonomy of reason shapes ethical reasoning in the same
way that it shapes mathematical reasoning. The practice of moral reasoning initially took
hold in our species when our hominid ancestors, already quite social, acquired linguistic
and sophisticated conceptual abilities. This evolutionary transformation enabled us to
become “more conscious of the patterns of our social life.”189 In particular, it made
possible more sophisticated responses to conflict, actual or anticipated. From “responding
with a friendly lick or an intimidating growl when another member of the group does or
does not repay favors,” we went to “responding with an approving or a condemnatory
judgment.”190 The key difference between the two sets of responses, on Singer’s account,
is that while the former leaves no room for questioning, the latter invites it. Having
evolved to be language-using animals, our ancestors learned to ask, “Why did you do
that?” In doing so, they initiated a practice of asking for (or perhaps demanding) and
giving reasons for action. Like learning to count, learning these skills of mutual
accounting was a first step onto an escalator that leads up and out of sight.
Singer fleshes out the details as follows. “In a dispute between members of a
cohesive group of reasoning beings,” he says, “the demand for a reason is a demand for a
justification that can be accepted by the group as a whole.”191 Articulating such a reason
requires a measure of impartiality. I must frame my own intentions in terms acceptable to
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my audience, in terms they themselves could adopt under relevantly similar
circumstances. That leaves it open, of course, what group members will recognize as
relevantly similar circumstances. But the basic point stands. Giving a reason for action, in
a group context, involves stepping back from one’s immediate desires and articulating a
social justification, in the form of an impartial principle, for the desired course of action.
If I claim a large share of the nuts my group has gathered, for example, I must tell a story
about why I deserve the nuts, and that story must pass with the others.
So the first step in Singer’s speculative reconstruction of human ethical history is
this demand for the justification of action. It leads, on Singer’s account, to the emergence
of early normative systems—what he calls custom. “As inherently public,” Singer says,
“customs are necessarily impartial between individuals, in form at least. They may
oppress whole groups, like women, or the poor, but they do so in a way that the
oppressed can—and often do—accept as proper.”192 The function of a system of custom
is to serve as a public guide to social life in a given tribe or society. While custom may
codify patterns of action we presently condemn, it nevertheless represents an
improvement, in an important sense, over a customless society. As Singer puts it, “To be
a victim of oppressive customs is very different from being a victim of personal
malice.”193 That’s not to say it’s “better” to be oppressed than it is to fall victim to
malice—and in any case, the two categories are not mutually exclusive. The point is just
that an oppressive moral system justifies itself (it attempts to, at least) to those it
oppresses.194 In that regard, it addresses them on a level not reached by simple,
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unjustified assault. It also opens the door to the transformational critique that
characterizes later stages of development.
In later phases of moral evolution, systems of custom come under question. This
critical moment is sometimes possible when tribes or societies come to have knowledge
of each other and of their differences. “From the outsider’s point of view, the customs of
my own society appear as one among a number of different possible systems. Thus they
lose their sense of natural rightness and inevitability.”195 At such junctures, questioners in
the mold of Socrates appear, calling into question the customs of the ancestors,
demanding, in effect, a justification of custom itself. Disputes over conflicting interests
within and between human societies lead to conflict between ethical codes of conduct.
These disputes are not in principle irresolvable, according to Singer. Rather, “we
can progress toward rational settlement of disputes over ethics by taking the element of
disinterestedness inherent in the idea of justifying one’s conduct to society as a whole,
and extending this into the principle that to be ethical, a decision must give equal weight
to the interests of all affected by it.”196 Just as, when I justify myself to my peers, I must
frame my action impartially, in terms my peers can see as action-guiding for themselves,
so also competing customs can be bridged by articulating impartial principles to cover the
relevant interests.
Conflict between individuals or societies can provide the impetus to articulate
ever more general, ever more impartial, principles of action, which, in virtue of their
impartiality, can be recognized as such and adopted by reasoning beings. The value of
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ethical reasoning is not merely prudential however. According to Singer, the logic of
impartiality has inherent force. “The idea of a disinterested defense of one’s conduct
emerges because of the social nature of human beings and the requirements of group
living,” he says, “but in the thought of reasoning beings, it takes on a logic of its own
which leads to its extension beyond the bounds of the group.”197 This explains Singer’s
metaphor of the escalator: once moral dialogue has begun, reasoning animals can
understand how one step leads to the next, and thus come to recognize the inherent logic
of ethical justification. Old moral boundaries are recognized as arbitrary, and distinctions
of sex, race, and nationality come to matter less and less. The result is what Singer
describes as an expanding circle: self-interest is mitigated in dialogue with others, and
moral principles are found to govern a life that is increasingly fair to everyone.
Expanding Sympathies

The endpoint of this process of expansion in moral thought, Singer argues, is a
single action-guiding principle: the principle of the equal consideration of interests. “[T]o
be ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests of all affected by it.”198
According to this principle, ethical judgments must be made “from a totally impartial
point of view.”199 The principle of the equal consideration of interests is the logical
terminus of the process of ethical reasoning, and thus also the only possible rational
foundation for ethics.200 Although the shift to a fully universal ethical point of view is not
universally accepted today, Singer says, “it is the direction in which moral thought has
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been going since ancient times.” This is no accident of history. It is, rather, “the direction
in which our capacity to reason leads us.”201
There are alternative explanations for our broadening ethical horizons. Singer
mentions Edward Westermarck’s explanation of those expansive tendencies in terms of
growing “altruistic sentiments.” But such explanations are not necessarily incompatible
with the reason-first account. “We do not have to choose one or the other,” Singer says,
“we can accept both explanations.”202 New patterns of trade might facilitate a broadening
of our sympathies, for example. But this does not impugn the explanatory power of
reason. “[I]t is independently plausible,” according to Singer, “that reasoning should lead
us to a more and more universal view of ethics.”203 Moral thinkers from all of the world’s
traditions have tended to converge on that ideal (Singer cites as evidence the teachings of
Rabbi Hillel, Jesus of Nazareth, Confucius, the Indian Mahabharata, Marcus Aurelius,
and Seneca204). And reason resists evolutionary counterpressure in ways simple emotion
cannot:
If we say, as Westermarck did, that the expansion of the sphere of altruism has
been solely the result of an expansion of the feeling of benevolence, the existence
of genuine, non-reciprocal altruism toward strangers remains mysterious.
Evolution should have wiped out such non-rewarding traits as a broad unselfish
feeling of benevolence . . . [But] the capacity to reason is not something that
evolution is likely to eliminate.205
Given the reality of non-reciprocal altruism (Singer mentions voluntary donations to the
British National Blood Transfusion Service as an example), the simplest explanation is
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that “it is not feeling, but reason that is chiefly responsible for it.”206 For reasons to be
specified below, I will call non-reciprocal altruistic behavior directed toward non-kin
wide-ranging altruism. Hence Singer’s first thesis on reason, TOR1: reason explains the
existence of wide-ranging altruism.
Reason, on Singer’s view, points the way to an objective point of view in which
all interests are considered impartially. That completely impartial point of view can
function as a rational foundation for ethics. (Call it Singer’s second thesis on reason,
TOR2: reason can provide us with a foundation for ethics.) But while this objective
standard is “unimpeachable” for the person who asks “What ought I to do?”, Singer also
thinks we can be more accommodating in our answer to the question “What ought to be
the ethical code of our society?”207 That second question invites us to take into account
human ethical ambivalence and advocate for societal norms that are less demanding than
what abstract reason strictly as such requires. We need concrete rules that can guide our
behavior towards the rational ideal. “The goal of maximizing the welfare of all may be
better achieved by an ethic that accepts our inclinations and harnesses them so that, taken
as a whole, the system works to everyone’s advantage.”208 Moral sainthood is not a
realistic ideal for everyone, Singer concedes, and so ethical rules other than the principle
of the equal consideration of interests, though they “have no ultimate authority of their
own,” might be necessary.209
In this way, Singer says, we come full circle on the question of the relevance of
sociobiology to ethics. Sociobiology cannot provide ultimate ethical premises on its own.
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Only reason can do that non-arbitrarily. The takeover bid fails. But the objective standard
of reason is too demanding to function as an effective societal code of ethics. Without
abandoning reason as the objective foundation of values then, the deliverances of biology
(and history, anthropology, psychology, etc.) must be consulted in the crafting of
workable moral standards for everyday living. That gives us rules for living that move us
toward the ideal of increasing general welfare without subjecting us to “a morality
unsuited to normal human beings.”210 We can call this Singer’s thesis on progress, TOP:
we should adopt ethical rules suited to human nature that maximize welfare.
Singer’s Five Theses

On my reading, Singer’s account centers on the five theses I’ve emphasized
above. They are as follows.
Theses on Sociobiology:
TOS1 Sociobiology explains the evolutionary origins of altruism.
TOS2 Sociobiology cannot provide us with a foundation for ethics
Theses on Reason:
TOR1 Reason explains the existence of wide-ranging altruism.
TOR2 Reason can provide us with a foundation for ethics.
Thesis on Progress:
TOP

We should adopt rules that maximize welfare.

I have no disagreement with Singer with respect to TOS1 and TOS2. I find TOP to be an
attractive proposal, but I have little to say about it for now, save that it stands or falls on
its own merits, apart from the other theses. I take it for granted that TOP in some sense
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captures a canonical, humanist ideal of progress. My critique, accordingly, focuses on
TOR1 and TOR2. I will argue that the arguments for each fail. I return to the question of
what consequences this has for Singer’s attempt to ground his expansive, humanist moral
vision in reason in my conclusion.
I will call Singer’s argument for TOR1 the Rational Altruism Argument, and I
will call Singer’s argument for TOR2 the Rational Foundation Argument. I will critique
each one in turn. Then I will offer my overall assessment of Singer’s rationalist account.
3. The Rational Altruism Argument

Beyond Biology?

The British National Blood Transfusion Service receives donations from people
who give blood voluntarily. There is no payment for donation, and no way for donors to
receive payment from recipients of blood donation. This, and analogous cases, provides
evidence for the existence of “genuine, non-reciprocal altruism,” according to Singer.211
The apparently gratuitous nature of such altruistic behaviors is crucial for Singer’s
account. In his review of the standard evolutionary accounts of the evolution of altruism,
kin selection and reciprocal altruism figure prominently. These predict that human beings
will be inclined to behave altruistically toward biological relatives and toward those who
can be expected to reciprocate. Insofar as we behave altruistically toward strangers
however—specifically, strangers who can’t be expected to reciprocate—the altruism of
British blood donors, and those like them, appears to be something of a mystery.212 There
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is an explanatory gap here, Singer argues, that standard sociobiological accounts do not
bridge.
Singer contends that human emotion, considered on its own, cannot bridge the
gap. He knows some have tried to explain the broadening of our ethical horizons in terms
of an emotional expansion. Westermarck, who “pointed to the increasing size of our
community—from the village to the nation, and now to the world as a whole—as a factor
in the breakdown of narrower limits to our concerns and sympathies,” gets a hearing, for
instance.213 Singer concedes that emotions are probably a part of the story of the
expanding circle. But a generalized feeling of benevolence, he says, without any further
psychological scaffolding, would be unlikely to resist countervailing evolutionary
pressure. By itself then, emotion can’t bridge the explanatory gap left by standard
sociobiological accounts of altruism.
Only reason, Singer claims, can bridge the gap. Only reason can provide a
genuine explanation for why the circle of moral concern has expanded, such that acts of
“genuine, non-reciprocal altruism” occur today. This is because, first, reason has
independent evolutionary value: natural selection would be unlikely to root it out, given
its practical uses across a variety of domains. Second, on Singer’s account, “the ability to
reason and the ability to see the reasons for a wider moral concern are essentially the
same ability.”214 Thus, given the explanatory gap left by standard sociobiological
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accounts—given the unexplained occurrence of acts of wide-ranging (non-kin, nonreciprocal) altruism—it seems that reason is best suited to bridge that gap, to explain the
existence of wide-ranging altruism. “[T]he persistence of genuine altruism would be
inexplicable if it were based on feeling alone,” Singer says. Thus: “it is not feeling, but
reason that is chiefly responsible for it.”215
We can schematize Singer’s argument, which I have called the Rational Altruism
Argument, as follows.
(1) Wide-ranging altruism exists.
(2) Sociobiological accounts do not explain how we could have gone beyond kin and
reciprocal altruism.
(3) Emotion (alone) can’t explain this either.
(4) But reason has independent evolutionary value.
(5) The ability to reason and the ability to see the reasons for wider moral concern are
essentially the same ability.
(6) Therefore, [TOR1] reason explains the existence of wide-ranging altruism.
The critique that follows takes aim at theses (2) and (5). The accounts of sociobiologists
have grown increasingly sophisticated, and wide-ranging altruism is now well accounted
for in standard evolutionary psychological accounts. (2) might have been plausible in
1981, when The Expanding Circle was first published. But thirty years later, the claim of
an explanatory gap is untenable.216 The claim of (5), which I have lifted verbatim from
the text, is also problematic. I focus first on what I take to be a straightforward reading of
the claim, before attempting a more generous interpretation, grounded in the concrete
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mechanisms Singer identifies as effecting progressive moral change in history. On the
first reading, Singer’s claim is simply false. On the second, it is much more plausible, but
that plausibility comes at the cost of substantially diluting the force of the argument.
Indirect Reciprocity

I have been referring to altruistic acts toward non-reciprocating strangers as acts
of wide-ranging altruism. This is because the role of reciprocity, according to
contemporary evolutionary psychological accounts, can be either direct or indirect. Direct
reciprocity is standard reciprocal altruism: cooperation with non-kin emerges under
conditions of mutual (sometimes delayed) benefit when organisms are capable of
discriminating between cooperators and non-cooperators.217 Whereas direct reciprocity
involves two parties, indirect reciprocity involves at least three. A cooperates with B
under the watchful eye of C, who is then disposed to cooperate with proven cooperator A.
If indirect reciprocity can explain wide-ranging altruism, then it is misleading to call
wide-ranging altruism “non-reciprocal.” Wide-ranging altruism may in fact be reciprocal,
albeit indirectly. This is why I have chosen not to follow Singer on terminology.
We can think of indirect reciprocity as an outgrowth of direct reciprocity for
social animals. As individual organisms cooperate, or fail to cooperate, with others, they
develop a reputation as cooperators or non-cooperators (as “altruists” or “egoists”).
Reputation, a kind of social status, then figures as currency in subsequent social
exchange. A proven cooperator receives preferential treatment from conspecifics seeking
a dependable cooperator. Richard Alexander explains:
Systems of indirect reciprocity . . . are social systems structured around the
importance of status. The concept of status implies that an individual’s privileges,
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or its access to resources, are controlled in part by how others collectively think of
him (hence, treat him) as a result of past interactions (including observations of
interactions with others). Status can be determined by physical prowess, as in
those nonhuman (animal) dominance hierarchies in which coalitions are absent, or
(as in humans) by mental or social prowess. Mental and social prowess, in this
sense, includes . . . effectiveness and reliability in reciprocity and cooperation.218
The anthropologist and evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar (famous for calculating
“Dunbar’s number,” the supposed numerical limit of stable relationships that individual
human beings can sustain—about 150) argues that we are, in an important sense,
gossiping primates.219 Although we can in principle use language to discuss any number
of things, much of human conversation seems to revolve around keeping track of friends
and allies, exchanging information about free riders, and engaging in “reputation
management.”220 To the extent that we are surrounded by incurable gossips, each of us
has an incentive to appear altruistic. And one way to appear altruistic is of course to act
altruistically, even (and especially) toward non-reciprocating strangers.
On Alexander’s account, the importance of reputation in the social life of
primates such as ourselves can be expected to generate social rules emphasizing the
importance of cooperation. “Rules,” he says, “are aspects of indirect reciprocity
beneficial to those who propose and perpetuate them, not only because they force others
to behave in ways explicitly beneficial to the proposers and perpetuators but because they
also make the future more predictable so that plans can be carried out.”221 Rule-governed
systems of indirect reciprocity, on Alexander’s account, are moral systems. I suspect we
might not want to call all such rules “moral” in the normative sense, but Alexander’s
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broadly anthropological or descriptive conception of moral systems is in keeping with my
own account of morality as a fundamental institution in chapter two. His suggestion about
the significance of rules, likewise, echoes a point from chapter three: moral norms and
ideals are formulated by particular individuals occupying particular social locations, and
there often seems to be a connection between the content of those ideals and the social
position occupied by their advocates.
The picture that emerges from Alexander’s account is of human beings as
calculating, genetically self-interested organisms. We are not “self-interested” in the
sense of being psychological egoists—our conscious motivations are not exclusively
egoistic. Rather, in keeping with the standard sociobiological picture, we (nonsociopaths) genuinely care about our kin and our friends. It also seems that we sometimes
care about strangers. The psychological dispositions that underlie our care for all these
others can be explained, in evolutionary terms, by the genetic payoff of care for offspring
and other family, of cooperation with direct reciprocators, and of a good reputation.
It is important to remember that the social “calculations” that guide our
interactions with others, on the sociobiological account, are not necessarily conscious.
Alexander says, “I would not contend that we always carry out cost-benefit analyses on
these issues deliberately or consciously. I do, however, contend that such analyses occur,
sometimes consciously, sometimes not, and that we are evolved to be exceedingly
accurate and quick at making them.”222 There may even be pressure for the evolutionary
function of reputation-enhancing behavior not to be conscious. We pass most effectively
as good altruists in social exchange, the thinking goes, when our conscious motivation is
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sincere concern for others, rather than transparently Machiavellian calculation.223 In any
case, Alexander’s contention that most of us are surprisingly adept at social calculation is
experimentally well borne out.224
The theory of indirect reciprocity predicts that we are most likely to cooperate
with strangers when such behavior can be expected to maintain or boost our reputation as
cooperators. When we do so, our conscious intent need not be reputation management as
such. This means that indirect reciprocity explains more than just intentionally targeted or
“discriminate” beneficence. We don’t just cooperate when the payoff is obvious. In fact,
the existence of large, complex societies, Alexander argues,
fosters the appearance of tendencies to engage in indiscriminate social investment
(or indiscriminate beneficence)—which I define as willingness to risk relatively
small expenses in certain kinds of social donations to whomever may be needy—
partly because of the prevalence of interested audiences and keenness of their
observation, and the use of beneficent acts by others to identify individuals
appropriate for later reciprocal interactions. In complex social systems with much
reciprocity, being judged as attractive for reciprocal interactions may become an
essential ingredient for success.225
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I am keen to add that there is no evolutionary mystery in the emergence of large, complex
societies. So we should resist the temptation to think an evolutionarily odd faculty of
impartial reason explains that particular piece of the puzzle as well. There is no
evolutionary mystery in the fact of our being surrounded by strangers to whom we can be
kind (or not).226
According to thesis (2) of what I have called Singer’s Rational Altruism
Argument, sociobiological accounts do not explain how we could have gone beyond kin
and reciprocal altruism. This is the explanatory gap that Singer’s account of reason is
supposed to fill. I contend that Alexander’s account is sufficient to show there is no gap.
Wide-ranging altruism is well accounted for in contemporary evolutionary psychological
accounts (even if, to be fair to Singer, such accounts have come a long way since 1981).
Alexander himself takes up Singer’s claim that British blood donors are “working
refutations of the contention that altruism can only exist among kin, within small groups,
or where it pays off by encouraging reciprocal altruism.”227 From a more up-to-date
evolutionary perspective, he says, we might view blood donation as, “rather than
unreciprocatable altruism, a social investment with a very special and high likelihood of
paying off handsomely. Who among us is not a little humble in the presence of someone
who has casually noted that he just came back from ‘giving blood’?”228
To sum up: I have argued, contra thesis (2), that there is no gap to fill in extant
sociobiological accounts of altruism. In all likelihood, we have gone beyond simple kin
and reciprocal altruism thanks to the power of indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity is
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an outgrowth of direct reciprocity (standard reciprocal altruism) in social, gossiping
primates. As genetically self-interested organisms, we have an interest in maintaining a
reputation as good cooperators, and in proposing and perpetuating rules that serve us and
bring stability and predictability to social life. In certain social contexts (especially large,
complex societies), this may also provide an incentive to engage in (non-costly)
indiscriminate beneficence. The social calculations that drive this behavior need not be
conscious.
The Rational Altruism Argument proposes to identify and fill a gap in
evolutionary theory. There is no gap. That being said, to say that evolutionary
psychologists have developed models that bring clarity to the question of how wideranging altruism evolved is not to say that reason explains nothing, or that it has been
causally epiphenomenal in our history. There may still be some sense in which reason
explains wide-ranging altruism, even if Singer’s published work on sociobiology is now
out-of-date. But to pursue this possibility we need to get clear on what Singer takes
reason to be. We can do this by scrutinizing thesis (5).
Reason as a Psychological Capacity

I contend that Singer’s general account alternates between two distinct pictures of
reason. According to the first, reason is a psychological capacity of ordinary human
beings. According to the second, it is an emergent phenomenon—one that occurs when
reasoning animals (“reasoning” in the simple, psychological sense) justify their conduct
to each other. While Singer is at times quite clear about the distinction (as when he
distinguishes between reasoning at the “collective level” and reasoning at the “individual

124
level”229), he is at other times very ambiguous. That ambiguity is at play in the Rational
Altruism Argument. Accordingly, I propose to explore two readings of this claim—thesis
(5)—that “the ability to reason and the ability to see the reasons for wider moral concern
are essentially the same ability.”230
First then, consider the claim that immediately follows in the text. Singer says,
“Just as any person who can reason adequately can, like Hobbes, follow Euclid’s proofs
of the theorems of geometry, so can anyone capable of reasoning understand the
objective point of view from which his or her interests are no more important than the
like interests of anyone else.”231 Here it seems as though Singer has a psychological
capacity in mind. If one can “reason adequately,” one can follow Euclid’s proofs.
Likewise, one can also “understand the objective point of view.”
The psychological reading of Singer’s claim runs into trouble because
understanding here can take two forms. It might take the form of a conceptual grasp of
the notion of a God’s-eye-view (a view from everywhere). Or it might take the form of
being drawn to that point of view. If Singer only means that basic cognitive ability entails
the capacity to understand the concept of an impartial standpoint, then he may be right.
But such a fact is irrelevant to the success of the Rational Altruism Argument. The fact
that most human beings can understand a particular idea doesn’t explain any phenomenon
(wide-ranging altruism or otherwise) without an account of the practical use or appeal of
that idea. And then it is not reason that explains wide-ranging altruism, but rather the
circumstances that have provoked the use of reason.
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If, on the other hand, Singer means that basic cognitive ability entails being
motivationally drawn to the impartial point of view, then the claim appears to be simply
false. We non-sociopaths do by nature care for others beside ourselves. But the ability to
reason as such need not (and, it seems, usually does not) put outward pressure on that
existing moral concern.232 Even in moral philosophy, the idea that complete impartiality
is an ideal we should aim for is controversial.233
But Singer is aware that, while we may be rational animals, we are only
ambivalently so. He says:
To revert to the example of altruism given earlier, while many people in Britain
do give blood to strangers, far more—94 percent, to be precise—do not.
Undoubtedly many of those who do not give blood reason as well as or better than
some of those who do . . . These people are capable of following the line of
reasoning that [leads] to altruism, yet they do not do so, or if they do, they
disregard it in their actions.234
Should we conclude that reason is in fact powerless to expand our moral horizons? Singer
argues for a negative answer. Reason, he claims, is not merely an instrumental faculty.
While reason can be used to satisfy our pre-existing desires more effectively, it also
generates desires and feelings of its own.235 Desires and feelings may be what moves us
to act, but insofar as it is reason which gives us some of those desires and feelings, reason
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is more than just a slave of the passions.236 This is the sense in which reason moves us.
Reason moves us beyond ourselves, Singer argues, in at least three ways.237
First, ordinary human beings find cognitive dissonance uncomfortable. On Leon
Festinger’s account, which Singer endorses, “Cognitive dissonance can be seen as an
antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as
hunger leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction.”238 So considerations of
consistency lead ordinary human beings to revise their beliefs or their behavior to
minimize inconsistency (at least when the inconsistency is pointed out).239 Second,
Singer argues that the kind of hypocrisy that would be required of a person to espouse
impartial moral ideals in public but to actually and intentionally live by selfish ideals in
private would not be emotionally feasible for most of us. “[B]ecause we are social
beings,” he says, “reared and educated in a community and bound to the community by
deep emotional ties, a life of systematic hypocrisy is likely to be uncomfortable.”240 Third
and finally, Singer appeals to the paradox of hedonism. The idea here is that a selfcentered life is for most of us ultimately unsatisfying, and that deeper fulfillment is found
only when we invest in things (people, causes) outside of ourselves.241 In these three
concrete ways then, according to Singer, reason draws us outside of ourselves.
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These are the concrete psychological mechanisms by which ethical reason has a
hold on us, according to Singer—ways in which reason moves us. The problem is that
these mechanisms do not by themselves lead in the direction of universal concern.
Consider for instance R. M. Hare’s famous character of the “fanatic,” the committed
Nazi.242 The Nazi ideal, I take it, involves a society “free” from Jews, gays, gypsies, and
other “undesirables.” According to Singer’s own picture, reason must have a hold on the
fanatic through the constraining power of consistency, the discomfort of hypocrisy, and
the appeal of interests that transcend the self. But these three psychological forces are
jointly insufficient to push the fanatic away from his ideals. Consistency, through the
discomfort of cognitive dissonance, might lead him to conclude that, were he himself to
turn out to be a Jew, he should be killed. That might be a hard pill to swallow, but
fanatics have embraced stranger beliefs still.243 The discomfort of hypocrisy might lead
him to be very sincere in public about his beliefs and his ideals. And the appeal of selftranscending interests might lead him to devote himself more fully to the cause.244 Absent
certain social and perhaps emotional constraints on these psychological mechanisms, the
expansion of our moral horizons is thus not guaranteed. I conclude that a simple,
psychological interpretation of reason in thesis (5) is not promising.
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The Social Activation of Reason

Social constraints do in fact play an important role in Singer’s account of reason.
Although they sometimes fade into the background of his account, moral dialogue,
education, and the increased likelihood of social uptake for broader moral categories all
count as driving forces in the evolution of ethical reasoning, according to Singer.245 So
we should understand the significance of the aforementioned psychological mechanisms
in dialogical relationship with these social pressures. That gives us what I call the social
activation account of reason. On this account, impartial ethical reasoning is a latent
psychological capability, actually instantiated in a few “outstanding” thinkers, and
partially instantiated in the rest of us under certain kinds of social pressure.
The social activation account of reason makes good sense of many of Singer’s
comments (including the claim that advocates of universal moral concern are
“outstanding” thinkers). He says, “Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks
universal application . . . Left to itself, reasoning will develop on a principle similar to
biological evolution.”246 “Wherever there are rational, social beings, whether on earth or
in some remote galaxy, we could expect their standards of conduct to tend toward
impartiality, as ours have.”247 And, “Ethical reasoning, once begun, pushes against our
initially limited ethical horizons, leading us always toward a more universal point of
view.”248 It’s not clear these claims make sense for a simple, psychological capacity. It is
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rather the many interactions of reasoning beings that makes (socially activated) ethical
reasoning a force for progress. At least, that’s the best sense I can make of Singer’s
account of ethical reasoning.249
Once the significance of social pressure is recognized however, the progressive
potential of reason as such—of reason by itself—is called into question. The kinds of
moral dialogue that lead to the expansion of our moral categories, after all, don’t just
happen. In fact, the overcoming of social distance between privileged and marginalized
groups for the sake of genuine dialogue is already an important egalitarian moral
achievement. In ordinary life, justificatory pressure is not evenly distributed.250 As we
saw in the case of the ethics of care, conversations can continue over millennia without
including certain constituencies (for example, women). Once the previously marginalized
are able to contribute to the conversation, the terms of that conversation can shift, moral
categories can grow, and the circle can expand. But the preceding condition for that
expansion is the achievement of genuine dialogue. The marginalized have to be seen by
privileged discussants as deserving of address, worthy of inclusion. As Jesse Prinz
suggests, moral reform or moral expansion may in general be very difficult unless the
powerful are made to suffer.251 The point is reminiscent of a central theme in much
feminist work: power often comes with the possibility of ignoring, and even of silencing,
marginal voices. For the conversation to change, there must at the very least be pressure
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to justify oneself to the relevant parties.252 What form that pressure needs to take will of
course vary from case to case. In brief then, social and political forces pertaining to the
distribution of justificatory pressure play an important, activating role for the progressive
potential of reason.253
I want to add to this discussion of socially activated reason a further contextual
point about its progressive force. The expansion of the moral circle depends on, in
addition to social and political factors, important ecological and technological constraints.
European colonizers may have had larger moral horizons, in at least some ways, than
Pacific islanders during the colonial period (ignoring for the moment the fact that
indigenous peoples of foreign lands usually fell outside of those horizons, however
expansive Europeans were with respect to other Europeans). Their nations of origin were
certainly larger. But they were not more rational (whether individually or collectively).
Of course, Singer is not committed to the claim that they were. But we need to give this
insight full force: life on an island is not like life on a large continental landmass. Life on
a large continental landmass makes possible the emergence of certain forms of trade,
certain forms of material accumulation, and certain forms of political organization that
are simply impossible on small islands (at least, absent globalization).254 It would be a
mistake, therefore, to criticize on grounds of irrationality (individual or collective) early
inhabitants of some Polynesian island for fishing (Singer argues that the moral circle
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should expand to include most non-human animals) or even for fighting with neighboring
bands. The terrain may be such that this is the only form of life that works.255 So there are
ecological and probably also technological constraints to consider in any general account
of moral expansion.
The Rational Altruism Argument proposes to explain the existence of wideranging altruism—the fact that we have gone beyond mere concern for kin and for
reciprocators—by appealing to reason. My counter-argument has had two prongs: first, a
critique of the claim that sociobiology leaves an explanatory gap. The theory of indirect
reciprocity fills that gap with no remainder. Second, a critique of Singer’s picture of
reason. Either reason is to be understood as a simple, psychological capacity, in which
case it cannot meaningfully explain boundary-crossing moral expansion; or it is to be
understood as socially activated. But if ethical reasoning depends for its progressive force
on social and political factors—and I have argued that it does, as well as on ecological
and technological factors—then Singer’s claim that the ability to reason is the same as the
ability to see the reasons for wider moral concern (and a fortiori the idea that reason
explains wide-ranging altruism) is much diluted. Rather: reasoning beings in certain
ecological and technological contexts, in response to, or as activated by, certain
distributions of justificatory pressure, sometimes expand their moral categories and
institutions. For thesis (5), and thus also for TOR1, this is the death of a thousand
qualifications.
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It would be surprising if reason had no role to play in moral progress. But that is
not what I have argued. What the arguments of this section show, I think, is that what
progress has been made has been the result of a collaborative venture, so to speak,
between genetically self-interested reasoning primates and the diverse social worlds they
have created in diverse ecological contexts. In what follows, we consider the possibility
of a more central role for reason in leading the way forward.
4. The Rational Foundation Argument

Why Reason?

It is time to consider Singer’s forward-looking claim about reason. According to
Singer’s second thesis on reason, TOR2, reason can provide us with a foundation for
ethics. Singer is keen to avoid what he sees as the existentialist’s dilemma: in the absence
of a rational foundation for ultimate value choice, we’re left with arbitrary leaps of faith
to different and incompatible value systems. But if some moral systems are better than
others, then there must be more to say than this. Reason, accordingly, appears in a
salvific light. If it can determine a single foundation for ultimate value choice, we are not
left with the existentialist’s dilemma. We have a path forward, a way to choose between
different, conflicting value claims.
The Rational Foundation Argument, which aims to establish TOR2, takes two
forms. There is an early version, which features prominently in Singer’s original account,
and there is a later version, formulated briefly in Singer’s 2011 afterword, after an
explicit rejection of the early version. Here, for the sake of thoroughness, I want to
examine both.
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The first version—call it the default utilitarianism version—accepts John
Mackie’s claim that the ideal of objective ethical truth is implausible, strange, or “queer,”
and aims to vindicate an ethic of universal concern (preference utilitarianism) with an
argument that shows it to be the only rational ethic for social animals. The second
version—call it the normative truth version—instead rejects Mackie’s claim, and aims to
show that we do in some cases have objective (desire- or preference-independent) reasons
for action.
In both cases, Singer is motivated by the concern that, absent a rational
foundation for ethics, all we’re left with is conflicting, genetically-driven and
emotionally-based moral judgments that point in no specific direction at all. In what
follows, I argue against the Rational Foundational Argument, in both its default
utilitarianism and normative truth versions. But I am keen to add that, even without a
single rational foundation, it may be the case that there is more to say for expansive,
humanist moral ideals than Singer imagines. However, I must put off making that
positive case (without a rational foundation, as Singer understands it) until the next
chapter.
The Default Utilitarianism Version

Here is Singer’s most succinct statement of the argument in its early form:
In making ethical decisions I am trying to make decisions which can be defended
to others. This requires me to take a perspective from which my own interests
count no more, simply because they are my own, than the similar interests of
others. Any preference for my own interests must be justified in terms of some
broader impartial principle. It might seem that this is compatible with all sorts of
moral rules and principles, including some which pay little or no attention to the
interests of others, as long as they pay equally little attention to my own interests.
When we investigate these other moral rules or principles, however, we find that
the grounds for recommending them are either that they will further the interests
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of all, or simply that they are right in themselves. If the first of these grounds is
offered, the principle of equal consideration of interests remains the ultimate basis
of morality, and we are left with the task of working out how best to further the
interests of all. On the other hand, the idea of moral laws existing independently
of the interests and preferences of living beings is implausible, once we have
more straightforward explanations of the origins of ethics. Without the notion of
an independent moral reality to back them up, however, claims made on behalf of
these moral rules or principles can be no more than expressions of personal
preferences which, from the collective point of view, should receive no more
weight than other preferences. Thus conflicts over differing moral ideals can be
treated like any other conflict of preferences, that is, by assessing them impartially
and doing what, on the whole satisfies most preferences.256
Ethical practice begins, on Singer’s account, in an attempt to justify ourselves to each
other. The fact that some preferences or values are mine is irrelevant to their justification
in a social context. In principle then, ethical justification involves the adoption of general
principles that can impartially govern a group of rational beings. So the central
desideratum for a foundational moral principle is, according to Singer, a kind of
generalizability. The principle of the equal consideration of interests, which stipulates
that everyone’s interests should be considered impartially (my preferences mattering no
more than yours), thus appears suitable as an ethic for a group of rational, social beings.
To be vindicated as the only rational foundation for ethics, alternatives have to be
considered. Singer begins with egoism. Can egoism be prescribed as a general principle
of morality for a group of rational beings? On one interpretation, egoism can be justified
(at least in the mind of some economists) because “the individual pursuit of self-interest
leads to the greatest good of all.”257 While Singer does not believe this claim is true, he
does believe it meets the criterion of impartiality. It instantiates the principle of the equal
consideration of interests, in conjunction with certain problematic empirical premises.
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Empirical questions aside then, this kind of egoism does not in fact constitute a genuine
alternative to Singer’s principle.
“A different defense of disinterested egoism,” Singer says, “would be the claim
that it is right or reasonable for everyone to further his or her own interests, irrespective
of the consequences of this for others.”258 But how could such a potentially disastrous
morality be justified to a group of rational beings? It could, on the one hand, be the
expression of subjective preference. In that case, it fails to be impartial, and must merely
be taken into account by the preference utilitarian’s genuinely general stance. On the
other hand, this kind of egoism could be asserted as right or correct simpliciter: the claim
“that egoism is a true moral principle, irrespective of the consequences of adopting it.”259
But Singer is skeptical of this idea of objective moral values, for reasons analogous to
Mackie’s. “Values are inherently practical,” he says. “How can there be something in the
universe, existing entirely independently of us and of our aims, desires, and interests,
which provides us with reasons for acting in certain ways?”260 Once we have a more
convincing story about the origins of ethics, this picture of moral values makes little
sense. Egoism is thus not a viable alternative to the principle of the equal consideration of
interests as a rational foundation for ethics.
Could more conventional moral rules play that role? The idea that some set of
moral rules (such as a prohibition on lying, or a prescription to keep promises) can
function as a moral foundation falls to the same argument as egoism. Such rules can be
thought of as general guidelines for conduct with a kind of “dependent validity” insofar
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as they tend to maximize welfare, in which case the principle of the equal consideration
of interests still reigns supreme.261 If thought of as expressions of subjective preference,
they do not meet the criterion of impartiality, and should merely be taken into account by
the preference utilitarian. And if it is argued that they are right in and of themselves, they
invite the charge of metaphysical “queerness.” Singer concludes that conventional moral
rules cannot provide an alternative to the principle of the equal consideration of interests
as a rational foundation for ethics.
From these considerations, Singer concludes that the principle of the equal
consideration of interests is the only possible rational foundation for ethics. Alternative
proposals for an impartial foundation that would commend themselves to a group of
rational beings all fall prey to the charge that they are either expressions of subjective
preference, in which case they cannot be impartially action guiding, or that they are
asserted to be objectively valid, a notion that Singer, like Mackie, finds mystifying and
unsatisfactory. If there are no objective values apart from human interests, then the only
rational thing to do is to maximize the fulfillment of human preferences.
When he revisits this argument in 2011, Singer finds it unsuccessful. The problem
lies with a claim at the heart of the principle of the equal consideration of interests: this
idea that “our own interests are no more important than the interests of others.”262 If it is
true that our own interests are no more important than the interests of others, then
Singer’s preference utilitarianism is effectively the default position for a rational ethics.
But Singer diagnoses an ambiguity in the claim. It can be taken, he says, descriptively—
in which case, the claim that my interests are no more important than the interests of
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others just means that we all have our own interests. But it can also be taken, and for the
success of the original argument it must be taken, normatively—as an objective ethical
truth. This is in direct contradiction to his endorsement of Mackie’s view, according to
which objective ethical truths are metaphysically “queer.”
The proposal of the preference utilitarian needs to be treated like the proposals of
the egoist and the conventionalist in Singer’s original argument. Thus the principle of the
equal consideration of interests is either put forward as the personal ethical preference of
the utilitarian, in which case it lacks the requisite general and impartial action guiding
force, or it is put forward as objectively true and valid, in which case it too counts as
metaphysically “queer.” Having adopted Mackie’s skepticism about objective values,
Singer finds his own normative stance undercut. “The denial of objective truth in ethics
thus leads not to preference utilitarianism as a kind of metaphysically unproblematic
default position,” he says, “but to skepticism about the possibility of reaching any
meaningful conclusions at all about what we ought to do.”263
The Normative Truth Version

The principle of the equal consideration of interests cannot be defended as an
unproblematic default position, Singer concedes. If it is to be defended, it must be as an
ethical truth. While he found such a notion odd in 1981, Singer is much more open to it in
2011. At the end of his new afterword then, he cautiously endorses Derek Parfit’s recent
defense of objective normative truth.264
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Parfit’s defense of this notion involves the highly stylized example of a man with
“Future Tuesday Indifference”—a condition that makes him indifferent to suffering pain
on any future Tuesday. In fact, Parfit contends, the man has reason not to be indifferent to
pain (on Tuesdays or any other day), and so his preference is intrinsically, objectively
irrational.265 Closer scrutiny of his thought experiment reveals Parfit’s analysis to be
deeply problematic however, and Singer prefers a different, and more realistic, thought
experiment.266 Singer’s aim is still to get this notion of objective reasons for action off the
ground. If there are objective reasons to act, regardless of all our other motivations, then
the notion of objective normative truth is coherent and defensible (contra Mackie). The
principle of the equal consideration of interests might thus be defended, not as having
metaphysically default validity, but as an objective ethical truth.267
Here is Singer’s scenario.
I am about to spend a month on a remote island where there are no dentists when I
detect the early signs of a toothache coming on. On the basis of past experience, I
believe that if I don’t go to the dentist today I am very likely to suffer an
agonizing toothache all next month, which will prevent me enjoying what will
otherwise be a rare opportunity to relax and enjoy the natural beauty of the island.
If I do go to the dentist today, I will suffer mild discomfort for less than an hour.
My knowledge that I will suffer an agonizing toothache all next month if I do not
go to the dentist gives me a reason to go to the dentist today. It would be irrational
of me to ignore the pain I will suffer if I do not go.268
He goes on:
But note that nothing has been said about my present desires. Perhaps I am the
kind of person who is more influenced by what will happen to me now, or in the
next few hours, than what will happen to me tomorrow or next week. Hence right
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now, when I am standing in front of my dentist’s office, what I most want is to
avoid anything even slightly unpleasant today. Intellectually, I know that next
week, when I am in agony and my island sojourn is being ruined, I will regret this
decision, but at the moment that knowledge has no impact on my desires. The fact
that next week’s agony does not motivate me to take steps to prevent it, however,
does not vitiate the claim that I have a reason to take such steps.269
According to Singer, the remote island vacationer with a sore tooth (let’s call him Soren)
believes that if he doesn’t go to the dentist today, he will suffer an agonizing toothache
all next month. It is this knowledge that he will suffer, Singer claims, that gives Soren a
reason to go to the dentist. But “nothing has been said about [Soren’s] present desires.”
Therefore, the judgment that Soren has a reason to go to the dentist does not depend on
his present desires. He is after all the kind of person who is more influenced by present
concerns than by future concerns. In other words, Soren is on Singer’s account not
epistemically deficient—intellectually, he knows he will suffer—he is motivationally
deficient. The point, I take it, is that what Soren has reason to do is a function of what he
knows to be the case, not of his desires. His desires are irrelevant.
Singer concludes that the notion of objective reasons for action is viable. This
suggests to him the possibility of a rational foundation for ethics: “[I]f we can accept the
idea of objective normative truths, we do have an alternative to reliance on everyday
moral intuitions that, according to the best current scientific understanding, are
emotionally based responses that proved adaptive at some time in our evolutionary
history.”270 If all we had were evolutionarily designed emotional responses to physical
and social stimuli, there would be no principled basis for adjudicating between norms.
But “The existence of objective moral truths allows us to hope that we may be able to
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distinguish these intuitive responses from the reasons for action that all rational sentient
beings would have, even rational sentient beings who had evolved in circumstances very
different from our own.”271
I am not convinced that Singer’s thought experiment succeeds in establishing the
viability of a notion of objective reasons for action. We should distinguish between (1)
the claim that one’s reasons are independent of one’s present desires, and (2) the claim
that one’s reasons are independent of all of one’s desires.272 We can grant Singer’s claim
that Soren does not presently have a desire to avoid future agony, or that it is significantly
weaker than his other present desire not to go to the dentist. But this only establishes (1).
Plausibly however, if Soren does have a reason to go to the dentist, it is because he will at
some point desire not to suffer, or to enjoy his vacation, and because these desires are in
some sense more important to him than the more fleeting desire not to go to the dentist.
Thus, it is arguably this configuration of Soren’s desiderative economy that provides
grounds for a charge of irrationality. In his cooler moments (if he is like most human
beings), he recognizes that he values an agony-free month on the island more than not
going to the dentist’s, but he lets his more immediate desires get the best of him. This is
why he is irrational.273
If this account of Soren’s irrationality is correct, then Singer’s scenario does not
establish the truth of (2). It is not the case that Soren has reasons that float free of all of
his desires. They are rather a function of his deeper and more abiding desires. It is not
Soren’s belief that he will suffer next month that gives him a reason to go to the dentist
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after all. It is rather his characteristically human aversion to suffering. In ordinary cases,
being in pain centrally involves the desire not to be in pain. So Soren is irrational
because, in spite of his (latent) dislike of suffering, his belief that he will suffer has no
present effect on his behavior. Absent that dislike however, there would be no necessary
connection between Soren’s belief and his reason to go to the dentist.274
Singer’s character is in some sense irrational. But whereas Singer accounts for
that irrationality in terms of his having objective reasons for action (which he ignores), I
contend that he is irrational because of tensions internal to his desiderative economy. In
his cooler moments, Soren values an agony-free month of island vacationing more than
not going to the dentist; but, in the moment, his more fleeting aversion to sitting in the
dentist’s chair gets the best of him. If Soren weren’t an ordinary human being, if he were
an enlightened Buddhist monk, say, or an alien visitor with some strange psychology, and
if for that reason he really didn’t want to not be in pain, he would indeed by very different
from the rest of us, but that wouldn’t be enough to make him irrational.275 I conclude that
Singer has failed to establish the viability of a notion of objective reasons for action or
objective rationality, where “objective” means, roughly, desire- or preferenceindependent.276
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Reasons for Whom?

Singer rejects the default utilitarianism version of the Rational Foundation
Argument because the principle of the equal consideration of interests, if it cannot be an
ethical truth, can only be a subjective preference. Thus he updates the Rational
Foundation Argument in 2011 with a defense of normative truth. I have argued, however,
that that defense fails. Is there anything else to be said for or about the principle of the
equal consideration of interests as a foundation for ethics?
If it does hinge on this notion of objective ethical truth, then strictly speaking,
Singer is right: the principle of the equal consideration of interests is incompatible with
skepticism about objective values. Is a more modest defense of the principle of the equal
consideration of interests possible on prudential grounds? The idea would be to propose
the principle of the equal consideration of interests not as an objective ethical truth, but
just as a useful idea. In the case of a community of equals, such a proposal may well gain
widespread or total assent. But little follows from this. What happens when the
conditions of equal power and voice break down?
On my view the default utilitarianism version of the Rational Foundation
Argument fails not because it fails to answer the question of what ethic a community of
rational, social (and presumed equal) beings should adopt, but because that is the wrong
question. It is the wrong question because we are not that community. If reason is to
provide a moral path forward for us, it must explain how its reasons connect with our
reasons—the reasons we have in a world of difference.
If all we are is rational, social animals, then the claim that the principle of the
equal consideration of interests is the only rational approach to ethics is quite plausible,
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in my estimation. The hypothetical, bare-bones value choice scenario makes alternative
proposals look silly. But of course, we are much more than just rational and social (and a
bit less impartially rational, I’m inclined to say). In the actual world, different
individuals, different groups, have differential access to power and cultural voice
(differences of power often “justified” in terms of differences of sex, gender, race, class,
ability, and so forth). Because of these differences, those with the greatest interest in a
more impartial ethic often have the least power to implement it, and those with the
greatest power to implement it have the least interest in doing so. Under conditions of
difference of power or cultural voice, that is, the justificatory pressure that generates
expansion lapses. Singer has nothing to say about this—he pictures all moral dialogue as
egalitarian moral dialogue.
According to both Parfit and Singer (in 2011), we can and should distinguish
between whether we have normative reasons to do something and whether we are
psychologically motivated to do something.277 The defense of normative truth is a
separate matter, on their view, from the question of whether people will be moved to act
in accordance with the truth. I concede that the issue of psychological motivation is a
complex one, especially if the focus is on particular individuals. But I want to resist the
idea that normative theorizing is especially fruitful when done in complete abstraction
from the things that in fact move us. Singer asks: “If we gain acceptance of the claim that
there are objective reasons for action only by granting that even those who fully
acknowledge the existence of a reason for doing something will not necessarily be
motivated by it, have we won only a Pyrrhic victory?”278 Singer skirts around a
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straightforward answer, but on my view, the answer is a simple yes. If reason is to
provide a path forward for us, its reasons must connect with our reasons, and not only
with the reasons we would have if we were the perfectly equal, rational, and impartial
actors of our idealizations.279
5. Conclusion

Singer’s account of evolution, ethics, and moral progress in The Expanding Circle
can be summed up, I have claimed, in five central theses. The first theses, on
sociobiology, state that sociobiology, or what we would now call evolutionary
psychology, explains the evolutionary origins of altruism, but that it cannot provide us
with a foundation for ethics. I know of no reason to resist Singer on either point. Singer’s
fifth thesis, on progress, states that we should adopt rules that maximize welfare. This
expansive, humanist moral ideal is in my view very attractive. But its merits are not
closely tied to Singer’s theses on reason. Accordingly, I have focused a critical eye solely
on Singer’s theses on reason.
Singer’s first and backward-looking thesis on reason claims that reason explains
the existence of wide-ranging altruism. His argument to that conclusion assumes, first,
that standard sociobiological accounts leave an explanatory gap that must be filled, and
second, that the ability to reason is the same as the ability to see the reasons for wider
moral concern. I have argued that Singer is wrong on both counts.

279

By following Parfit in divorcing the normative from the psychological, Singer substantially weakens his
account in my view. Singer’s account of how reason has a motivational hold on us plays an important part
in making his view initially plausible. If he really does think questions of psychological motivation can be
completely bracketed, then whatever victory he hopes to have will in fact be Pyrrhic, I think.

145
Singer’s second and forward-looking thesis on reason claims that reason can
provide us with a foundation for ethics. The first version of his argument for that claim
presents preference utilitarianism as a metaphysically unproblematic default position for
any set of rational and social beings in search of a group ethic. Having realized the
tension between this approach and his adoption of Mackie’s skepticism about objective
values or objective ethical truth, Singer disavows the argument in its original form in his
2011 afterword. In its stead comes a defense of objective normative truth. That defense
fails as well however, because it overlooks the significance of subjective desire or
preference in its account of “objective” irrationality.
For Singer, the significance of both the backward-looking and forward-looking
claims is that, together, they paint a compelling picture. Evolution, according to this
picture, has only taken us so far. It has given us a concern for kin, for our own small
group, and for potential reciprocators. Having become reasoning beings along the way
however, reason has taken up the slack, pushing on the arbitrary boundaries of our
affections. The result has been a slow and steady climb to an increasingly universal point
of view, in which everyone’s interests (even, at the extreme, those of non-human
animals) are taken into consideration. We can continue to make progress if we get on
board, according to this picture. If we adopt a humanist ethic of universal concern, we are
not making an arbitrary choice of ultimate values. Rather, we are in some sense fulfilling
the movement of reason in history.
I have argued that Singer’s picture of the role of reason in moral progress is
flawed. In its stead, I have offered a picture that is more in keeping with current
evolutionary understanding. On this picture, we are genetically self-interested, socially
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calculating, gossiping primates, characterized by various differences of social status and
thus social power, who inhabit diverse social, technological, and ecological niches. Under
certain conditions, our moral categories and institutions expand. While some internal,
psychological constraints do play a part in this process, the main impetus for moral
change is social: we expand our categories and institutions when existing categories and
institutions come under new forms of justificatory pressure. In all but the most unusual
circumstances, this pressure is uneven—a point Singer repeatedly misses. And yet, when
by virtue of ecological change, technological innovation, or political agitation,
justificatory pressures shift, the result can be an expanding circle of moral concern. For
those of us with broad, humanist moral ideals then, we do well to keep an eye on all of
these factors.
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CHAPTER FIVE

THE CASE FOR UTOPIA

1. Introduction

In this final chapter, I examine Philip Kitcher’s recent arguments in favor of
expansive moral ideals. Kitcher’s account, “pragmatic naturalism,” pictures ethics as an
evolving practice that is as old as human life itself. Ethics is a social technology, he
argues, initially aimed at relieving social tension caused by failures of altruism. This
“ethical project” has evolved, and its functions have proliferated, sometimes generating
functional conflict. These conflicts can be overcome, Kitcher argues, if we reinstate the
original function of ethics—remedying altruism failures—as primary. This doesn’t mean
undoing the progress inherent in the development of richer and more sophisticated
conceptions of the good life (the kinds of lives historically available to very few people).
It means rather that the ideal for us should be to make such rich and fulfilling lives
available to all. Observing that this is the ethical ideal likely to emerge from an imagined
global conversation under ideal epistemic and affective conditions gives it a normative
force, Kitcher claims, that none of its rivals have.
Kitcher’s account is worth analyzing for two reasons. First, Kitcher’s pragmatic
naturalism offers a functionalist framework for making sense of ethical progress. This
framework allows us to speak intelligibly about objective progress in ethics, on analogy
with objective technological progress. Second, Kitcher’s account is explicitly social.
Ethical progress on his account is not the accumulation of ethical truth, but rather the
more successful discharging of ethical functions—an essentially social achievement.
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On both counts, however, Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism faces difficulties. After
providing a more detailed overview of his views, I will argue, first, that functionalism
cannot provide the modest objectivity Kitcher wants for his account of progress. This is
because his account of the original function of ethics is inadequate, and because his
account of the problem background to which ethics is a response is untenable. Second, I
will argue that Kitcher’s ethical ideal is insufficiently social. His proposed vision of the
good itself is too robust and his ethical method too weak. In this respect, I will argue, he
repeats Singer’s mistake of leaving expansive ideals disconnected from the real world.
Kitcher’s ethical functionalism, I will argue, cannot be salvaged. With it, we must
give up on the idea of a distinctly ethical or moral axis of progress. However, I will argue
that the shortcomings in Kitcher’s ethical ideal can and should be corrected. Doing so
involves thinning out the Utopian ethical vision and strengthening Kitcher’s ethical
method. The imagined global conversation, I will argue, needs to actually happen. The
case for expansive humanist moral ideals, in other words, needs to be forcefully made
through political action. Although humanist ideals cannot claim for themselves a strong
kind of objectivity, the charge that political action reduces humanist work to simple plays
of power can be turned back.
In concluding, I will, in a very preliminary way, discuss two ways in which
humanists might speak meaningfully of progress in our moralities—two axes of progress,
as it were. What matters most in an account of progress, I will suggest, is primarily to
capture the possibility of progress for us, here and now. If, at the end of the day,
naturalists cannot provide a single “moral” spectrum against which to chart all moral
change, that is, on my view, no great loss.
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2. Pragmatic Naturalism

The Ethical Project

Kitcher’s view, pragmatic naturalism, pictures ethics as a social practice with a
history—one that spans most of our history as a species.280 As its name indicates,
pragmatic naturalism is inspired, first, by pragmatism, in its attempt to connect
philosophy with human life, and in its “Deweyan picture of ethics as growing out of the
human social situation.”281 Further, its account of ethical truth is inspired by William
James’ approach to truth (James famously quipped that “truth happens to an idea”;
Kitcher thinks truth can “happen” to ethical ideas under certain conditions).282 Second,
pragmatic naturalism is naturalistic, insofar as no mysterious entities are invoked in the
explanation of ethics. “Naturalists intend that no more things be dreamt of in their
philosophies than there are in heaven and earth,” Kitcher says.283 His aim is to provide a
compelling picture of ethics that can simultaneously connect the present to the past,
dispelling any sense of mystery in our ethical practice, and reinvigorate expansive moral
aspirations, without any sleight of hand. As he puts it: “The aim is to use history—in the
ways, and to the extent, we can reconstruct it—to liberate discussions of ethics from the
confining pictures that prompt a sense of mystery.”284
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Kitcher thus begins with the past: specifically, with the social situation of our
hominid ancestors. Our ancestors, on Kitcher’s account, had limited altruistic
dispositions. Like contemporary chimpanzees, they were altruistic enough to live
together, but the limits of their altruism often led to social friction and violence, requiring
cumbersome bouts of peacemaking and reassurance.285 However: “A look at their
descendants some quarter of a million generations later discloses that the limits have been
transcended.”286 If the tense social situation of our ancestors is regarded as a problem,
then the problem has effectively been solved. This is not to say no further tensions exist
today. Something has happened, however, that enables us to live together in much larger
groups than the bands of our ancestors, and to do so with very little conflict, relatively
speaking.
The innovation that explains the transition from the life of our hominid ancestors
to modern human living, Kitcher claims, is a “capacity for normative guidance.”
Normative guidance replaces “The cumbersome peacemaking of our original hominids”
with a device “preempting rupture rather than reacting to it.”287 It is not necessary to
suppose that a single psychological change accounts for the jump. Kitcher prefers a
liberal understanding of normative guidance. Through the use of language, our ancestors
acquired the capability to understand and obey commands, in some form or other, and
they learned to substitute basic forms of behavioral altruism for the altruism failures that
had preceded.
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Kitcher’s idea of an altruism failure is relatively simple. A behaves altruistically
toward B when A, while acting, takes B’s desires into account. Conversely, A fails to
behave altruistically toward B when A does not take B’s desires into account. Insofar as
social living requires a mutual accommodation of desires, such altruism failures produce
social tension. If A can be made to behave altruistically toward B, to be responsive to B’s
desires or to accommodate them in some way, then this solves the problem of altruism
failure. We do not even need to suppose that A’s motivation for behaving altruistically is
a concern for B or for B’s desires. Proxies (e.g. fear of punishment by C) can achieve the
same end result.288 Perhaps in tandem with practices of punishment, we may suppose that
there emerged in the psychological lives of our ancestors an internalized sense of what is
and is not allowed, or what we would call conscience.289
Central to Kitcher’s picture of the emergence of ethics is the idea that, from its
very inception, normative guidance was socially embedded.290 What this means is that the
content of the behavioral and educational codes that came to govern the lives of our
ancestors was always a joint product of the adult members of the band, produced in and
through group discussion. Kitcher adduces three lines of evidence for this strong claim:
first, anthropological studies of contemporary hunter-gatherer bands reveal this kind of
egalitarianism at work in their societies; second, insofar as normative guidance solves the
problem of social tension, it must actually solve the problem of social tension, and not
just displace it; third, it is likely that our ancestors lived in ecological contexts that
generated egalitarian pressures. For instance, Kitcher argues that the evolution of
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hominid sociality depended on our ancestors’ ability to band together in coalitions. The
resulting race to form coalitions (to pool resources and therefore gain an evolutionary
advantage) would have terminated, according to game theoretical models, in “a situation
in which the habitat is partitioned into territories controlled by sizable coalitions,
occasionally with a floating population of individuals who live in the fringes.”291 Given
the competitive pressure from neighboring bands in such situations, the cooperation of
every individual would be needed for group survival. Our ancestors’ practice of
deliberating together and articulating codes of conduct by which to live their lives—a
practice to which we are heirs—is what Kitcher calls the ethical project.
From the early ventures in norm-governed social living of our ancestors, new
codes have evolved (primarily through cultural forms of selection) as norms and ideals
have been passed down and renegotiated from generation to generation. Hence, the
ethical project is one we are still involved in today. While the historical record is too
sparse to reconstruct with any certainty the actual course of events between the
emergence of ethical project and its contemporary form, we can nevertheless tell a
plausible “how possibly” story about that development. That story, on Kitcher’s retelling,
emphasizes the transition from a relative egalitarianism to a mild division of labor.
“Deliberations about how to share scare resources surely acknowledged the basic desires
of all members of the band,” he says, “and endorsed those desires, in the sense of
preferring everyone’s desires to be satisfied provided there is enough to go around.
Attitudes of endorsement create pressure to transform conditions of scarcity into a state
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of greater abundance.”292 The resulting division of labor, in Kitcher’s “how possibly”
reconstruction, generates a surplus of goods, which can be used in times of scarcity for
survival, or in times of abundance for trade.293 Success with this social arrangement
generates pressure for individuals in the band to develop their talents—an injunction that
might be formulated explicitly in the group’s ethical code. Those who perform especially
difficult or demanding socially necessary jobs are rewarded with social approbation (and
perhaps also, it is imagined, the approbation of the ancestors, the gods, or more generally
of the “unseen enforcer” of the ethical code294). New conceptions of the good life and of
excellence emerge. Institutions such as private property are developed, perhaps beginning
with the specialized tools required by specialists in their given roles. New psychological
capabilities are brought to bear on ethical living—not only fear of (visible or invisible)
enforcers of the rules, but desires for social recognition, pride, reverence and awe, and so
forth. And thus the familiar apparatus of recognizable and more modern moralities is
born.
The aim of providing this kind of story, Kitcher says, is not to give us historical
knowledge. It is rather to dispel the sense that no ordinary processes could have gotten us
from the starting point of our ancestors (a starting point we do have some historical
certainty about, according to Kitcher) to our current situation. And by Kitcher’s
judgment, the story we can tell plausibly explains how it is possible to get from there to
here.295
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However, the very fact of telling a naturalistic story about the cultural evolution
of the ethical project poses a problem. There are episodes in both recent and not so recent
history that we are inclined to view as progressive. Kitcher’s examples of recent progress
include the achievements of feminism, the abolition of chattel slavery, and what he calls
“the withering of vice” (i.e. the relative normalization of homosexual desire).296 It is hard
to resist the judgment, Kitcher argues, that these stories are not stories of mere change—
that they are instead stories of progress. Thus, he says, we need a framework for making
good naturalistic sense of this idea of progress.
Functions, Ethics, and Progress

Kitcher proposes a functionalist framework for rendering these and other claims
of ethical progress intelligible. His account begins with two clear cases of meaningful
function-talk: first, there is the artifactual case, in which an entity has some function as a
result of the desires of its designer (and the parts of the artifact each have the function of
contributing to that overall function); second, there is the biological case, in which an
organism’s parts, traits, or organs have the function of helping the organism survive and
reproduce—i.e. respond effectively to the most general Darwinian pressures (and
likewise at smaller levels, parts of cells and organs and so forth have the function of
contributing to large scale functioning that discharges the more general Darwinian
function).297 In both cases, according to Kitcher, we can speak of the “problem
background” to which a function is a response.298 In the artifactual case, the problem
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background is constituted by the desires a designer wishes to fulfill with some piece of
technology, and in the biological case, it is constituted by Darwinian selection pressures
for a given organism in a given environment.
We can begin to understand the concept of ethical functions, according to Kitcher,
by seeing the technological and biological cases as two extremes of a continuum that
admits of intermediate cases. Kitcher explains:
Between clear-headed recognition of problem structures [in the artifactual cases]
and the biological cases, in which no cognitive subject who sees the problems and
designs the solutions is present, stand intermediate cases. On occasion, people
recognize difficulties—they know not all is well—even though they cannot frame
the troubles exactly. You feel twinges of discomfort and sometimes pain when
you perform particular motions; your doctor formulates the problem precisely and
prescribes a supportive device or a program of exercises.299
Against this background understanding of functions, Kitcher proposes that social
embedded normative guidance (the development of which marked our species’ first steps
in the ethical project) be understood as a social technology responding to the problem
background of—and thus having the original function of responding to—recurring
altruism failures.300
Regarding our (unintentionally) pioneering ancestors, Kitcher says,
None of them had a clear understanding of that problem background. Moved by a
sense of the fragilities and tensions of their social life, they first guided their
behavior by regularities to help them avoid trouble and later discussed with one
another rules to govern conduct, to be applied in increasingly explicit systems of
punishment. Crucially, the problems arise not for a single individual, but for the
social group . . . Each of them feels the difficulties the circumstances of their
shared life impose, the frequent tensions, the long episodes of peacemaking. The
problems are felt by all. Ethical codes serve the function of solving the original
difficulties, dimly understood by these ancestors.301
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Thus the social tensions that characterize chimpanzee-hominid life can be conceived as
symptoms of an underlying social problem: altruism failure. The ethical project initially
emerged as a (partial) solution to that problem. It had to take the form it took—socially
embedded normative guidance—because, under the social and ecological conditions
faced by our ancestors, alternative responses to the felt social tensions, such as dictatorial
rule, would not have actually solved the underlying problem. “To use an obvious
analogy,” Kitcher says, a dictatorial solution “palliates the symptoms without attending to
the underlying cause, as if the doctor were to offer to cure your aching knee by
amputating your leg.”302
This functionalist framework allows Kitcher to provide a simple account of
progress. Just as, in the technological case, progress consists in growing effectiveness or
efficiency in discharging the relevant functions—a process Kitcher calls functional
refinement—so also, in the ethical case, progress can be understood in the refinement of
ethical codes that permits a more effective response to the problem of recurring altruism
failures that cause social tension.303 The ethical project “began in small, egalitarian
societies, in which people with limited tendencies to psychological altruism lived
together. Feeling the tensions of their social lives, they had no successful options except
to address the (unrecognized) cause—and ethics was born with the function of remedying
altruism failures.”304 Our ancestors began to make ethical progress when they found ways
of discharging this function more effectively. Advances in techniques of socialization, the
development and refinement of systems of punishment, and expansions of the moral
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circle, effected either by attending to the marginalized within a society or by forming new
bonds with another society all served to enhance social harmony in some way, decreasing
conflict by resolving altruism failures.305 “Major instances of ethical progress can thus be
seen in terms of functional refinement, where the function in question is that identified as
the original function of ethics.”306
However, the process of solving an initial problem can give rise to new problems.
The invention of the automobile solves one kind of problem, related to a population’s
transportation needs, but many new problems are generated along the way—how to
regulate traffic, balance speed and safety, build and repair infrastructure, etc. This is
functional generation, and it exists in the ethical case as well, Kitcher says. Social
tensions might initially be decreased and basic needs met through a mild division of
labor, and this might then generate new problems relative to the desires and aspirations
of, and demands on, skilled laborers (for example). So the ethical project evolves not
only through functional refinement but also functional generation. Just as the
development of the automobile solves one problem and creates many more, so too new
ethical functions are generated as we continue to address the problems posed by social
living.307
Functional generation is important for Kitcher’s account because it raises the
possibility of functional conflict—the case in which fulfillment of generated functions
comes at the cost of fulfilling other generated functions, or of fulfilling the original
function. Functional refinement helps make sense of a notion of local progress, but
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functional generation and functional conflict explain why it can be hard to speak
meaningfully of global progress. Kitcher elaborates:
In the transition to hierarchical societies with pronounced division of labor and of
status, fulfillment of the generated functions (supplying enough to satisfy the
previously endorsed desires of all) is obtained at the cost of compromising the
satisfaction of the original function . . . The societies who emerge from these
changes have the choice of whether to take steps to improve the fulfillment of the
original function at cost to the solutions they have achieved with respect to the
generated problems.308
According to Kitcher’s “how possibly” story of the evolution of ethics, divisions of labor
(and, subsequently, status) initially fostered relative social harmony by making it possible
to consistently meet everyone’s basic needs—thus solving the problem of altruism
failures manifest in social tension. But this solution in turn generates new desires and
new conceptions of the good life for individuals occupying particular social roles. Thus
there emerges a tension between the problem of satisfying these newer, higher order
desires and continuing to solve the problem of altruism failure.
In and of itself then, the functionalist framework only suffices to make talk of
ethical progress intelligible. It is insufficient, by itself, to pronounce definitively on what
counts as progress for us (here, now), given the generated functions of ethics—in
particular those that conflict with the original function. In addition to the functionalist
framework then, we need an account of how to solve the problem of functional conflict.
That is what Kitcher offers with his discussion of ethical method.
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Utopia

On Kitcher’s view, we face today a scaled up version of the predicament of our
ancestors. This is true insofar as our global civilization is marked by failures of
altruism.309 Further, “All members of our species face the common problem of avoiding
(further) environmental changes that would dramatically disrupt human lives.”310 It might
be thought that the globally privileged and powerful can insulate themselves from these
changes, but “It is overwhelmingly improbable that the insulation can be maintained for
long, given the technological possibilities for violent retaliation now increasingly
available to the poor and oppressed (or to those who claim to represent them).”311 Thus
we face today on a global scale a problem analogous to the problem faced by our huntergatherer ancestors: that of remedying altruism failures causing social tensions that none
can escape.
Kitcher’s positive proposal accordingly puts the priority on remedying altruism
failures—the original function of ethics. He says:
Consider an imaginary social state: Utopia. In this state, each member of the
human population has a serious chance of living a good life, a life in which the
person can recognize a number of different possibilities for living, can make a
free choice of a project informed by that recognition, and realize a significant
number of the plans, intentions, and desires central to that project; moreover the
chances of living such lives are equal across the population . . . Pragmatic
naturalism’s proposal: Once a particular stage of technological development has
been reached, a world counts as good to the extent actualizing it would lead us
toward Utopia.312
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Utopia, then, is Kitcher’s solution to the problem of functional conflict (not in general,
but our problem of functional conflict, here and now). And although Utopia is an ideal, it
is not beyond the realm of possibility for us at this point of human development,
according to Kitcher.313 The sophisticated conceptions of the good life that first emerged
in inegalitarian societies do represent some kind of progress, but in Kitcher’s Utopian
vision, these generated functions of ethics are made to serve the original function.314
Kitcher calls the conditions under which the ethical project first began, which
involved conversations of all adult members of a particular band discussing their shared
desires and needs, conditions of mutual engagement. “Because of their existing
dispositions to psychological altruism, limited though these were” he says, “because of
the pressures on the group and the perceived need for joint action, the original ethicists
were forced into mutual engagement with people who lived beside them every day.”315
This form of interaction was effective at generating ethical solutions to their shared social
problems.
Because he pictures our current predicament as a scaled up version of the
predicament of our ancestors, Kitcher suggests that an ethical method suited to resolving
functional conflict today should replicate these conditions of mutual engagement. It is no
longer possible, given the size of the global human population, to stage an actual global
conversation. But an imagined conversation under the right conditions can stand in for
the actual conversations of our ancestors.316
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Thus Kitcher proposes that the “Ideal conversation,” which is to generate a
workable picture of progress, “consists in attempts to show that proposals that
participants desire to implement as ways of responding to functional conflict either
accord or fail to accord either with ethical functions all participants recognize or with
their shared understanding of the need to respond to the wishes of all.”317 This in turn
requires that participants in the conversation meet affective and epistemic requirements
that make the imagined conversation fruitful. Participants must not rely on false beliefs
about the natural world, or on false or incomplete beliefs about the wishes of others, and
they must know the consequences for everyone of proposed institutional changes.318
Furthermore, the desires of conversationalists must be responsive to the desires of all
other conversationalists, such that no “contaminated” desires—desires that, to be
fulfilled, require that the like desires of others be thwarted—make their way into
conversationalists’ proposals.319
The method of pragmatic naturalism therefore recommends scrutinizing proposed
standards of progress in light of the ideal conversation. The proposed method, Kitcher
argues—a global conversation, conducted under ideal epistemic and affective conditions,
and involving all cognitively competent human adults, each being given an equal voice—
is likely to produce something very much like Utopia.320 Starkly non-Utopian proposals,
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he argues, can be shown to fall afoul of conditions of mutual engagement. They are either
grounded in false beliefs, or simply fail to take into account the wishes of all.321
Kitcher’s method for justifying “revolutionary” ethical change (change that
resolves functional conflict) is egalitarian. While this might be imagined to make the
method viciously circular—assuming the very same equality that is supposed to be
produced by the method—in fact, the types of equality that characterize the method
(imagined global dialogue), on the one hand, and the progressive proposal (Utopia), on
the other, are different. It is at least possible, Kitcher says, that a conversation undertaken
under conditions of discursive equality not produce an egalitarian vision of the good. As
a matter of fact, he thinks, the method does produce an egalitarian vision of the good
(namely, Utopia). But it doesn’t do so as a matter of logical necessity. This shows that
Kitcher’s pair of proposals—Utopia, and its justifying method—achieves an important
form of coherence. And this, Kitcher argues, is enough to distinguish pragmatic
naturalism’s understanding of progress from that of its rivals.322
3. Against Functionalism

The Original Function of Ethics

In this section and the next, I take aim both at Kitcher’s functionalism and at his
normative proposals. The case against functionalism is decisive, in my estimation, for the
reasons I lay out below. I will be more conciliatory in my remarks on Utopia and global
discourse. But I begin with a two-pronged critique of functionalism. I contend, first, that
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Kitcher’s account of the original function of ethics is deeply problematic, and second,
that his account of the problem background to which ethics is a response is untenable.
Kitcher’s talk of ethical functions, functional generation, and functional conflict
only does what he needs it to on an assumption of functional persistence for the original
function of ethics. It is because the original function of remedying altruism failures
persists that there is now a problem calling for a collectively reasoned solution (because
that original function conflicts with generated functions). Let us grant that the original
function of ethics is in some sense still with us. Even so, I submit, it is not clear that the
result can be in line with Kitcher’s intentions. This is because his account of the original
function of ethics is arguably incorrect. I offer three reasons to be skeptical.
The first is that the account is speculative. While Kitcher concedes that
connecting the ethical project from its inception to its present day incarnations is a matter
amenable only to “how possibly” explanations, he also insists that we can be pretty sure
about how the ethical project got started. Remedying altruism failures is how ethics
actually got started, according to Kitcher. But, as Ron Mallon notes, there are alternative
accounts of the origins of ethics in the literature: normative guidance might have grown
“out of selection for ways of regulating eating together so as not to disgust those with
whom we eat” (a position argued for by Leon Kass323), or from the practice of “regulating
our conspecifics to avoid ‘poisons and parasites’ (benefiting ourselves via herd
immunity)” (the position of Daniel Kelly324). “Or perhaps,” Mallon says, “we came to
endorse and debate third-party norms only as a mere byproduct of first-person aversions
to action types” (a view he associates with Debra Lieberman, John Tooby, and Leda
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Cosmides325). Mallon concludes: “The point is that reconstructing the actual natural
history of humanity is a quite difficult affair, and that it seems that large parts of Kitcher's
discussion are hostage to the truth of a particular empirical thesis about it.”326 This is odd,
since what’s at stake is an objective account of ethical progress.
Second, although this is in a way an extension of the previous point, Kitcher is
careful to paint the invention of the “unseen enforcer” as a distortion of the ethical
project, one that emerges some time after its inception. Today, he says, we should simply
undo the distortion.327 If “distortions” are so easy to undo (relatively speaking), this
already casts a shadow on the assumption of functional persistence. But the deeper point
is that Kitcher may be wrong. It could be that ethics is “religiously entangled” not only
because “the very specific link between unseen powers and ethical conduct bestows
significant advantages in cultural competition,”328 but also because the gods were already
there at the beginning, so to speak. On Julian Jaynes’ account, what Kitcher calls
“normative guidance” was, from the very beginning, a rather literal case of divine
command.329 Jaynes argues that our ancestors had “bicameral” minds, in which the right
hemisphere of the brain sometimes gave behavioral guidance perceived by the left
hemisphere as coming from “outside.” If something like this is true, then the original
function of ethics is to do what the gods say—hardly a function to which we feel bound
today. Even more problematically, Jaynes argues that, for a variety of reasons, we no are
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longer able to hear the gods: the bicameral mind has “broken down,” and now our brain
hemispheres are generally more integrated. Modern subjectivity has emerged precisely as
a response to the silence of the gods. On a Jaynesian account, that is, fulfilling the
original function is no longer even possible.
Third and finally, even if we set aside rival hypotheses about the origin of ethics
and the sources of its religious entanglements, Kitcher’s account of the original function
of ethics is problematic on its own terms. Remedying altruism failures, for Kitcher, is the
original function of ethics—it was the function of our ancestors’ first ventures in socially
embedded normative guidance—and it is to be the primary function of ethics for us
today—the benchmark for ethical progress. If the original function of ethics were
something radically different from remedying altruism failures, then Kitcher’s proposal
for today couldn’t go through, as I have just suggested. But now notice that, according to
Kitcher’s “how possibly” reconstruction, our ancestors inhabited partitioned
environments and competed with neighboring bands.330 This means that “remedying
altruism failures” simpliciter could not have been the original function of ethics. Rather,
the original function of ethics (by Kitcher’s own account) must have been to remedy, not
all altruism failures, but rather in-group altruism failures. Out-group enmity, that is, was
just as much a part of the original function of ethics as in-group amity, being its
precondition.
Kitcher borrows from Singer the idea that the development of peaceful relations
between previously hostile bands counts as progress. Expanding the circle of moral
concern, he says, addresses “classes of previously occurring altruism failures (in
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aggressive interactions among neighboring bands).”331 By identifying “remedying
altruism failures” as the original function of ethics, Kitcher is able to fold such
sociomoral transformations neatly into his functionalist scheme, and to make a powerful
case for its ongoing relevance today. I contend, however, that the transformation of
hostile relations between bands cannot simply be painted as one more “refinement” of the
original function of ethics. If we take Kitcher’s model seriously, the forging of inter-band
harmony is not a more thorough fulfillment of the original function of ethics but is rather
a departure from that original function. It remedies certain failures of altruism, but not
those that were relevant at the dawn of ethics. In fact, it “remedies” those failures of
altruism that were essential to the initial development of ethics and without which the
ethical project would never have been born. If we follow Kitcher and Singer in viewing
the forging of peace across group boundaries as an important kind of progress, then, by
the same token, we necessarily reject the original function of ethics as binding for us, and
as a measure of ethical progress, today.
Thus I conclude that, even if we were to grant Kitcher’s assumption of functional
persistence for the original function of ethics, the result would not be directly relevant to
an account of ethical progress for us today. The original function of ethics may not be
what Kitcher thinks it is, and there are grounds even within his own account for resisting
its characterization as the unqualified remedying of altruism failures.332 Insofar as
Kitcher’s account of the original function of ethics serves to anchor the technological
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metaphor by which he thinks talk of ethical progress can be made intelligible, this is quite
the difficulty. Further difficulties lie ahead.
Functions, Problems, and Personal Ends

Ethical functionalism is Kitcher’s way of giving his account of progress a
measure of objectivity. Kitcher finds subjectivist accounts of progress inadequate—a
point I revisit below—and talk of functional generation and functional conflict is
intended to overcome those inadequacies. In fact, however, ethical functionalism fails to
secure even the modest objectivity Kitcher’s account needs. The argument for this claim
is what occupies me in this section.
We can begin with some criticisms of functionalism made by William
FitzPatrick.333 On FitzPatrick’s analysis, Kitcher’s remarks about the role of socially
embedded normative guidance in the lives of our ancestors are best read in a biological
light. Group harmony and cooperation, the ends served by socially embedded normative
guidance, can be seen as serving the biological, Darwinian end of increasing reproductive
output. It may be the case that this social technology was developed in response to
psychological discomfort. But insofar as that discomfort is itself the expression of
naturally selected emotions, the technology that remedies altruism failures serves
biological ends and has a biological function, FitzPatrick argues. “This biological
function,” he says, “is a matter of the contingent instrumental role that remedying
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altruism failures through normative guidance played ultimately in enhancing reproductive
output, which is why the whole business presumably evolved.”334
What this means, FitzPatrick argues, is that remedying altruism failures “has no
more intrinsic (or noninstrumental) significance within this framework than the
monopolization of mating privileges by a dominant male elephant seal has in the
biological functional story of seal behavior.”335 It may be the case that socially embedded
normative guidance increased social harmony for our ancestors, but it’s not clear why this
should have any bearing on our understanding of ethical progress today. FitzPatrick
presses the point: “nothing in this functional story yet supports treating the remedying of
altruism failures as a worthy goal in its own right for us as rational agents, demanding our
attention and providing a standard of ethical progress for us.”336 The fact that ecologically
and socially forced egalitarian conversations leading to roughly egalitarian codes of
conduct marked the start of an “ethical project” and helped our ancestors survive has no
obvious ethical bearing on our own (very different) lives. If ethical functions are
ultimately oriented toward the discharging of merely Darwinian ends, FitzPatrick
concludes, then Kitcher’s framework fails to make sense of genuine ethical progress.
As best I can tell, however, Kitcher has seen this problem with merely biological
functions. He rejects a biological account of functions and functional progress, saying:
“progressive transitions are not to be identified with those promoting Darwinian or
cultural success.”337 It is to his credit then, that FitzPatrick considers an alternative
reading of Kitcher’s account. The functions Kitcher has in mind might be artificial, or, as
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I shall say, artifactual—on analogy with the functions of artifacts made by human
designers. Given the centrality of Kitcher’s technological metaphor, we are perhaps
closer to his intent with such a reading.
“But to move to the framework of artifacts and their psychologically imposed
functions,” FitzPatrick says, “gets us no closer to objective, authoritative standards for
progress.”338 This is because, in an artifactual framework, the purpose of an artifact is to
function as its designer intends. An artifact’s function is contingent upon the desires of its
designer. This is a problem in the ethical case because whether or not we care about the
remedying of altruism failures will simply be a contingent fact about our desires. And if
ethical functions depend only on the varying nature of our personal ends, then it is no
criticism of these ends that they undermine the “original function” of ethics. We are not
bound by the ends of artifact designers in our own use of their artifacts. We can
repurpose them as we see fit, giving them new purposes that suit our desires.339 On an
artifactual reading then, Utopia ends up being simply Kitcher’s personal preference—
hardly an objective measure for ethical progress.
Does FitzPatrick’s analysis miss the point? Kitcher explicitly positions ethical
functions as, in some sense, intermediate to biological and artifactual functions.
“Between clear-headed recognition of problem structures,” he says, “and the biological
cases . . . stand intermediate cases.”340 Here Kitcher seems to be resisting any easy
assimilation of the ethical case to either the biological or the artifactual cases. The
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question is whether Kitcher’s account of function actually has the resources to resist one
of these two readings. What sense can we make of intermediate ends to ground ethical
functional talk?
The problem background in the ethical case, on Kitcher’s analysis, is not clearly
discerned. Our ancestors were moved by a sense of social tension, but they only dimly
understood the problems they faced. That is how Kitcher explicates his intermediacy
thesis, as I shall call it. “On occasion,” he says, “people recognize difficulties—they
know not all is well—even though they cannot frame the troubles exactly. You feel
twinges of discomfort and sometimes pain when you perform particular motions; your
doctor formulates the problem precisely and prescribes a supportive device or a program
of exercises.”341 This is a medical analogy. But who is the patient? The problems faced
by our ancestors were problems they faced as a group. This is a recurring theme of
Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism. The group-based perspective is Kitcher’s answer to the
charge of subjectivism. The problems faced by our ancestors, he says, “can be regarded
as objective features of the social situation” to which our ancestors responded. “Desires
for relief are in no way idiosyncratic—they would be felt by virtually all members of our
species.”342
This is the crux of the matter: Kitcher tries to get ethical functionalism off the
ground with a medical analogy (shoulder pain) in which the patient is a social group. This
is the argumentative burden of the intermediacy thesis. The patient (the group) has a
problem (namely, the physiological cause of the shoulder pain, or socially, altruism
failures), and the doctor can prescribe a solution (exercises responsive to the underlying
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cause of the shoulder pain, or socially, the forms of normative guidance stumbled upon
by our ancestors). Ethical functionalism fails to get off the ground precisely here, and for
one simple reason: there are no medical problems that are not problems for someone. The
intermediacy thesis aims to separate problems (as objective features of the social
situation) from personal psychological ends (which are regarded as subjective and
“idiosyncratic”). But the separation fails, as I shall presently explain.
According to Kitcher, a community that experiences social tension is like an
individual who experiences shoulder pain. The individual can tell something is wrong,
that there is a problem, but needs help to figure out exactly what that is. So too, the
community can tell something is wrong, that there is a problem, but it can only stumble
along until it fortuitously hits upon a workable solution. Retrospectively, we can play for
our ancestors’ communities the doctor’s diagnostic role.
The analogy only works, I contend, because Kitcher has unwittingly assumed that
shoulders have a proper function.343 This assumption in turn completely infects the
understanding of group function upon which his ethical functionalism is built. It is
possible, of course, to speak of function in a biological sense—both for shoulders and for
communities. To the extent that unimpaired strength and range of motion (say) are
necessary for activities relevant to survival and reproduction (via hunting and gathering,
perhaps), we can speak of the “proper” biological function of shoulder muscles and
joints. Likewise, to the extent that a measure of social cohesiveness is necessary for
activities relevant to survival and reproduction (in the context of group selection via
inter-band conflict, say), we can speak of the “proper” biological function of a social
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group as a whole (in a particular ecological context). But we have already seen that this is
not the framework within which Kitcher wants to utilize talk of functions. And this is
damning, for there is no proper function of shoulders, and, a fortiori, of social groups,
outside of a biological framework.
I propose an alternative account of the “problem” of shoulder pain. The problem
faced by the person with shoulder pain, I submit, is the shoulder pain. It has an
underlying physiological cause, we can grant. But the problem itself is the pain, or
perhaps the limitations it imposes on the person’s regular activities. That is, the problem
is a problem relative to that person’s desires and ends. The underlying physiological
cause of the shoulder pain can be considered a problem, but only in a secondary sense, as
the actual or potential cause of further pain. Palliating the present symptoms of their
underlying physiological cause can be said not to solve “the problem.” But this isn’t
because the physiological condition itself is a problem apart from its relation to the
person’s desires and ends. Rather, the physiological condition must thwart, or have the
real potential to thwart, the person’s fulfillment of their desires. In such cases, the
problem (and it is the problem of pain—both present and future) can be solved most
effectively by addressing the underlying cause.344
There are many medical “problems” (or rather, abnormalities) that are not really
problems, because they are not problems for the persons who have them. An inguinal
hernia, for example, is a protrusion of intestinal matter beyond the intestinal wall (more
common in males because of the greater space left in the abdominal wall by the descent
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of the testes). The hernia can become a problem if the intestines themselves become
trapped outside the abdominal wall. But this is only because such a condition causes a
variety of unpleasant symptoms for the person with the hernia. Such complications are
uncommon however, and contemporary medical practice involves simply keeping an eye
on the hernia. Reparative procedures frequently have more painful side effects than the
hernia itself, which is in most cases painless.345
The point is this: with the exception of problem structures imposed by Darwinian
selection, which both Kitcher and FitzPatrick see as irrelevant to ethics, a problem is a
problem for someone. Non-biological functions serve needs and desires. Thus Kitcher’s
medical analogy is inappropriate. Outside of a context in which we can speak of group
selection, and thus of the biological function of in-group pro-social behavior, it is
illegitimate to simply take for granted a group-wide perspective. We can speak of
impaired shoulder function in an individual’s case, in a non-biological sense, only
relative to that individual’s desires and ends. To speak legitimately of non-biological
group function then, we must rely on the contingently overlapping desires and ends of the
individual members of that group. It is only to the extent that individuals in the group
care about the group’s functioning in a particular way, that is, according to their shared
desires for the group, that we may speak of that group’s function non-biologically. It is
only relative to the overlapping or shared ends of individuals that the group to which they
belong can be said to have a problem. In cases in which individuals in a group do not
have shared desires for the group, there are no grounds for talk of “the group’s”
problems.
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To sum up: functionalism is supposed to give Kitcher’s account of progress a
degree of objectivity, distinguishing it from merely subjective accounts. But if ethical
functions serve biological ends, then the account is not really one of ethical progress. If
ethical functions serve personal ends (e.g. desire fulfillment), then what we have instead
of “functional conflict” is just desiderative conflict—different people wanting different
things—and a notion of objective progress is still out of reach. Kitcher struggles to find a
different way of talking about function. But the metaphor that is supposed to get this new,
ethical functionalism off the ground is a hasty medical metaphor that imports an
unrecognized assumption of proper function, which is inappropriate outside of a
Darwinian framework, and applies it to human groups considered as a whole. I have
argued that there are no (non-biological) medical problems that are not problems for
someone (i.e. relative to that person’s desires or personal ends). In the social case then,
there is no room for talk about an ethical function that exists apart from the desires of the
individuals that make up the group.346
It may of course be the case that our ancestors were forced together to survive,
that their desires for social harmony therefore overlapped substantially, and that the most
effective solutions addressed the most common altruism failures in the group. What we
have here is just a historical fact (assuming it is a fact). But we are not bound by history.
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And our desires have manifestly evolved. Today, human desires, and therefore human
problems, differ. We can certainly speak of global altruism failures in some sense. But
we should not pretend that these altruism failures are equally a problem for everyone.
Because he thinks we can speak of problems apart from the contingently
overlapping desires or personal ends of individuals, Kitcher thinks functionalism can
provide a modest kind of objectivity for his notion of ethical progress. In fact, however,
he simply takes for granted a humanity-wide perspective, from which failures of altruism
count as a problem for the human group as a whole. But, because there are no nonbiological group functions apart from shared ends, this is simply to beg the question.
4. Defending Utopia

Dealing with Skeptics

I have argued that Kitcher’s ethical functionalism relies on two indefensible
assumptions: first, that the original function of ethics is still with us and relevant to us
today. I have given several reasons for thinking that it cannot have the relevance Kitcher
imagines. Second, that there are non-biological grounds for speaking of the problems
faced by a group as a whole. I have argued that this is only true when individuals in that
group have shared desires for the group. Insofar as human individuals and human
communities today do not share the same desires or the same visions for their
communities or for the global community, it is therefore inappropriate to speak of the
problems “we” all share. Our desires are different and therefore our problems are
different. For these reasons, I do not think Kitcher’s functionalism can be saved.
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I turn in what follows to Kitcher’s vision of the good and to his ethical method.
There are problems here too, but my assessment in this case is not completely negative. I
begin with Kitcher’s response to his skeptical detractors. This leads to the first of
Kitcher’s problems of power, as I shall call them. I identify a second in the following
section, before suggesting a rectification.
On Kitcher’s account, the ethical project liberated our ancestors from their tense
and uneasy social life. Thus, complete moral skepticism is not something that can be
seriously entertained.347 The alternative to an ethical (in some sense) form of life would
either be a return to the tense and unenviable condition of our ancestors, or a jump to
something completely new and unknown.348 “Although one may challenge parts of the
ethical practices we have inherited,” Kitcher says, “there is no escaping the ethical
project.”349
Three skeptical characters from the history of Western ethical thought are given a
hearing in the lead up to this conclusion. First up is Plato’s Thrasymachus.350 The claims
of justice, according to Thrasymachus, are merely impositions of the powerful upon the
weaker, designed to advance their interests. To this, Kitcher responds that many ethical
codes do in fact bear the marks of power—this is Thrasymachus’ insight. But
“Functional ethical practice,” he says, “is not a tool for asserting the will of the strong
and mighty, but rather grounded in attempts to take into account the desires of all
members of a society. The original function of remedying altruism failures acknowledges
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the wishes and aspirations of all.”351 Kitcher concludes that Thrasymachus is wrong to
reject the ethical project as a whole, but that he can be enlisted as an ally “and invited to
continue in the evolving project of ethics by responding to places at which it is
dysfunctional.”352
Next, Kitcher gives a hearing to Hume’s “sensible knave.”353 Knave is a free
rider. He does not want to convert others to his viewpoint, but is content to advance his
own interests by taking advantage of others where he can do so undetected. The
pragmatic naturalist, according to Kitcher, cannot silence Knave—there is no guaranteed
conversion in the offing. But the pragmatic naturalist can point out ways in which
Knave’s life has been made possible by the ethical project, and that Knave might
experience psychological discomfort as a result of his exploitation of others. That is, the
pragmatic naturalist can give a diagnosis of what Knave is doing, even if that diagnosis is
ineffective in conversation. Given that a complete silencing of Knave is unlikely, Kitcher
focuses on practical tactics: “Some real-life knavery results from inadequate education,”
he says, “some requires sterner measures.”354
Finally, Kitcher considers the Nietzschean free spirit.355 Free spirit, according to
Kitcher, isn’t trying to convince everyone that ethics is oppression (unlike
Thrasymachus). And unlike Knave, free spirit isn’t trying to advance only his solitary
ends. Rather, free spirit aims to convince his peers (whoever they might be) that they are
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oppressed. Depending on the target audience, there may be something to free spirit’s
claim, according to Kitcher. If so, he may be a moral reformer, advocating for more
“functional” norms, and attempting to produce functional refinement, or to undo earlier
distortions of the ethical project.356 In this case, he is someone we can have a
conversation with. If his critique aims at something else however, then we are left
wanting more. What, precisely, does free spirit have in mind? Kitcher says,
We do know something of social life outside the tradition of ethical practice, for a
life of this sort is the lot of our evolutionary cousins, the chimpanzees. Given the
psychological dispositions free spirit has acquired, this cannot be a serious
possibility for him. Can he offer another? . . . Until we are given some description
of an alternative—or until the Übermensch actually arrives—our choices are
confined to the human, the ethically guided, life and the social state of the
chimpanzees, a state transcended by our first human ancestors.357
So Kitcher’s strategy in dealing with skeptics is relatively simple. It involves
emphasizing the centrality of ethics to human life. If a skeptic’s critique is too general,
then we are owed an alternative to the ethically guided life that is not simply the tense
social state from which ethics liberated us. If a critique targets particular norms and
values, then there is a conversation to be had about whether these discharge the
recognized ethical functions properly, or about better ways to rank ethical functions.358
It is against this background, I think, that we can understand Kitcher’s claim of
coherence for his normative and methodological proposals. Kitcher’s point is not really,
as FitzPatrick claims, “a variant of a Kantian approach […] with an undefended
assumption of the normative force of coherence considerations.”359 The point is rather
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that supposed “alternatives” to pragmatic naturalism’s vision of the good and ethical
method aren’t really alternatives. Or as he puts it elsewhere, radical challenges to
pragmatic naturalism cannot “be developed as a coherent package, one that has a serious
claim to conversational attention.”360
This final way of putting it, I think, draws out both the strength and the limitations
of Kitcher’s ethical method. Kitcher’s judgment is that, in a global conversation
conducted under ideal epistemic and affective conditions, visions of the good that depart
substantially from Utopia, or something like it, cannot get off the ground. They fall afoul
of the stipulated criteria, falling either into falsehood or manifesting a premature closing
off of empathy. The point is reminiscent of one made in the previous chapter: a discursive
community of equals may well end up with something very much like the most
celebrated egalitarian and humanist ideals. But this means the same critical question
applies: what follows from this fact (assuming it is a fact) in a world of radical difference
and inequality?
Utopia, with its robust egalitarianism, represents a challenge to existing political
and economic structures. For this reason, it is unclear how it is supposed to gain any kind
of real social and political traction. When Kitcher mentions in passing the possibility that
a privileged few might insulate themselves from the problems of others, he says: “Even if
the comfortable few assume their security can be preserved in the long term, the thought
of an imaginary conversation, in which they must discuss respecifying the good, on equal
terms with the many who live in want, should concentrate their attention.”361 This I find
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completely implausible. Rather: the thought of an imaginary conversation is likely to be
utterly powerless.
Some among the privileged and comfortable might find such a thought troubling
in light of their self-image. Seeing themselves as generous and compassionate, they may
appease their conscience by donating to charity. Or, seeing themselves as deserving of
their good fortune, they may spin meritocratic myths.362 Others may simply laugh at such
an unusual thought. More fundamentally, however, the thought would first have to come
to them. The comfortably privileged and insulated would have to feel the pressure to
imagine the justifications they might give for their comfort and privilege. And if they are
truly comfortable, privileged, and insulated, I have a hard time seeing that pressure as
anything but fleeting, and easily set aside. Given the kind of conversation Kitcher finds
ideal—with its strict epistemic constraint (no rationalizations, no falsehoods) and its
expansive affective conditions (in which the desires of all are accommodated and
balanced)—the pressure faced by our hypothetical elite would have to be formidable
indeed. If the globally powerful are in fact (knowingly or unknowingly) versions of
Knave, who will bring them to account? Thus it appears that Kitcher’s ideal, however
appealing (to some of us at least), is relatively toothless—relatively powerless—given the
ideality of its justifying method.
Justifying Utopia to Whom?

The ideality of Kitcher’s method also has a sinister side. Call it Kitcher’s second
problem of power. There is a potentially pernicious inconsistency in Kitcher’s
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understanding of justification. For, on the one hand, Kitcher repeatedly rejects the notion
of ethical expertise, insisting that the only authority of ethics is that which emerges from
conversation.363 But, on the other hand, he also makes the conditions of his imagined
global conversation highly counterfactual. Thus there is a tension between his claim that
ethical codes are negotiated by human beings in conversation (that moral justification is
something we do amongst ourselves, as I would put it) and that Utopia is “justified” in
some sense by an ideal conversation from which most human beings on the planet are in
principle barred.
The problem emerges if we imagine the Utopian ideal actually gaining some form
of political traction. Kitcher’s imaginary conversation is secular, and so it is probably no
surprise that Kitcher’s Utopia is a secular Utopia (communing with God or achieving
enlightenment do not figure in his list of praiseworthy life goals). But of course, even
with the weakening of institutionalized religion in the West, some form of religious belief
and practice plays a central role in the lives of much of the global population. Notice the
resulting tension in what Kitcher says about religion.
Religion is central to the lives of many people, and, for them, to remove it from
the ethical forum can be felt as disenfranchisement. A mutually engaged
secularism should take seriously the psychological and social needs religion, and
religious community, satisfies, recognizing and responding to the desires and
aspirations out of which religious commitment grows. Especially for the world’s
poor, for whom basic material needs are not met and for whom it is difficult to
think in terms of a freely chosen structure for their lives, religion can provide both
consolation and framework. The conception of the good [Utopia] is intended to
recognize and respond to the predicaments of the poor, including the desires that
have made the world’s religions so attractive. This egalitarian conception is a
deeper embodiment of mutual engagement.364
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The paradox then, is this: Kitcher seeks “mutual engagement” to give normative force to
his vision of the good, but the desires of much of the world’s population are distorted, on
his account, by religious falsehoods. Thus “we” must work for a world in which the
needs and desires beneath these religious expressions are met. The mutual engagement
here is—it has to be—purely hypothetical. We (secular philosophers? the educated elite?)
imagine a conversation with counterfactual others (e.g. the world’s poor, “freed” from
religion and unmet basic needs), and this imagined conversation gives normative force to
a Utopian vision. If Utopia were to gain traction in the centers of power, we could
witness the paradox of an ideal, the theoretical legitimacy of which is explicitly wedded
to conversation, being implemented in the absence of such conversation.
However much we might like Utopia, there is something troubling with this
theoretical structure. Alison Jaggar’s remarks strike me as apt:
Any method of moral reasoning that requires moral agents to think from others’
perspectives is impossible in principle, because individuals’ perceptions, values,
and modes of reasoning, their understanding of their own and others’ needs and
interests, even their constructions of moral situations, vary both individually and
systematically according to their particular social experiences and locations.
Although such thought experiments may have rough-and-ready heuristic value,
they cannot enable anyone, not even a philosopher, to attain a universal moral
standpoint that entirely transcends the particularities of his or her socially located
perspective. Pretensions to think from all perspectives are no more than
disingenuous rhetorical devices that philosophers utilize to claim unwarranted
false authority for their own opinions.365
We might interpret Kitcher’s method as a set of guidelines by which secular, humanist
philosophers might guide our contributions to a global conversation about ethics. In that
case, there seems to be no problem. But the method seems intended to be more than
that—it seems intended as a justification of Utopia in general, for everyone (as if a moral
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ideal could be “justified” simpliciter). Kitcher claims moral force for Utopia on the basis
of needs and desires that are stipulated to underlie religious belief and practice among the
world’s vast, non-secular population. Thus, his account simultaneously (1) ties the moral
force of ethical codes to their production under conditions of mutual engagement, and (2)
excludes from the discourse all needs and desires that stem from religious practice. This
internal incoherence is politically dangerous. If, by the workings of Kitcher’s
imagination, Utopia is “justified,” then it can and probably should be implemented
without consulting the religiously deluded (for “we” know what they want better than
they do). The collaborative spirit of Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism is thereby lost, and, if
he happens to be wrong about what religious folk the world over “really” want, then his
Utopia might well be their Dystopia.
Power, Politics, and Bullying

Both problems of power—the problem of the powerlessness of the Utopian ideal
on the one hand, and the problem of its highly counterfactual (and therefore politically
pernicious) justifying conditions on the other—result from Kitcher’s Utopia-first,
method-later approach. One of the important lessons to be extracted from historical
evolutions in moral thought, on my view, including that arc I traced in chapter three, is
one of caution. We don’t know what others want or need until we see them, until we
speak with them, until we listen to them. And often this is difficult work. While we may
not be able to do without some working understanding of what most human beings want
from life, it is better to make this working picture a thin one.
With respect to method, an imagined conversation will not do. Kitcher’s
methodological proposal needs to be transformed into a normative proposal for
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humanists: let us make the global conversation happen, and let us work for the epistemic
and affective conditions that will expand our sympathies and our institutions.366
Technology, trade, and the risk of global ecological collapse may well have the effect of
forcing some conversation, as Kitcher notes. But that is not enough. These pressures may
only generate palliative measures from the globally privileged and powerful. A medical
analogy: if the underlying causes of certain unpleasant symptoms can simply be
managed, extensive surgery might be unnecessary. It is only if the underlying condition
causes sustained discomfort that the patient has the incentive to address its root cause.
The patient must be forced to attend to the symptoms of his pain. So too, globally, the
privileged and powerful are unlikely to alleviate the misery of the masses unless they are
made to feel their pain—unless the problems of the poor, the disenfranchised, and the
displaced somehow become their problems.367
In his historical overview, Kitcher clearly sees this point. “The evolution of
ethical practice,” he says, “can give rise to codes whose shortcomings and burdens are
felt by only a few. When that occurs, the first task of would-be reformers is to make the
problem apparent to all members of the society.” This can be done, he says, “through the
exerting of pressure from people whose voices have not previously been heard.”368 But
this insight into the political antecedents of moral dialogue on terms of rough equality
drops out in the discussion of ethical method. Let us revive the insight. Kitcher’s method,
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I propose, must be made normative. Humanist ideals must gain traction through political
agitation.
What does this mean concretely? Here we can draw some inspiration from
Kitcher himself. Whereas in The Ethical Project the method that justifies Utopia is an
imagined conversation,369 in Science in a Democratic Society, Kitcher argues that we
should “replicate, to the extent that we can, a conversation that proceeds through mutual
engagement with all the potentially affected parties.”370 There what he has in mind is the
democratic determination of scientific ends. Well-ordered science, he suggests, should
pursue democratically determined goals. Concretely, Kitcher recommends the
compilation of an “atlas of scientific significance” (to inform the public of areas in which
scientists feel, on the basis of their expertise, that more research is warranted), the
building of an “index of human needs” (to inform the public, and scientists, of basic
human needs and desires that are going unmet, perhaps somewhere out of sight), and
constant work on the part of both citizens and scientists to be scientifically literate and to
view “popularization” as part and parcel of their job descriptions, respectively.371
For our purposes, we can sidestep the bit about the reconciliation of scientific
expertise with democratic ideals and focus on this idea of an index of human needs. On
Kitcher’s account, the index “would be built up by systematically exploring human
problems as they are perceived by the people who encounter them.”372 Whether we take
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the idea of this index metaphorically or literally (perhaps on analogy with the impressive,
constantly evolving repository of human knowledge that is Wikipedia), the basic idea
seems to be that people’s needs and desires—as they themselves experience them—
should be publicly known and, as much as possible, accommodated. We (humanists)
should work for the accurate representation of people’s interests in the institutions that
shape their lives, in other words. That is what it means to say the ethical conversation
needs to actually happen. Very generally, this entails the transformation of our social,
political, and economic institutions, both locally and globally, in the direction of greater
democratic participation (or at least the possibility of such participation) and in the
direction of better representation.373
Richard Joyce, our sparring partner from chapter two, is skeptical that moral
institutions can be made transparent. If we acknowledge the human or “institutional”
nature of morality, he says, “The worry is that this makes morality out to be, at bottom, a
species of whining combined with bullying along with a touch of rhetorical
obscurantism.”374 I gave my reasons for rejecting Joyce’s version of skepticism in chapter
two. I bring up his concern here simply because, having claimed that humanist ideals
must be given political teeth, I have opened myself up to the charge of being a humanist
bully. It is as though I had confessed that humanism doesn’t have sufficient theoretical
appeal, and that therefore political means must be employed to further the cause. Only
those who have lost the moral argument have to resort to politics, the thinking might go. I
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offer three thoughts by way of rebuttal.
First, the objection assumes a roughly Platonic model of morality, where morality
“itself” is something objective, transcendent, and ideal. The messy social and political
workings of power can thus only be corrupting influences on morality. I rejected this
picture in chapter two. On a social view, morality is the fabric of our relationships, a
fundamental institution that gives its particular texture to our form of life. Insofar as our
social lives are already shot through with power, and insofar as moral practices
themselves are also practices of power (e.g. practices of accountability, of punishment, of
status allocation, etc.), there is nothing necessarily antithetical between social and
political action and the pursuit of moral ends.375
Second, the objection assumes an unrealistic model of moral motivation. We are
not consistently moved merely by even attractive moral ideals. We are motivationally
complex, and—as we saw in the previous chapter—some moral ideals are only adopted
or put into effect under certain kinds of social justificatory pressure. If, as is evidently the
case, moral progress has in the past been made in part through social and political action,
putting pressure on those in positions of power, it would be odd to forego social and
political action in the pursuit of further progress.
Third and finally, it is important to consider the direction and nature of the
pressure for which I am advocating. Humanists, as I am presently picturing them, are
those who bring whatever form of justificatory pressure they can to bear upon those in
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the centers of power—on those who directly or indirectly influence the social, political,
and economic structures of our societies—and who do so on behalf of the marginalized,
the ignored, and the forgotten. The direction of this pressure—from the margins to the
center—is crucial. A bully abuses power to exploit or harass the weak. But standing up to
a bully is not (usually) bullying. The humanist activism I am recommending is thus not a
matter of making demands on people to whom we are unrelated, nor is it a matter of
oppressing anyone. It is rather a response to pressure, a response to pressures already at
work in an existing relationship. In other words, the humanist demand for a justifying
account of that relationship is a form of counter-pressure.
Further, we can distinguish between mere counter-pressure (of which terrorist
tactics might be an example) and humanizing counter-pressure. Mere counter-pressure
meets pressure with pressure, force with force, and violence with violence. Such games
of power are merely games of power. If this is all social and political action could be,
then “morality” on a social view would only ever be bullying and counter-bullying. But
humanizing counter-pressure leans on the values of truthfulness and transparency to
demand an account, a justification, of a relationship, the nature of which is in question.
Often enough, these are values those in power at least claim to honor. It is difficult to
command the respect and trust of others if one is “out” as a liar and an obfuscator. I say a
bit more about this below.
By suggesting that Kitcher’s ethical method needs to be transformed into a
normative proposal for humanists, I am suggesting a humanizing form of counterpressure. Working for genuine dialogue, even when this work requires political
mobilization, agitation, consciousness-raising, and other forms of social action, paves the
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way for social illumination. It is not just an exercise of power. It is an exercise of power
that sheds light on existing power structures, mobilizing ideals of truthful communication
in the service of transparency. I see no meaningful way to call this bullying.
5. Moral Progress

Axes of Progress

My arguments in both this chapter and the previous chapter have been largely
negative. Singer thinks reason, understood in a particular way, can determine a
progressive trajectory for all human moralities. I’ve argued that his arguments fail.
Kitcher’s account is a bit subtler. And yet, by viewing the remedying of altruism failures
as the fountainhead of all ethical functioning, by proposing to make this “original
function” of ethics the master function, so to speak, Kitcher can be seen as looking for a
dominant and distinctly ethical trajectory in the evolution of moral thought and practice
as well. Ultimately however, his account simply begs the question from something like a
humanist standpoint.
I do not see much hope for these types of accounts of moral progress. This does
not mean, however, that progressive moral visions as such have no home in a naturalistic
picture of the world. Rather, I think moral philosophers can work to identify the many
ways in which our moralities (understood in light of the social view articulated in chapter
two) can be said to progress. The thought that must be set aside, I submit, is that there is a
distinctly ethical or moral axis of progress along which all progress in our moralities can
be charted. In other words, we must substitute the idea of progress in our moralities for
the idea of moral progress—progress along some distinctly moral axis. Human beings
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and human societies have various, sometimes divergent, sometimes overlapping, needs
and desires, and morality is the fabric of the relationships that are formed in the course of
navigating the related difficulties in a shared form of life under particular social
conditions and in particular material ecologies. I suspect then that there is no single end,
and probably no dominant end, served by any and all moral systems.
The plural ends of our moralities do not vacate talk of progress of all meaning,
however. As Jesse Prinz argues, there may be several values (not necessarily “moral”
values) embedded in our evaluative webs against which progress in our moralities can be
measured. Normative proposals might be progressive, according to Prinz, by making our
moral norms more consistent, more attuned to human well-being, easier to follow, less
susceptible to genealogical undermining, and so on.376 We can say that these represent
many axes of progress in our moralities.
It is against this background that I offer some tentative reflections, in closing, on
some of the ways in which humanists might argue for their picture of progress. Let me
stipulate that both Singer and Kitcher can be read as attempting to give a strong defense
of humanist ideals. A strong defense of such ideals sees them as woven, if not into the
fabric of reality, then at least into the fabric of practical reason (for Singer) or into the
history of ethical practice (for Kitcher). That is, you start outside of humanist
commitments and argue your way in, as it were. What follows is a weak defense of
humanist ideals. I begin within a humanist outlook and aim simply to make connections
with values that are perhaps more broadly shared. My aim is not to vindicate humanist
ideals once and for all, but rather to illustrate ways in which humanists might speak
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meaningfully of moral progress (understood as progress in our moralities) in ways that
resonate broadly. I point to two axes of progress: first, the wider fulfillment of endorsable
human desires; second, the achievement of sociomoral transparency, which dovetails
with liberal values of self-determination.
Progress and Human Desire

Ethical functionalism is Kitcher’s solution to the unsatisfactory nature of
subjective measures of ethical progress. But the subjectivism Kitcher is quick to reject in
fact holds more promise for talk of progress, I think, than he imagines (subject to the
qualifications above). A subjective foundation for talk of progress won’t give us the
“normatively authoritative, objective standard” that FitzPatrick, like Kitcher, is looking
for.377 But there is something that subjectivism gets right—namely, the need to connect
our understanding of moral progress to the needs and desires of individual human beings.
Here I want, first, to briefly outline Kitcher’s critique of subjectivist accounts of progress,
and second, to give a critique of Kitcher’s critique. I concede that we can’t start from
individual desires and get to expansive, humanistic ideals. But making the connection in
the opposite direction nevertheless gives humanists something significant to say.
The possibility of a subjectivist account of progress emerges, in Kitcher’s
development of pragmatic naturalism, just after the discussion of the emergence and
eventual abolition of chattel slavery. An intuitive (but ultimately mistaken, in Kitcher’s
view) understanding of progress in this context looks to the fact that, “When they
contemplate the world before the reintroduction of slavery and the world after slavery
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returned, [people today] prefer the earlier state to the later (in this respect, at least).”378
This gives us a criterion for progress grounded in such preferences: “a change in an
ethical code is progressive just in case those who live after the change prefer life in the
later world to life in the earlier one.”379
What is wrong with this account? The expressions of preference that are supposed
to ground the progressiveness of an ethical transition are too contingent, Kitcher thinks,
to do the work required of them. “Were the individuals who make these judgments to be
placed within a rival tradition,” Kitcher says, it is possible that they would “endorse
incompatible judgments of progressiveness.”380 Given the possibility of conflicting
judgments, ethical changes in contrary directions might equally count as “progressive.”
Clearly then, this would not be an ordinary conception of progress.381
The shortcomings of Kitcher’s critique can be seen clearly, I submit, by focusing
on whose preferences serve as the standard for the progressiveness of moral change. For
instance, Kitcher seems to suggest that people can just as easily prefer the transition into
slavery as they can the transition out of slavery. But this claim is completely implausible
if the people we have in mind are those who are to be enslaved. At the very least, we can
offer two confident judgments: the transition into slavery is regressive for those who are
enslaved, and the transition out of slavery is progressive for those who are enslaved. The
institutional constraints that sustained chattel slavery in the West would have been
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completely unnecessary if the enslaved had been fully reconciled to their enslavement. It
is fair to assume, therefore, that they were not. (And if the preferences of those not
directly affected by slavery are so malleable as to prefer either slavery or its absence, why
not ground a judgment of progressiveness in the much less flexible desires of those it
affects directly?)
Admittedly, Kitcher is right that a subjectivist account of progress cannot by itself
tell us whose preferences to privilege in case of a conflict. Third parties unaffected by
slavery might be indifferent or malleable in their preferences about slavery. I have argued
that the enslaved are not plausibly regarded as indifferent or malleable. From their point
of view, the transition away from slavery is unequivocally progressive. But I have not yet
mentioned the perspective of the slaveholder. If the slaveholder has a strong preference
for slavery, is this sufficient to call the transition away from slavery regressive? And if
so, then doesn’t subjectivism leave us with conflicting and irreconcilable preferences, and
thus no workable understanding of progress? Strictly speaking, yes. But that is not the
end of the story.
Humanism, as I understand it, is the type of moral view according to which all
human beings matter. Humanism counts as an expansive moral outlook insofar as it
refuses to place certain categories of human beings beyond the sphere of moral concern.
For my purposes here, what matters is just that humanism be understood as taking sides
in the aforementioned conflict of preference between slaveholders and the enslaved.
Humanism sides with the enslaved. In this conflict, humanism gives greater weight to
considerations of self-determination and freedom from intentionally administered
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suffering than to the economic considerations that presumably motivate a slaveholder to
prefer the system of chattel slavery to its economic alternatives.
If we begin with the subjective preferences of different human beings, we cannot
climb our way up to the humanist view. But if we start with the humanist view, we have a
workable story to tell about the subjective preferences of different human beings. First of
all, the desires of the enslaved are in Kitcher’s terminology endorsable. That is, it is in
principle possible (the humanist stipulates) to create a world in which all human beings
are free from such undeserved and unwanted coercion. The desires of slaveholders,
however, are contaminated. It is impossible to create a world in which all human beings
are slaveholders. For a humanist, this is reason enough to be wary of the slaveholder’s
preference.
Second, if the desires of slaveholders were as a matter of psychological fact both
deep and inflexible, the transition out of slavery could still be progressive, but it would
also be tragic, at least for the slaveholders. Humanists cannot by fiat rule out the
possibility that some conflicts of interest might be irreconcilable. In the case of chattel
slavery, however, it appears that the desires of slaveholders fulfilled by slavery were not
in fact all that deep or all that inflexible. Slavery as a fundamental institution, in the
terminology of chapter two, did not simply serve the basic needs of slaveholders, and it
certainly thwarted the basic needs of the enslaved. To judge by the basic-ness of the
needs served, the abolition of slavery was unequivocal progress. In cases of putative
conflict, then, humanism seeks a principled ranking of some desires as more basic than
others. In the case of slavery, this ranking is easy enough to make.
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Humanism, I am suggesting, commends itself because it takes into account the
desires of all human beings. To that end, it distinguishes between desires that are
endorsable and those that are contaminated, following Kitcher. And in cases of conflict, it
ranks desires by their relative depth and flexibility. Desires that are deep and inflexible it
is content to call needs.382 Again, the point is not to ground a humanist outlook in the
desires of individuals, but rather to illustrate ways in which humanists can connect their
moral outlook to the deep desires of everyone. On these grounds, humanism commends
itself to those who value the fulfillment of their basic needs and of the basic needs of
others.383 Humanists view the fulfillment of human desires, and in particular those desires
that are deep and endorsable, as an axis of progress.384
Truthfulness and Transparency

Truthfulness breeds trust, and trust sustains and nurtures life-giving human
relationships. Conversely, a lack of truthfulness destroys trust, and thereby destroys
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human relationships.385 Bernard Williams helpfully distinguishes between what he calls
the two virtues of truth: sincerity, on the one hand, and accuracy, on the other.386 We may
speak of a person’s sincerity when she has no intent to deceive. A person’s accuracy has
to do with his sense of reality. A conspiracy theorist, for example, can be sincere without
succeeding at being truthful if his epistemic standards are off. The truthfulness that
breeds trust combines both sincerity and accuracy. And chronic failures of either sincerity
or accuracy destroy trust.
Humanist political action aims to shed light on existing social relationships. By
pressuring the privileged and powerful to give an account of their relationship with the
marginalized, by airing that conversation, humanists aim to reveal possible breaches in
either sincerity or accuracy on the part of the privileged. When the rich and powerful are
revealed as liars and crooks, or when they are revealed as factually misinformed—in
ways pertinent to their relative standing in society, of course—these revelations are
deeply embarrassing and morally destabilizing. As I argued in chapter three, this
destabilization can, given the right sorts of political pressure, make possible a transition
to a more stable and more transparent social ordering—to a sociomoral order less likely
to embarrass its members in light of the truth about how it works.
I have already argued that humanist ethical method with teeth, the commitment to
make something approximating Kitcher’s global dialogue under ideal epistemic and
affective conditions actually happen, cannot be reduced to simple “bullying.” The
foregoing serves to deepen this point. Given the foundational role of truthfulness in
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almost every kind of human relationship, even the globally privileged and powerful are
likely to at least pay lip service, and even perhaps to genuinely and publicly endorse, the
value of truthfulness. Machiavelli’s infamous prince, though he lies, knows that he must
maintain the appearance of truthfulness.387 This means that humanists fight not only for
their vision of their good, but also and especially for truthfulness in human relationships.
In this regard, I believe, humanist ideals are likely to commend themselves very broadly.
In their efforts to create political counter-pressure from the margins of society, humanists
rely on values of truthfulness and transparency that are already acknowledged (even if
only duplicitously, in the worst cases) in the centers of power. Thus, humanists believe
that the truth will serve their cause—that, in an important sense, the truth is on their
side.388
Here then is another axis of progress, according to the humanist: there is progress
in our moralities when they become more transparent, when the understandings that
justify existing relationships, existing distributions of power and distributions of
responsibility and accountability, are truthful, both in the sense that those in the
relationship are sincere with one another about that relationship, and in the sense that no
falsehoods enter into the justification of the relationship.
Further, the value of truthfulness in this case intersects with Enlightenment ideals
of freedom and self-determination. As Williams puts it,
the interest of the disadvantaged lies in an aspiration to the most basic sense of
freedom, that of not being . . . in the unrecognized power of another, and the
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pursuit of truth in this area is concentrated into the aim of destroying
representations that have the effect of keeping people in such a situation.389
Insofar as we value self-determination and freedom from unrecognized authority, and
insofar as we value truthfulness in our relationships, both formal and informal, I judge
that humanist commitments are likely to have a deep resonance.
6. Conclusion

Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism attempts to provide a naturalistic account of ethics
that also includes an objective understanding of ethical progress. I have argued that the
functionalism by which Kitcher hopes to secure a measure of objectivity for his account
is untenable. His account of the “original function” of ethics is problematic, and his
account of the problem background to which socially embedded normative guidance is a
response imports an unrecognized assumption of the proper function of the group as a
whole. At key points then, Kitcher’s account of progress simply begs the question.
While Kitcher’s normative proposal also faces important problems—problems of
power—I have argued that a bit of tinkering can make things right. The heart of my
suggestion is to view Kitcher’s ethical method as a normative proposal of its own.
Humanists should take it upon themselves to make global dialogue happen, to put
justificatory pressure on the globally privileged and powerful. The claim that giving
moral ideals political teeth constitutes a debasement of those ideals is wrong-headed.
Morality, as the social phenomenon that it is, is already shot through with power. The
mere exercise of power does not disqualify a moral ideal. And I have suggested that
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humanist social action leans upon the independently recognized values of truthfulness
and transparency in human relationships.
Kitcher, like Singer, can be read as attempting to identify a distinctly moral axis
of progress. I have suggested that this goal is unattainable, and should be set aside. Moral
progress should be (re)conceived as progress in our moralities. The axes by which
progress can be measured may be various. I have suggested, in a very preliminary way,
two general axes of progress that might be emphasized (among others, no doubt) by
humanists. First, progress in the fulfillment of deep and endorsable human desires
plausibly counts as progress (giving us a fairly straightforward account of the
progressiveness of the transition out of slavery). Second, progress in the achievement of
sociomoral transparency plausibly counts as progress too—in resonance not only with the
value of truthfulness but also with those values of freedom and self-determination that are
part of our Enlightenment heritage.
Kitcher hesitates to render a final verdict on the question of global progress. It’s
not unequivocally clear, by his lights, that the very large transition from the (more or
less) egalitarian lifestyle of our hunter-gatherer ancestors to the lifestyle(s) of our more
stratified “civilizations” can be considered progressive. But “The lack of a concept of
global progress,” he says, “does not make a difference in the situations where a notion of
ethical progress is most needed.”390 We need the concept of progress, on Kitcher’s
account, to inform “our deliberations about what further modifications to make.”391 On
this point, I am in agreement: the desire for an account of moral progress is not first and
foremost the desire for a linear scale upon which to peg every moral transition in every
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human culture throughout history. Rather, it is first and foremost the desire for a sense of
possibility, an expression of the desire for progress here and now. By pointing to more
than one way in which we might speak of genuine improvements in our moralities, I hope
at least to have shown that this is not a vain hope, nor an empty desire.
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CONCLUSION

In chapter one, I asked my framing question: is the knowledge we get from the
sciences dangerous? Does it undermine our ability to take morality seriously, that is, does
it undermine moral living? The answer for which I have argued in this dissertation is: not
necessarily.
We can reconcile a scientific understanding of ourselves, which is to say, a
naturalistic and evolutionary understanding of ourselves, with moral living, I have
claimed, by adopting what I call a social view of morality. According to the social view,
which I developed in chapters two and three, morality is a social phenomenon. I have
argued that we can capture the pervasiveness of morality, both across the globe and
within our lives, by seeing morality as a fundamental institution—one that gives our
social form of life its structure. Moral authority, on this account, is just the inescapability
of that social form of life, the material inescapability of normative space for social
animals such as us. We give morality its authority by living under, promulgating, and
enforcing its norms.
Furthermore, I have shown that the social view is not crudely relativistic because
it allows for the possibility of critique. I captured this possibility in my account by
viewing moral justification as a social phenomenon—as something we do amongst
ourselves, as we interpret, extend, reinterpret, or reject inherited moral norms and ideals.
However, and by the same token, I have rejected the idea that moral norms or ideals can
be justified simpliciter. The resulting picture of morality is dynamic. Moralities co-evolve
in lockstep with our forms of life, on my account, as we struggle to find and define better
ways of getting along together, since, for the most part, we must.
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In this respect then, the social view provides a compatibilist account of the
relationship between moral living and naturalism. Moral life can, in principle, be lived
transparently, even if that transparency is an achievement that must be indefinitely
sustained, lest it be lost. But my account is also a critical compatibilist account. It does
not simply christen all extant moral norms (“moral” in the descriptive or anthropological
sense) as moral (in the normative sense).
Because it pictures moral norms and ideals as tools we use to get along together,
the social view naturally leads to questions about how well the tools are working, who
made the tools, and why, and so forth. Bringing an understanding of morality as a social
tool into the social processes that constitute moral justification, in other words, is
transformative. Once we come to see moral norms and ideals as products of fellow
human beings with whom we may or may not share a culture or a social location, we are
compelled to understand the social processes by which these norms and ideals have
become authoritative for us. As I suggested in chapter three, sometimes the ideals hold up
under scrutiny, but often, they do not. And in the critical space opened up by such
exercises in transparency, I have claimed, lies the possibility of a transition to more
transparent, more reflectively sustainable, and perhaps even more stable, sociomoral
structurings.
I have also tackled the question of moral progress. As I argued in chapters four
and five, the prospects for a strong defense of humanist commitments seem to me quite
dim. We cannot, it appears, work our way into humanist commitments from the outside,
so to speak.
But this does not mean expansive moral ideals are incompatible with a naturalistic
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understanding of morality. I have argued that we can substitute the idea of progress in our
moralities for the more traditional idea of moral progress, understood as progress along
some distinctly “moral” axis. The result is that we can speak of several axes of progress,
of various ways in which our moralities can be said to improve.
Against this background, I have offered some remarks that might count toward a
weak defense of humanist ideals. The humanist, I have claimed, has an intelligible story
to tell about the progressiveness of transitions such as the end of chattel slavery (related
to the importance of deep and endorsable human desires), and about the desirability of
sociomoral transparency, of truthfulness in our shared understandings. The humanist, in
other words, can speak meaningfully of progress in ways that are likely to resonate even
beyond humanist circles.
Thus, I hope to have shown that the examined life and the moral life (even when
it is understood to encompass expansive moral ideals) need not part ways. It may be that,
in particular social and political contexts, their reconciliation requires much work. But
there is no need to preemptively lose all hope.
I have developed my critical compatibilist account in response to the possibility
that scientific knowledge might be morally dangerous—dangerous, that is, to ordinary
moral living. But throughout, and especially in chapters three and five, I have suggested a
rather different way in which knowledge might be dangerous. I have suggested that the
privileged and powerful often maintain their power and privilege through distance,
opacity, and obfuscation. For those of us on the outskirts of society then, or for those of
us who stand (or try to stand) in solidarity with the marginalized, there is hope in the
truth. There is hope that shedding light on how inherited norms and ideals have actually
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been made, and on how inherited norms and ideals actually work, will destroy the air of
legitimacy that surrounds oppressive moral understandings. There is hope, in our counterpressure against those who would control us without looking us in the eyes, without
seeing us, or those we love, that the truth will be on our side. For those who occupy the
centers of power then, there may still be some forms of knowledge that are dangerous.
For those of us with humanist sympathies, that knowledge is ours to employ. I hope we
are up to the task (a task which is necessarily social and political) of making it truly
dangerous.
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